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Abstract 
 
The notion of a concept has been widely viewed to be fundamental to 
understanding the mind. However, some have recently questioned the explanatory 
role of this notion, asserting that we should eliminate it from our considered theory of 
the mind. In doing so, these critics are said to endorse a form of concept 
eliminativism. In this thesis, I challenge concept eliminativism and advance a defence 
of the theoretical relevance of the term ‘concept’. 
Firstly, I develop a new general taxonomy of eliminativist arguments and 
claims through examining a range of different eliminativist projects in different 
domains. Particularly relevant for this thesis, the proposed taxonomy allows for the 
characterisation of a type of eliminativism that appeals to the theoretical inadequacy 
of concepts that do not clearly designate a single class of things. 
Secondly, I challenge what is currently the most prominent eliminativist 
proposal regarding concepts, namely, Machery’s concept eliminativism. I begin by 
providing an overview of contemporary theories of concepts and their main problems. 
Then I go on to show that Machery’s eliminativist proposal fails because it inherits 
many of the same problems facing the theories of concepts that Machery criticizes. 
Moreover, I contend that Machery’s alternative to concepts is ill-equipped to solve the 
problem of intentional content. I conclude that these are good reasons to reject the 
claim that the benefits of eliminating the notion of a concept overweigh the cost of 
keeping it. 
Finally, I defend the theoretical term ‘concept’ by sketching an approach to 
natural kinds suitable for an immature science, such as the contemporary science of 
the mind. I examine several apparently incompatible attitudes towards natural kinds 
within philosophy of science and argue that this apparent incompatibility demands 
revision. I address this challenge and develop a positive view that vindicates the 
scientific relevance of the term ‘concept’. 
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Preface 
 
The topic of this thesis falls within the realm of the philosophical problems 
that emerge from contemporary cognitive science. More specifically, it critically 
examines scientific eliminativism regarding concepts, that is, the claim that the 
theoretical term ‘concept’ should be eliminated from scientific theorising about the 
mind. The aim of this work is to challenge what is currently the most prominent 
eliminativist proposal with respect to concepts and defend the theoretical relevance of 
the term ‘concept’. 
Cognitive science has traditionally been characterised as a constellation of 
disciplines occupied with answering questions about the nature and the workings of 
the mind. A common assumption underlying the answers provisionally given to these 
questions is that the mind is a causal-explanatory factor of intelligent behaviour. The 
present work is committed to this assumption and the classical understanding of the 
mind that derives from that interdisciplinary field. According to this understanding, 
the cognitive mind is best understood in terms of complex representational structures 
in virtue of which mental processes are computationally implemented. 
Indeed, the notion of representation is one of the basic constructs of cognitive 
science. Theories of concepts arising from this emerging field of empirical study have 
centred around the view that concepts are the key structural constituents of the 
complex mental representations involved in our cognitive processes. In this sense, an 
account of the nature of concepts is deemed a central challenge in practically any 
theory of cognition committed to the aforementioned classical understanding of the 
mind. 
For over half a century, research in concepts has been marked by debates 
about the representational nature of concepts and the cognitive functions they may 
help to explain. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have offered different theories 
of concepts and there is significant agreement about the explanatory strengths that 
each of these theories has with respect to a number of cognitive phenomena. 
However, none of these theories have proved satisfactory for providing an account of 
all the properties concepts are expected to have and the phenomena they are expected 
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to explain. Given this scenario of apparent stagnation as regards the development of a 
unified theoretical framework for the study of concepts, it would appear that, since 
there is so little agreement about what concepts are, the field is ripe for a radical 
reform. According to a proposed reform, cognitive scientists should renounce a 
unified theory of concepts and adopt an alternative that does not in any way appeal to 
‘concept’ as a relevant theoretical term that designates some putative psychological 
kind. In other words, the proposal is to eliminate the term ‘concept’ from the 
theoretical vocabulary of scientific psychology. In the present work, I take issue with 
this radical proposal and explore the possibility of a different option that vindicates 
the theoretical relevance of the term ‘concept’ without risking accusations of scientific 
stagnation. 
There are several motivations for exploring this latter option. First, the notion 
of concept is considerably useful. Even though there is not yet agreement as to which 
of the available theories of concepts (if any) should prevail, the notion of concept is 
directly connected with focal issues in a variety of disciplines such as, for example, 
linguistics (e.g., the meaning of words), developmental psychology (e.g., conceptual 
change in human development), cognitive psychology (e.g., categorisation and 
inference), and philosophy of science (e.g., accounts of natural kinds; cognitive views 
of scientific change). It is thus reasonable to think that it is good for scientists to keep 
theoretical terms which are so useful, even if we do not have a very precise 
understanding of what they might actually designate. Second, it is unclear whether we 
should apply the same standards for the elimination of theoretical terms to all 
sciences, without distinguishing between more and less immature scientific 
disciplines. If the elimination of natural-kind terms is committed to standards for the 
reality of a given putative natural kind that are too high, then we might find ourselves 
forced to give up many other terms, irrespective of how useful they are in promoting 
fruitful enquiry. At the same time, if we are to keep highly imprecise terms merely 
due to their pragmatic role in promoting further enquiry, then it will be better that we 
count on a clear idea as to the conditions those highly vague yet useful terms should 
meet in order to avoid elimination. 
A third motivation for attempting to vindicate the term ‘concept’ involves the 
productive interaction between theorists working in different areas of cognitive 
science, including philosophers with an interest in the scientific study of the mind. 
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Prima facie, it is not very difficult to note that different theorists working in concepts 
might not be talking about exactly the same thing when they discuss concepts. In 
particular, this consideration applies to a certain recurrent distinction between 
psychological and philosophical theories of concepts, where it is claimed that 
philosophers’ hypotheses about concepts are both controversial and irrelevant for 
psychologists’ actual empirical work on concepts. As I will intend to show in this 
dissertation, this is one of a number of assumptions that motivate a series of 
unproductive tensions between apparently incompatible attitudes and perspectives 
towards the study of concepts. It is then interesting to explore a possible re-
interpretation of this incompatibility and the conditions for a productive interaction 
between apparently inconsistent explanatory interests. 
My proposal to vindicate the theoretical relevance of the term ‘concept’ will 
ultimately consist in a re-interpretation of the interaction between two broadly 
construed attitudes towards natural kinds: one which is primarily methodologically-
motivated and one which is primarily metaphysically-motivated. If we are to come 
closer to an understanding of the productive role of the term ‘concept’ within the 
current study of mind, we need to cope with the fact that the lack of consensus among 
different theories of concepts is not enough reason for concept elimination. Highly 
immature sciences must indulge in certain latitude with respect to an account of 
natural-kind terms. If this is correct, the idea of accommodating highly different 
attitudes towards the putative natural class of concepts is a perfectly coherent option 
to explore. The current dissertation is an attempt to deal with this challenge. In what 
follows, I will first summarise the general topics of each of its six chapters and then I 
will briefly specify some basic theoretical commitments that this thesis will take for 
granted. 
Chapter 1 explores eliminativism from a broad perspective and provides a 
comparative picture of a variety of eliminativist projects in different domains. Here 
the aim to show that eliminativism is a label used for a family of related types of 
eliminativist arguments and claims. Accordingly, a general taxonomy of these 
arguments and claims will be provided. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of contemporary theories of concepts which 
serves as context for the eliminativist view to be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Without an account of these theories, it is difficult to arrive at an understanding of 
what it is that the concept eliminativist is objecting to. Hence, the main focus of this 
chapter will be on the problem of the nature of the concepts, that is, the answer that 
these theories provide to the questions of what concepts are. 
Concept eliminativism presupposes that there is some inadequate theoretical 
term that is ripe for elimination but, as I shall argue in Chapter 3, the prospects of 
such type of eliminativist projects hang on what it is that the eliminativist takes 
concepts to be. 
In Chapter 4, I go on to show that the alternative to concepts previously 
presented in the case examined in Chapter 3 is noticeably ill-equipped to solve one of 
the traditional problems theories of concepts have been expected to address, namely 
the problem of intentional content. I argue that this is good reason to support the claim 
that the costs resulting from the elimination of the notion of concept are outweighed 
by the benefits of keeping it. 
Chapters 5 and 6 advance a defence of the theoretical notion of concept by 
sketching an understanding of natural kinds suitable for the current state of 
development of the study of cognition. In chapter 5, I argue that the mere realisation 
that the notion of concept fails to clearly pick out a natural kind according to a given 
conception of natural kinds does not ipso facto entail concept eliminativism. An 
alternative approach to natural kinds in the domain of the mental is proposed. Chapter 
6 is a conclusion chapter, where I take stock and lay out my positive view regarding 
the scientific relevance of concepts. 
The present work will take a number of preliminary assumptions for granted. 
The first assumption involves the central place of the representational-computational 
model of the mind in a general theory of cognition. According to this model, the mind 
is both some kind of computational mechanism and a representational system. The 
assumption that the mind is a computational mechanism amounts to the view that the 
functional descriptions of mental processes are equivalent to computational processes. 
In turn, the assumption that the mind is a representational system amounts to the view 
that cognitive processes characterised as computations are realised over mental 
representations which are also the vehicles of intentional content (i.e. they are about 
events or things in the world). Thus characterized, the kind of intentional psychology 
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this work is committed to should be understood as a scientific attempt to vindicate our 
commonsensical explanation of human behaviour characteristically couched in terms 
of folk notions of intentional states such as beliefs and desires. 
A corollary of this first preliminary assumption is that, to the extent that 
qualitative or subjective states (e.g. those typically attributed to the domain of 
consciousness) are understood as falling outside the boundaries of the computational-
representational model of mind, the present work will not consider those states as 
relevant for the explanation of the behaviour of agents like us. 
The second preliminary assumption is a version of physicalism, understood as 
the view that mental processes and intentional mental states are part of the physical 
world. Our mental states have the property of being about something else and that 
“something else” is the world—or, if you want, aspects of the world, including other 
mental states. If the processes and intentional states that cognitive science postulates 
are real (i.e., if they are part of the natural order of things), then those mental 
processes must be realisable by physical mechanisms and those contentful mental 
states must ultimately involve the kind of physical entities that are the objects of study 
of some basic science such as physics. According to a common understanding of the 
relationship between mental states and those basic physical entities, mental states qua 
mental causes can be characterised in terms of a type-token distinction—to illustrate, 
when multifaceted musician Sting utters “message in a bottle” ten times in one of his 
songs, he has uttered ten tokens of the same phrase type. Thus, while mental states 
(e.g., my desire to finish this thesis in due time) can be viewed as abstract (i.e., non-
physical) types, they can also be viewed as tokens (e.g., a particular occurrence of my 
desire to finish this thesis in due time) involved in mental causation. Hence, since the 
tokens of mental-state types are genuine physical objects, the type-token distinction is 
compatible with a physicalist view of mental states and processes. 
The third preliminary assumption is scientific realism. According to this view, 
scientists are justified in holding a positive epistemic attitude towards the reality of 
the particulars studied by a given science. Scientists develop theories about these 
particulars on the assumption that, especially in the case of our best theories, the 
existence and nature of those putative particulars are independent of those theories. 
An effect of this claim is the view that the classificatory schemes of a complete 
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science are to map onto the structure of reality. Put differently, this strong view states 
that the aims of science are true descriptions of the world (e.g., according to a 
correspondence theory of truth). Even though it is controversial to claim that a given 
science is (or can be) a current good approximation to a future correct and completed 
science, it is possible to distinguish a sort of minimal agreement among realist 
philosophers of science regarding this positive epistemic attitude. According to this 
agreement, our best theories are aimed at yielding knowledge about the world whose 
existence is metaphysically independent of the mind of the knowing subject. In the 
current dissertation, I endorse this agreement. 
Finally, the fourth preliminary assumption underlying the present work is the 
idea that, whatever else cognitive science amounts to be, it is safe to deem it a highly 
immature science. What exactly constitutes an immature science is a question 
philosophers of science have been unable to answer successfully yet. Different 
proposals have been offered in an attempt to distinguish features and stages of 
scientific enquiry, especially in terms of some possible set of fundamental 
commitments (e.g., the idea of a body of prevailing theories rooted in the logical 
positivist tradition; the Kuhnean notion of paradigm; Larry Laudan’s notion of a 
research tradition, Barbara Von Eckardt’s notion of research framework, etc.) that a 
given scientific community might share. For the purposes of the current work, I will 
only presuppose a rather lax yet relatively uncontroversial characterisation of what 
may count as highly immature sciences. This characterisation can be outlined in terms 
of a number of general metascientific claims, such as, for example, the claims that: the 
theories within highly immature sciences are fruitful yet they tend to resist 
unification; it is untenable that the outputs of highly immature sciences (e.g., their 
theories, models, hypotheses, explanations, generalisations, etc.) are specified in the 
form of the finished products of scientific inquiry; highly immature sciences are in 
need of a sort of research framework capable of accommodating some minimum set 
of shared commitments (e.g., regarding the domain of enquiry and some basic 
empirical questions) held by a given scientific community, etc. 
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 Chapter 1 
———————————— 
On Eliminativism 
 
1. Introduction 
The topic of this chapter is eliminativism. Essentially, eliminativism is the 
claim that denies the existence of some type of thing in the world. The first thing you 
notice when you start researching into this topic is that there is extensive literature 
about eliminativism regarding mental states and our commonsensical understanding 
of the mind—just try putting the term in any search engine on the Internet. On the 
face of it, one might be led to believe that the scope of eliminativism is exhausted by 
the intricate (and sometimes fierce) debates about the mind that have been taking 
place among philosophers and cognitive scientists. It is obvious that, if you are not 
familiar with those debates, you will find it difficult to understand what it is that, in 
the first place, there has been so much fuss about eliminating. This chapter intends to 
take a step back and explore eliminativism from a broad perspective. 
As we will see, people can be eliminativists about different things, which may 
belong in a variety of domains. For example, eliminativists may reject the existence of 
supernatural beings (e.g., Santa Claus, deities, trolls, fairies, etc.), biological 
classifications (e.g., species, races, cells, etc.), and artefacts (e.g., chairs, doorknobs, 
etc.). However, this does not mean to say that people holding eliminativist claims 
regarding these different types of things are all eliminativists in the same way. 
Examining different eliminativist arguments, for instance, can show that there are 
different ways of denying that there are some X’s and, therefore, that there are 
different ways of being an eliminativist about X’s. 
One general consideration that motivates the present chapter is that, whereas 
eliminativist claims, in general, seem to be alike in that they involve rejecting some 
candidate for eliminativism, there is not just one type of argument for eliminativism 
that applies for all of them. Indeed, it can be the case that arguments in two different 
domains are the same, while it can also be the case that there are different arguments 
within a common domain. Showing that this is the case will be the topic of the next 
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three sections. The rest of the chapter is aimed at evaluating the possibility of 
systematizing what seems to amount to a family of related types of eliminativist 
arguments and claims. 
 
2. Examples of eliminativism 
Some examples of eliminativism in different domains can offer a first glance 
at the diverse character of the eliminativist arguments and claims that this chapter 
aims to examine. Let us then consider the following cases of supernatural beings, 
biological classifications and artefacts, respectively.1 
 
a) The case of demons: 
Belief in magic and the workings of supernatural beings is common to all 
human cultures and ascribing responsibility to demonic powers for causing certain 
health states and conditions (e.g., blindness, developmental abilities, or diseases such 
as epilepsy) is a common historical example of pre-theoretical explanations. Together 
with the expansion of our reliable knowledge about the workings of natural things in 
the world around us, demonic explanations have become increasingly unpopular. 
Most of us would be hardly willing to accept the involvement of magical or demonic 
causes in people’s health and diseases at the expense of natural causes as informed by 
current scientific enquiry. Thus, by denying the existence of demons to explain the 
exact causes of diseases, as well as any other natural events, many of us are now 
eliminativists about demons. Consider, for instance, the following remark made by 
Ramsey (2013) when commenting on eliminativism within the context of theory 
change. 
 
The notion of a demon is just too far removed from anything we now posit to explain 
behavior that was once explained by demonology. […] We dropped demons from our 
current ontology, and came to realize that the notion is empty—it refers to nothing 
real. (“Eliminative Materialism,” Section 2.2, para. 3) 
                                                          
1 For clarity of exposition, I will focus on some paradigmatic version of the eliminativist arguments 
involved in each of these cases. 
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Underlying eliminativism about demons is a principle that we may call causal 
exclusion. According to this principle, if instances of a particular type of phenomenon 
are found to have causes of a certain kind, then there will be no causal room left for 
certain other supposed causes. Someone may go on to claim that entities whose 
presumed existence is proved unnecessary for explaining natural phenomena are also 
ontologically suspect. For instance, given some demonic explanation that posits the 
existence of several supernatural entities in order to account for each of the currently 
known types of blindness due to infections (there are at least three), those 
hypothesised entities are candidates for eliminativism because we now can account 
for the different causes of visual impairment by natural causes (e.g., certain specific 
contagious microorganisms) without appealing to supernatural beings in ontological 
realms beyond the natural world (e.g., demons). 
Notice that eliminativism about demons by causal exclusion involves calling 
into question the existence of a putative type of entity (namely, demons) not only due 
to their explanatory irrelevance but also due to the way in which they are irrelevant. In 
other words, the claim is that because demons play no explanatory role, since they are 
causally unnecessary, we are justified in inferring that they do not actually exist. 
 
b) The case of chairs: 
We normally think of the world we inhabit as populated by familiar objects 
such as people, buildings, chairs, stars, etc. and it seems reasonable to believe that 
these familiar objects, together with their familiar properties (e.g., colour, texture, 
size, shape, etc.), are features of reality in their own right, in that they have their own 
existence out there in the external world. However, at least in the case of some of 
these objects, notably objects like buildings and chairs, our intuition above has been 
directly challenged. 
In theorising about the metaphysics of artefacts, for instance, van Inwagen 
(1990) argues that the putative objects we call, say, a house, a ship or a chair are not 
really objects that exist in their own right. More specifically, his thought is that what 
really exists is not what we call artefacts but only the basic particles they are made of. 
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So he does not deny that there is some physical stuff there where we claim an artefact 
is but, instead, he just thinks such stuff is not a thing in its own right. This view is 
compatible with saying that what we call a house, a ship, a chair, or the like, is only 
some subatomic particles arranged, say, housewise, shipwise or chairwise, etc. Hence, 
his conclusion that “There are, therefore, no tables and chairs, and there are no other 
artifacts” (p. 127).2 In a similar vein, Elder (2007) describes the case of a carpenter 
who shapes pieces of wood in order to compose a desk and asks us to consider the 
question “Is it just that certain pieces of wood or bundles of cellulose fibres have 
gotten arranged differently towards one another, or has some object different in kind 
from either the pieces or the bundles been created?” (p. 33). 
Both Elder’s question about the putative creation of a new object from the 
carpenter’s work and Inwagen’s explicit eliminativist conclusion about artefacts 
exemplify the problems regarding the ontological status of artefacts metaphysicians 
have been interested in. This problem can be characterized in terms of the following 
puzzle. On the one hand, contemporary metaphysicians have reasons to believe that 
artefacts are not part of a serious ontological inventory of the world. This claim does 
not amount to the assertion that there is nothing in the space where, say, a wooden 
chair is said to be, but, instead, that there are either just some pieces of wood or, even 
more strictly, that there is just some set of atoms in the void. On the other hand, there 
is a strong philosophical argument against the proposition that what we claim to be a 
given wooden chair and the pieces of wood it is made of are in a relation of identity 
with one another, in that, when confronted to a relatively standard chair (whatever that 
might be), one feels equally compelled to view it either as a chair (thus, without 
noticing what the chair is actually made of) or merely as some bundles of cellulose 
fibres (thus, without noticing that there is a chair there where the bundles are). 
Consider that the chair and the pieces of wood differ in several ways from one 
another. For example, just as in the case of Elder’s desk, the pieces of wood in 
question existed before the chair was made, and they may continue to exist even if, as 
it might happen, the putative object chair was destroyed. Thus, the question arises as 
to whether the metaphysician is right when she claims that there are no such objects as 
chairs. 
                                                          
2 For a related view, see Unger (1979) and for different views that challenge this conclusion, see, e.g., 
McGrath (2005), Baker (2007) and Elder (2007). 
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Let us focus on the argument that artefacts such as chairs do not exist on the 
grounds that what we call a chair does not amount to an object in its own right. As 
Elder (2007) suggests, a common way to unpack this argument is in terms of certain 
worries about composition, where the issue to be decided is under what conditions 
things can compose an object (e.g., van Inwagen 1990). So, for example, if someone 
claims that a proper object is the result of the combination between the carpenter’s 
intentional arrangement of some pieces of wood and the uses to which people put that 
physical arrangement, then the question arises as to whether or not those intentional 
actions and uses are the kind of things that can be said to really compose a new object. 
The argument can be summarised as follows: 
 
Premise 1: There are things that can compose an object and things that cannot  
Premise 2: Real composite objects are made of things that can compose 
Premise 3: Putative composite objects such as chairs are not made up of things that can 
compose 
Conclusion: Putative composite objects such as chairs are not real composite objects 
 
Consider that the eliminativist conclusion of this argument depends on when 
composition occurs, given the metaphysical assumption that composition occurs in 
some cases but not in others. So, eliminativism regarding chairs differs from 
eliminativism regarding demons in interesting ways. Firstly, rejecting chairs involves 
a putative case where the eliminativists deny that some physical stuff deserves to be 
taken as being a proper object, while rejecting demons involves a putative case where 
the eliminativists simply claim that there are no physical instances of a given type of 
objects. Secondly, whereas rejecting the existence of demons is primarily the result of 
an epistemological concern (namely, whether demons exist depends on whether they 
play a causal role in explanation), rejecting chairs is primarily the result of a 
metaphysical concern (namely, when it is that a given collection of things that really 
exist within the space where someone claims a chair is deserves to be taken as an 
object in its own right). Of course, the argument against chairs may also involve 
epistemological concerns connected with explanatory relevance, but only after it has 
been already established that chairs are not made up of things that can compose. 
Finally, the elimination of chairs, but not the elimination of demons, is constrained in 
a principled way, namely, in virtue of the metaphysical notion of composition and the 
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conditions for its occurrence. Note that chair eliminativists of this persuasion can be 
united by their commitment to the metaphysical presumption that the compositionality 
principle is the case even if they disagree about its conditions for occurrence. Hence, 
since the eliminativism regarding chairs can be said to be motivated by the violation 
of a presumed metaphysical principle, I will call it a case of elimination by strong 
metaphysical offence. 
 
c) The case of moral properties and facts: 
Many of us think there are beliefs such as, for example, the belief that the peak 
of Mount Everest is the furthest summit from the centre of the Earth, which can be 
true or false depending on how things are in the world. In other words, if it is actually 
the case that the peak of Mount Everest is the furthest summit from the centre of 
Earth, then the mentioned belief is true. Otherwise, the belief is false. The 
metaphysical subtext, in this case, is that there really are certain properties and facts 
about the world (e.g., planets, mountains, the fact that two objects are at a given 
relative distance from one another, etc.) that can make certain beliefs (e.g., the belief 
that Mount Everest is the furthest summit from the centre of the Earth) either true or 
false. Those of us who are committed to the existence of those types of properties and 
facts are realist about them. By contrast, those who reject the existence of those types 
of properties and facts are non-realist about them. 
Likewise, there are those who can be said to be realist and non-realist about 
moral properties and facts, that is, the putative kind of stuff in or about the world that 
is supposed to make moral beliefs true or false. Thus, if someone claims that moral 
beliefs such as, for example, the belief that all human beings are naturally good or the 
belief that implementing government surveillance is harmful are true in virtue of how 
the world is, then there is a presumption that they are committed to the existence of 
certain moral properties and facts such as, for example, the property of goodness that 
something may have or the fact that a certain act is morally wrong. It follows from 
this that those who claim that no moral properties or facts exist will also have to claim 
that either moral beliefs can be neither true or false in virtue of how the world is or, 
simply, that those beliefs are always false. 
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Well, some people claim that moral beliefs are always false because no moral 
properties or facts are really part of the natural world.3 For the purposes of the present 
section, suffice it to go over the main arguments for supporting Mackie’s thesis 
concerning the metaphysical status of morality. Mackie (1977) has advanced what 
may be called moral eliminativism or the claim that no moral facts or properties 
exist:4 
 
[…] what I have called moral scepticism is a negative doctrine, not a positive one: it 
says what there isn’t, not what there is. It says that there do not exist entities or 
relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements, which many people have 
believed to exist. (p. 17) 
 
This claim is specifically about the metaphysical status of moral properties 
and the like and it does not entail rejecting common sense moral prescriptions. Indeed, 
Mackie’s moral eliminativism is compatible with accepting the usefulness of certain 
objectivist moral language, including moral judgments with deontological form (e.g., 
“Governments ought to be ready to help refugees seeking safety”), so long as the 
explanation of the apparent objectivity and universalizability of the referents of such 
language does not appeal to the existence of moral properties and the like as part of 
the fabric of the world. The reason for this compatibility is that, while the 
universalizability of moral judgments could be validated by the existence of moral 
properties and facts, the converse does not hold. Hence, the validity (or invalidity) of 
arguments for or against moral judgments can be said to be independent from the 
validity (or invalidity) of arguments for or against moral reality. As Mackie (1977) 
puts it, “The assertion that there are objective values […], which ordinary moral 
judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless, but false” (p. 40). 
Mackie (1977) presents two main arguments against moral properties and 
facts, which take the form of two arguments for a species of Moral Error Theory—
roughly, moral error theorists accept that there are moral claims but deny that they are 
                                                          
3 For a defence of an opposing claim, see, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2003) and Scanlon (2014). 
4 In this chapter I use ‘moral eliminativism’ and ‘moral properties and facts’ in the same way Mackie 
(1977) uses the terms ‘moral scepticism’ and ‘moral values’, respectively. My choice of terms is 
merely motivated by consistency of exposition throughout this work. Since nothing hangs on which of 
this terminology is chosen in this section, you may very well take them to mean the same. 
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actually true in virtue of how the world is. Mackie calls these arguments the argument 
from relativity and the argument from queerness, a version of each of which can be 
summarised in the following way. 
In the case of the argument from relativity, it is first stated that, if there were 
objective values (i.e., if moral facts and properties were part of the fabric of the 
world), people would tend to agree about their moral views. However, the argument 
goes on, disagreement and variation in moral views is abundant across and within 
different societies, classes and periods. Moreover, it is then stated, abundant 
disagreement about moral views is better explained by people’s adherence to and 
participation in different ways of life, rather than by the existence of objective values. 
Therefore, as it is concluded, there are no objective moral values. 
The argument from queerness is made up of two components, one is 
metaphysical and the other is epistemological. Given that the epistemological 
component is dependent on the metaphysical component, I think it is a good idea to 
combine both parts into a single argument in order to make that dependence explicit. 
Thus, the eliminativist argument Mackie (1977) defends can be set out in the 
following way. Firstly, (Premise 1) morality is committed to very strange or bizarre 
moral properties which we could only track by some very special perceptual or 
discerning faculty. Hence, (Premise 2) if there were objective values, the world would 
have to be such that it contains very strange and bizarre entities or qualities which are 
“utterly different from anything else in the universe” (p. 38) and we would have to 
possess some very special perceptual or discerning faculty which is “utterly different 
from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (p. 38). But, (Premise 3) very 
queer qualities and perceptual faculties are not to be taken seriously. Therefore, there 
are no objective values. 
How does moral eliminativism compare with eliminativism regarding demons 
and chairs? Well, to begin with, whereas rejecting demons involves rejecting the 
existence of a putative type of objects, moral eliminativism involves rejecting the 
existence of both a putative type of objective properties attributed to proper objects as 
well as putative objective fact-like referents of moral judgments. In turn, while 
eliminativism regarding chairs is committed to a metaphysical principle, moral 
eliminativism as examined above is committed to the falsehood of objective moral 
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facts and properties, which rules out their metaphysical reality. Finally, moral 
eliminativism, but not demons eliminativism (and less clear in the case of 
eliminativism regarding chairs), 5  allows for an independent account of the 
objectification of common-sense belief in the corresponding candidate for 
eliminativism. That is, moral eliminativism allows for there being some kind of 
objective common-sense moral claims without there being objective moral facts or 
properties. 
The argument for moral eliminativism is a kind of argument which is 
primarily motivated by the presumption that putative objects whose metaphysics is 
too strange or confused do not really exist. For that reason, I will refer to these type 
arguments as eliminativist arguments by metaphysical vagueness. 
So far, I have briefly presented three different examples of eliminativism 
which provides us with a general idea of the kinds of issues that may be at stake when 
someone intends to argue for the claim that some type of things in the world do not 
really exist. In particular, examples (a), (b) and (c) show that eliminativist claims arise 
across a wide range of domains. They also show that there is clearly not just one 
argument at work for all different types of eliminativist claims. In some cases, for 
example, eliminativists reject the existence of something because it is redundant for 
explanatory purposes (e.g., demons) or because it is too far-fetched to be taken 
seriously (e.g., moral facts and properties). In other cases, they argue that a putative 
class of objects is a candidate for eliminativism on the grounds that the alleged 
members of that class do not deserve to be considered existing objects in their own 
right (e.g., chairs and the like). Let us now take a closer look at some arguments for 
eliminativism. 
 
3. Types of arguments for eliminativism 
In this section, I will focus on eliminativist arguments in different domains. 
No special attention will be paid to objections that may have been made to these 
                                                          
5 Someone might think that talk of chairs and moral properties are alike because they are confined to 
non-scientific domains such as folk talk of artefacts and common sense normative claims, but then 
again, artefacts are sometimes accepted as proper natural kinds (e.g., in the field of paleoanthropology) 
and, hence, as objects of scientific enquiry (see, e.g., Machery 2009, section 8.2.1). 
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arguments. The goal is to simply present and clearly illustrate a list of arguments that 
have actually been given for eliminativism. A discussion on how these arguments 
compare and contrast will help us advance a taxonomy of eliminativist arguments, 
which is to be the focus of the last section. 
 
3.1. Elimination of propositional attitudes 
A common intuition is that people’s behaviour is somehow determined by 
their inner mental states and processes. This intuition is reflected in our daily 
mentalistic discourse such as, for example, when I explain my daughter’s decision to 
postpone her planned picnic in the park due to bad weather by saying that she believes 
the rain would ruin the picnic and desires to have a good time with her friends. The 
explanatory and predictive powers of this common sense understanding of the way 
our minds affect our behaviour have motivated the idea that such understanding really 
embodies a true theory of our mental life. Roughly, a view like this claims that mental 
states such as beliefs and desires are real inner states with causal powers and that 
common sense psychology (also known as folk psychology) presupposes law-like 
generalizations of the following type: If someone desires that X and believes that the 
best way to get X is by doing Y, then (all else being equal) she will intend to do Y. 
Some cognitive scientists (e.g., Fodor 1987) think science will eventually 
vindicate common-sense psychology and the existence of mental phenomena as 
described above. Others think otherwise. Consider the following thesis defended by 
Churchland (1981): 
 
[…] our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a 
radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and 
the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly 
reduced, by completed neuroscience. (p. 67) 
 
In order to justify this radical claim, known as Eliminative Materialism, 
Churchland puts forward an argument that takes three main steps. In the first step, it is 
argued that common-sense psychology constitutes an empirical theory the central 
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posits of which are so-called propositional attitudes. As their name suggests, 
propositional attitudes are normally characterized as the combination of attitudes (e.g., 
believing, desiring, hoping, etc.) and propositions (e.g., “there is bad weather”). 
According to Churchland, the structure of common-sense psychology resembles that 
of some physical sciences, the difference being the domain of abstract entities over 
which they quantify. For instance, while law-like relations in mathematical physics 
exploit numbers, law-like generalizations in common-sense psychology exploit 
propositions. Recognizing the theoretical status of common-sense psychology, 
Churchland claims, allows for a plausible explanation of several issues, including, 
among others, the explanation and prediction of behaviour. He thus concludes that 
there are good reasons for theorists to take the theoretical status of common-sense 
psychology seriously. 
If common-sense psychology is really an empirical theory, then it is possible 
for this theory to be refuted and, hence, for its set of theoretical posits to be displaced. 
Accordingly, in a second step, Churchland argues that common-sense psychology is 
deeply mistaken on the grounds that it has a very limited explanatory scope (e.g., it 
provides no accounts of mental illness or learning processes involving infants and 
other animals); it is a stagnant theory—“The FP of the Greeks is essentially the FP we 
use today” (Churchland 1981, p. 74)—and it is just as unreliable as other unscientific 
theories (e.g., alchemy and cosmology); and it is incoherent with the rest of the 
sciences in that it is not reducible to any other physical science. In his words, “Any 
theory that meets this description must be allowed a serious candidate for outright 
elimination.” (p. 76). Thus, the third and final step of Churchland’s argument consists 
of the radical conclusion that, because a theory of propositional attitudes is deeply 
mistaken, we are justified in inferring that its central posits do not really exist. 
The eliminativist conclusion regarding propositional attitudes championed by 
Churchland can be made explicit in the following argument, adapted from Stich (1983 
and 1996): 
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Premise 1: Propositional attitudes are the posits of a common-sense psychological theory 
called “folk psychology” 
Premise 2: Folk psychology is a deeply mistaken theory of the human brain/mind 
because it epically fails to provide a reductive and coherent explanation of the 
workings of the human brain/mind 
Premise 3: The posits of deeply mistaken theories do not exist  
Conclusion: Propositional attitudes do not exist 
 
As the second premise of this argument suggests, what is at stake in 
Churchland’s argument against the tenability of common-sense psychology is whether 
or not there are reasons to think that this folk theory is likely to be vindicated 
scientifically.6 For present purposes, suffice it to say that, in order that common-sense 
psychology can be scientifically vindicated, it should be, firstly, a serious competing 
theory and, secondly, a scientifically fruitful and coherent theory. Thus, because the 
eliminativist conclusion of the argument hangs on a total failure to meet those 
requirements, arguments of this kind can be dubbed eliminativist arguments by total 
explanatory failure. 
Compared to the three types of eliminativist arguments I have illustrated in the 
previous section, elimination by total explanatory failure is closer to elimination by 
causal exclusion in that both of them invoke some explanatory drawback as a crucial 
argumentative step. For example, while propositional attitudes are said to fail to 
explain the causes of behaviour, demons are said to fail to explain the causes of 
certain diseases. These two types of eliminativist arguments are also similar to one 
another in that they involve candidates for elimination that are said to be part an 
explanation of a given phenomenon, though perhaps an explanation no longer 
regarded as correct by current scientific theory. However, eliminativism regarding 
propositional attitudes and eliminativism regarding demons differ in an interesting 
respect, namely, in the way they failed to be scientifically relevant. While rejecting 
demons is a case where the replacing type of entities (e.g., micro-organisms) is 
supposed to explain the same type of phenomena (e.g., blindness due to infections) 
formerly attributed to the replaced type of entities (e.g., demons), rejecting 
propositional attitudes is a case where such kind of replacement is out of the question, 
given that common-sense psychology is said to have gone utterly wrong. 
                                                          
6 Indeed, it can be said that, regarding the prospects of scientific vindication of Folk Psychology, the 
jury is still out. For various defences of Folk Psychology, see, e.g., Horgan and Woodward (1985), 
Kitcher (1984), Fodor (1987) and Lahav (1992).  
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Put differently, it would appear that because in both cases there do seem to be 
phenomena that are in need of some explanation, viz., why people act as they do, and 
why people fall sick, one should feel inclined to conclude that there is no significant 
difference between eliminativism about propositional attitudes and eliminativism 
about demons. However, when taking a closer look at the way in which demons and 
propositional attitudes are said to fail to be the central posits of explanatory theories, 
it is clear that (from the eliminativist’s perspective) only propositional attitudes and 
their causal relation to our behaviour can be accepted as the posits of a certain 
legitimate scientific contender. The reason for this is that psychological explanation in 
terms of propositional attitudes is meant to provide an empirical and naturalistic 
account of the causes of behaviour, and so what the eliminativist thinks is that there 
must be some more adequate explanation of the causes of behaviour, even though 
what it is is not yet known to science. By contrast, for the eliminativist regarding 
demons, even though there is room in scientific theorising for episodes that are taken 
to be instances of demonic possession, there is no room for instances of demonic 
possession in scientific theorising about the causes of certain illnesses, since demons 
are not meant to be legitimate objects of scientific study.7 In this sense, while there 
could be said to be no reason to posit psychological explanations that appeal to 
propositional attitudes (e.g., because there might be better empirical alternative), there 
would seem to be every reason not to posit explanations in terms of demonic 
possession. 
 
3.2. Elimination of races 
Both scholars and ordinary people have customarily appealed to a putative 
biologically-grounded notion of races to distinguish alleged natural divisions and 
subdivisions among human beings (e.g., Caucasian, African, Asian, Spaniard, 
Amerindian, etc.). Thus, one recurrent assumption behind this practice is that these 
divisions are biologically real, in that they would have biological foundations which 
are made manifest in physical and behavioural features such as skin colour, eye shape, 
                                                          
7 Of course, someone might claim that there can be realists regarding both propositional attitudes and 
demons, but, then again, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate objects of study remains 
since only the realist about propositional attitudes is committed to the kind of realism that is 
scientifically relevant (i.e., one which is aimed at reflecting the casual structure of the world without 
appealing to supernatural beliefs). 
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health status, intelligence, etc. Despite this persistent tendency to categorize human 
beings into different races on those foundations, eliminativism is a widely held view 
about biological races nowadays.8 
The question that biological race eliminativists answer negatively is whether 
there are races, given their informed judgment that there are no biological grounds for 
distinguishing human beings into distinct and discrete categories of the sort. These 
grounds have been normally understood in terms of some type of essences, such as, 
for example, certain genetic properties, given the belief that these essences would 
determine certain visible physical traits. However, as the current scientific consensus 
in this respect suggests, there is no evidence to support the view that there is a 
significant correlation between people who share phenotypic features and any 
particular biological conception of essences. Indeed, genetic change does not always 
result in physically visible characteristics and (contrary to popular belief) even the 
most visible physical traits fail to work as a criterion to distinguish putative racial 
groups. For example, Zack (2002) has objected to the idea that the skin colour can be 
used to distinguish racial groups on the grounds that, because people’s skin tones vary 
gradually rather than discretely, it is not possible to say that people with certain skin 
tone (e.g., white) always differ from people with a different skin tone (e.g., black) in 
the same way. Moreover, people who are classified into different races can sometimes 
be judged to differ from one another less than some people who are supposed to be of 
the same race. Similarly, given the consideration that biological species are sometimes 
distinguished by reproductive isolation, it might seem plausible that the concept of 
race should apply to relatively isolated breeding groups such as, for instance, the 
Amish in America or Irish Protestants. However, as it has been noted elsewhere (e.g., 
Mallon 2006), the concept of race is typically used to distinguish groups of people 
that do not conform to the criterion of breeding isolation such as, for example, those 
characterised as Caucasian, African, Asian, Spaniard, Amerindian, etc. Thus, as the 
argument goes, because there is no notion of essences that can be said to biologically 
ground divisions of human beings in terms of visible physical traits, then there are no 
grounds for the existence of the scientific category of race. If scientific realism is 
embraced, such as in the case of Zack (2002), then being an eliminativist about the 
                                                          
8 For arguments defending the existence of races on different grounds, see, e.g., Gooding-Williams 
(1998), Andreasen (2004) and Sesardic (2010).   
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scientific category of race amounts to a metaphysical claim regarding the putative 
category of race, just as with displaced pre-scientific notions such as phlogiston, 
humors, etc. Indeed, as Zack puts it: 
 
The case for the scientific nonexistence of biological race is straightforward and 
consistent with (accepted) scientific cases for the nonexistence of many other things. 
(p. 7) 
 
At this point, we may already begin to consider how the case of eliminativism 
regarding races compares and contrasts with the other cases of eliminativism that we 
have already discussed. For example, when discussing the elimination of demons by 
causal exclusion, it was taken as a matter of fact that there is nothing in the world that 
counts as an instance of the type of things that demons are supposed to be. By 
contrast, rejecting races does not deny that the entities (viz., people) that are labelled 
“white person” or “black person” exist. Instead, the claim is that our commonsensical 
way of thinking about races does not correspond to a real category on the grounds that 
it does not amount to a scientifically grounded category. In other words, while the one 
claim is that nothing is actually an instance of a putative given kind (viz., the category 
of demons), the other claim is something like, given certain superficial differences 
among people, whatever they might be an instance of, they are not an instance of a 
given putative kind (viz., the category of races). Thus, resorting to the standard 
conception of a type/token distinction, to say that there are no demons by causal 
exclusion means that it is irrelevant to assume that there are tokens of some type of 
things. Conversely, to say that there are no scientifically grounded races means that it 
is unwarranted to assume that there is a certain type of things in itself. 
Note that this latter claim also applies when contrasting two different 
arguments. For instance, it would appear that the argument against races resonates 
with the argument against chairs in that both of them involve the conclusion that 
something we think is real is really something that should not be taken to be real in its 
own right. However, this is not the case, since in the argument against races, not in the 
argument against chairs, the conclusion accepts the type/token characterisation above. 
More specifically, what a chair eliminativist denies is that there are certain objects 
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(viz., chairs) that are instances (or tokens) of a certain type of things which is 
completely different from the type of things that the subatomic particles that make the 
objects are instances of. 
Is the argument against races an eliminativist argument by total explanatory 
failure just as the argument against propositional attitudes is? In some important 
respects, the answer to this question is yes. Consider that, if races are to be rejected 
from scientific taxonomy, it is, presumably, because this putative category fails to be 
relevant for supporting many scientific inductions. As Zack (2002) points out, the 
traditional assumption that ‘race’ is a biological taxonomy typically means: 
 
[…] a set of physical categories that can be used consistently and informatively to 
describe, explain, and make predictions about groups of human beings and individual 
members of those groups.” (p. 1)   
 
So, the elimination of races could also be conceived of as a case where the 
existence of a given type of things is denied on the basis of explanatory failure. 
However, as in the case of moral eliminativism regarding the need to develop some 
theory of common sense morality without appealing to the existence of objective 
moral values, race eliminativists do not need to reject what we may call talk of races. 
Recall that in Zack’s argument, just as in the case of Mackie’s argument, the 
eliminativist conclusion is negative in the sense that it is about what there is not, not 
what there is. So, there is still room for what both authors present as some alternative 
understanding of race and moral talk, respectively. Put differently, what each of them 
proposes is an account about certain types of things that we know are false but about 
which it is somehow good to keep talking (e.g. race talk might still be useful to 
discuss, characterise and resist certain forms of discrimination and attitudes towards 
specific social groups and communities which we could not otherwise effectively 
identify). 
The notion of talk of x I have just introduced deserves further clarification. 
Eliminativists about a given type of things typically go on to make a further claim 
which, even though they also label as ‘eliminativism’, is not a metaphysical claim at 
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all. To make this point palpable, let us first consider the distinction Mallon (2006) 
makes between normative eliminativism and metaphysical eliminativism. As he 
points out, what eliminativists normally argue from their conclusion that there are no 
races is that the concept of race should be avoided: 
 
Typically there is a close association between metaphysical positions on race and 
normative positions on ‘race’ talk. Racial sceptics typically hold that the nonexistence 
of race supports ‘race’ talk eliminativism. Since race does not exist, it would be false 
and misleading to continue to use ‘race’ talk as if it does. (p. 526; emphasis in 
original)9 
 
However, as we will see, it is perfectly possible that metaphysical 
eliminativism regarding X does not support normative eliminativism regarding our 
talk of X. For example, Mackie (1977) thinks that, because there are no moral 
properties or facts (or objective moral values in his terminology), morality is not to be 
understood as the result of discovery, but as something that is to be made. Roughly, 
the idea is that issues regarding, say, what moral views to adhere to are to be the result 
of a decision-making process that yields certain principles of conduct for guiding or 
controlling people’s choices of action. In this sense, even though Mackie denies there 
are objective moral properties, he is, at the same time, committed to the use of moral 
talk (i.e., the use of moral terms or concepts) that can play a role in evaluating human 
conduct. Likewise, Mallon’s distinction between metaphysical positions on race and 
normative positions on ‘race’ talk in the quote above allows us to better understand 
cases where eliminativists regarding the existence of races can be, at the same time, 
advocates of race talk. Indeed, the race eliminativism put forward by Zack (2002) 
exemplifies such a case in that, even though she claims that races of any type do not 
exist, she also defends a different view of races (viz., a form of racial constructivism) 
according to which racial categories  are socio-culturally constructed. In such a view, 
whereas the term ‘race’ is scientifically otiose, it can very well play a meaningful role 
in promoting, for example, race-based affirmative action aimed at favouring the well-
being of members of certain disadvantaged groups. 
                                                          
9 Mallon uses the term ‘racial scepticism’ for the metaphysical view that races do not exist at all. 
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The distinction between metaphysical and normative eliminativist positions I 
have just introduced will be useful at the moment of drawing some general 
conclusions about eliminativist arguments, so I will come back to it in the following 
sections of this chapter. For now, suffice it to conclude our characterisation of the 
argument against the existence of biologically-grounded races by noting what I take to 
be one of its most salient features, namely its weak defence of the elimination of 
racial terms from scientific taxonomy. As I have said before, this argument is about 
what there is not, in that it denies that there are races in the world, arguing for the 
scientific elimination of racial terms without defending a scientific alternative. The 
argument also states, as a central reason for its eliminativist conclusion, that there are 
no plausible biological grounds for racial groupings, grounds which have been 
characterised in certain specific ways. However, it is still possible for someone to 
argue, for example, that there can be natural racial groupings which do not appeal to 
those particular foundations, but, instead, to other foundations that may or may not be 
biological. Likewise, it is possible to argue that, just as it is useful for us to retain 
racial talk for social or political reasons, scientists may very well retain racial 
taxonomy even if they doubt that there are biologically-grounded racial groupings, so 
long as race talk can help discover generalizations about, say, human behaviour or the 
like. Thus, since arguments of this type are essentially meant to support a negative 
conclusion, I will dub them eliminativist arguments by weak metaphysical offence. 
 
3.3. The argument against the innate 
Within the context of philosophical psychology, the questions of what 
innateness is and what it means to say that a given trait is innate are typically said to 
have no clear answers. Cowie (2009)10 characterises at least 16 different ways in 
which the concept of innateness has been understood, which, in her opinion, reflect 
the state of disarray the folk notion of innateness is in. Since there is no common way 
in which all these different understandings of the notion of innateness can be 
analysed, it is not surprising that some people have felt tempted to question its 
explanatory usefulness and advocate its ostracism from scientific theorising (e.g., 
                                                          
10 Unless otherwise indicated, all reference to Cowie’s work in this section corresponds to Cowie 
(2009). 
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Griffiths, 2002). Cowie offers an instructive discussion on whether there is a plausible 
case for the eliminativist option with respect to the innate. She dubs this option as the 
case for ElimiNativism. Importantly for the purposes of this section, Cowie’s 
discussion provides us with a general taxonomy of different types of eliminativist 
views regarding the innate.11 
According to Cowie, arguments supporting elimiNativism can be initially 
distinguished in terms of two different kinds of eliminativist projects which she calls 
ontological and linguistic (or conceptual),12 respectively. The question the ontological 
elimiNativist attempts to answer is whether a given trait in the world is innate. The 
question the linguistic elimiNativist attempts to answer is whether or not the term 
‘innate’ plays a useful explanatory role in philosophical or scientific theorizing about 
cognition. 
While being distinct from one another, these two projects are also related. 
Thus, just as there can be reasons to think that theorists should stop using a given 
theoretical term on the grounds that the putative type of objects that the term purports 
to refer to does not really exist, there can be reasons to continue with its use. Cowie 
mentions the case of ‘centres of gravity’ in different contexts and that of ‘electron’ as 
referring to pure particles in chemistry, but we have also discussed the similar case of 
‘race’ and its normative relevance. Alternatively, theorists sometimes conclude that 
some putative type of objects does not really exist from the realisation that the terms 
used to refer to them (e.g., ‘ether’, ‘soul’, etc.) are not fit for a serious explanatory 
theory. However, there are terms which, even though theorists would deem them not 
fit for philosophical or scientific theorising, refer to certain types of things whose 
existence would not be easy to deny. Cowie mentions terms such as ‘sock’, 
‘Hummer’, ‘dirty joke’ and ‘herb’, but we have also discussed the similar case of 
‘chair’ and other artefacts. 
Together with the previous distinction, Cowie also distinguishes between three 
kinds of eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments she invokes to evaluate 
                                                          
11  Even though Cowie (2009) is specifically interested in assessing Stich’s position regarding 
elimiNativism, I will mainly focus on her proposed general taxonomy of eliminativist arguments with 
respect to the innate. 
12 With respect to elimiNativism, Cowie (2009) makes no distinctions of usage between ‘terms’ and 
‘concepts’. Since nothing in this section is meant to hang on this distinction, I will use these terms 
interchangeably too. 
26 
 
their possible application regarding the innate. She calls them ‘Aren’t Any’ 
eliminativism, ‘Doesn’t Work’ eliminativism and ‘It’s a Mess’ eliminativism, 
respectively. Let us have a look at each of them in turn. 
Aren’t Any eliminativist arguments are said to be aimed at the ontological 
eliminativist project and their eliminativist conclusions normally derive from the 
realisation that nothing in the world satisfies the analysis of a given concept. Cowie 
thinks Stich (1983) provides a suitable example of this first type of arguments, since 
Stich’s argument for the view that the folk psychological concept of ‘belief’ will not 
be part of a mature science of cognition derives from the realisation that nothing 
really satisfies the analysis of such concept. Cowie’s reconstruction of Stich’s 
argument against ‘belief’ can be set out in three main premises and an eliminativist 
conclusion. The first premise states that a scientific taxonomy of mental states does 
not admit states that are individuated in terms of content. The second premise states 
that scientific taxonomy of mental states is inconsistent with the folk psychological 
concept of belief because this concept is essentially individuated in terms of its 
content. The third premise states that folk psychological concepts that are inconsistent 
with a scientific taxonomy of mental states must be eliminated. Accordingly, the 
conclusion of the argument is that the folk psychological concept of belief must be 
eliminated. 
One way in which this argument could work in the case of innateness, as 
Cowie notes, is by establishing that there is something that can be said to be essential 
to the concept ‘innate’. Thus, if this was the case, an elimiNativist could attempt to 
defend the conclusion of Aren’t Any eliminativist arguments of the following form: 
 
Premise 1: A scientific taxonomy of psychological traits T does not admit concepts that 
are individuated in terms K 
Premise 2: A scientific taxonomy of psychological traits T is inconsistent with the folk 
concept of innateness because this concept is essentially individuated in terms 
of K 
Premise 3: Folk concepts that are inconsistent with T must be eliminated 
Conclusion: The folk concept of innateness must be eliminated 
 
Doesn’t Work eliminativist arguments are said to be primarily aimed at the 
linguistic eliminativist project and their eliminativist conclusions derive from the 
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realisation that the concept under analysis is part of what Cowie calls a bankrupt 
theory (i.e., a totally inadequate or scientifically useless explanatory theory). This 
form of argument is exemplified in the argument against propositional attitudes of 
folk psychology defended by Churchland (1981). I discussed this argument at the 
beginning of this section as an example of Total Explanatory Failure eliminativism, so 
I will not reproduce it here. Instead, I will present the form such type of argument 
could take if it was to apply for in the case of elimiNativism. 
First, the elimiNativist would need to argue that the theory of innateness on 
which the nativist’s research program is based can be taken to be an empirical theory. 
Then, she would have to provide evidence that such a theory is part of a degenerating 
research program which simply cannot be scientifically vindicated. The final step 
would have to argue from such scientific failure to the conclusion that the folk 
concept of innateness should be abandoned. The general argument can be set out as 
follows: 
 
Premise 1: The concept of ‘innate’ is part of an empirical research program 
Premise 2: The research program the concept of innate is part of is a totally degenerate 
and inadequate scientific program 
Premise 3: The concepts of totally degenerate and inadequate scientific programs should 
be eliminated 
Conclusion: The concept ‘innate’ should be eliminated 
 
Finally, It’s a Mess eliminativist arguments are said to be primarily aimed at 
the linguistic eliminativist project, but they can sometimes be taken to support the 
ontological eliminativist project too. Their eliminativist conclusions derive from the 
realisation that a given concept simply has no determinate analysis on the grounds 
that it is too vague or confused for useful explanatory purposes. Cowie illustrates this 
type of argument along the lines of proposals developed by Griffiths (e.g., 2002), 
Bateson (e.g., 1991) and Mameli and Bateson (2005). The general form of an It’s a 
Mess elimiNativist argument can be basically set out as follows: 
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Premise 1: ‘Innate’ is a (hopelessly) mudded and vague term that resists analysis 
Premise 2: (Hopelessly) mudded and vague terms that resist analysis should be 
eliminated from philosophical and scientific theorising 
Conclusion: The term ‘innate’ should be eliminated from philosophical and scientific 
theorising 
 
Just as in the case of Total Explanatory Failure eliminativism regarding 
propositional attitudes, It’s a Mess linguistic elimiNativism can flirt with It’s a Mess 
ontological elimiNativism, but, again, the linguistic eliminativist conclusion of the 
one does not directly entail the ontological conclusion of the other. Thus, the 
challenge for the It’s a Mess linguistic elimiNativist is to provide some additional 
premises to the previous argument such that it can be possible to derive the claim that 
nothing in the world is innate from the claim that ‘innate’ is unsuitable for scientific 
purposes. Cowie points out an interesting issue arising from this latter alternative, 
given that sometimes concepts that are deemed intractably vague and too messy to be 
taken seriously can, at the same time, play a productive role in a science of the mind. 
Hence, in her view, this third type of arguments for ElimiNativism, not the others, is 
the most interesting option. I endorse Cowie’s view with respect to the scientific 
relevance of many vague and imprecise theoretical terms 13  and, for my own 
classificatory purposes, I will characterise eliminativist arguments appealing to the 
theoretical vagueness of certain scientific concepts (e.g., memory, gene, centre of 
gravity, etc.) as eliminativist arguments by explanatory vagueness.  
 
4. Types of eliminativist claims 
I am now in a position to present a classification of the several types of 
eliminativist claims I have illustrated and discussed throughout the present chapter. I 
will do so in a way that benefits from the distinction Cowie (2009) advances between 
ontological and linguistic eliminativist projects. Roughly, the first project asks 
whether some type of objects exists or whether a given property is instantiated in the 
world and the second is aimed at deciding whether a given theoretical term should be 
used or abandoned for scientific theorizing. Since eliminativists are not always 
explicit about the precise scope of their claims regarding the previous distinction, it 
                                                          
13 The motivations for this endorsement are central to the present thesis and will be elaborated later on 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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will be useful to set out our classification in such a way that it allows us to distinguish 
cases in which the eliminativist claims are noncommittal to either the ontological or 
linguistic projects. Accordingly, a general classification of eliminativist claims can be 
made in terms of the following three categories: 
 
A. Claims which are committed to both ontological and linguistic elimination 
B. Claims which are strictly committed to either ontological or linguistic elimination 
C. Claims which are permissively committed to either ontological or linguistic 
elimination 
 
Type A claims are explicitly committed to the elimination of some type of 
things in the world and the abandonment of the terms used to refer to those things. 
The claim against propositional attitudes presented in the previous section exemplifies 
the kind of claims that belong in this category.14 Another example discussed above is 
It’s a Mess elimiNativist claims regarding the innate when they argue for linguistic 
elimination of ‘innate’ and go on to argue for ontological eliminativism about innate 
properties and the like. Type B claims, in turn, are explicitly committed to only one of 
the two eliminativist projects and, at the same time, they are neutral or non-committal 
about their corresponding counterparts. This is the case of the eliminativist claims 
connected with the other types of eliminativism about the innate (i.e., Aren’t Any, 
Doesn’t Work eliminativisms and It’s a Mess linguistic elimiNativism) which are 
primarily aimed at only one of the two projects (namely, ontological and linguistic 
elimination of X), as characterised by Cowie (2009). The eliminativist claim about 
artefacts is another example of type B claims, in the sense that it strictly focuses on 
the metaphysical question. Finally, type C claims can be exemplified by the 
eliminativist claims about race and moral properties discussed in section 3, both of 
which are committed to ontological eliminativism yet non-neutral about the 
elimination of the corresponding theoretical terms ordinarily used to talk about races 
and moral properties, respectively. In this case, ontological eliminativist claims are 
compatible with the permissive usage of theoretical terms for normative or unifying 
purposes. Eliminativism of this type can be found in Cowie (2009), where the fruitful 
                                                          
14 Another example can be found in Griffiths (1997), regarding our folk concept of ‘emotion’. 
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usage of muddled theoretical terms is illustrated with respect of the historical 
development of the concept ‘gene’. 
With this general classification of claims in hand, I will now turn to supply a 
classification of the different types of eliminativist arguments discussed in this 
chapter. This new classification will build on Cowie’s proposed taxonomy of different 
kinds of arguments for elimiNativism and the classification of eliminativist claims 
proposed in this section. 
 
5. A taxonomy of eliminativist arguments 
An important concern within contemporary philosophical and scientific 
theorising has to do with the evaluation of the extent to which the theoretical posits of 
a given explanatory theory are both suitable for the discovery of new inductive 
generalisations and coherent with whatever reliable knowledge we may already have. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to think that the main motivation for eliminativists to argue 
for the elimination of X is the thought that X fails to be useful for gaining better 
understanding of the way things really work in nature. In this section, I will use 
‘theoretical adequacy’ as a pivot concept to draw a general classification of 
eliminativist arguments. For plainness of exposition, theoretical adequacy should be 
taken as an umbrella concept that stands for the satisfaction of conditions for 
explanatory adequacy such as the facilitation of inductive generalisations, explanatory 
unification and the like. The aim is to show how different eliminativist arguments can 
be taxonomised on grounds of the way they advocate certain theoretically inadequacy, 
irrespectively of how good or bad arguments they can be. 
Thus, given the assumption that a certain candidate for eliminativism is 
thought to fail to meet some kind of conditions for theoretical adequacy, different 
types of eliminativist arguments can be initially sorted out according to three main 
categories. Call them Eliminativism due to causal/explanatory inadequacy 
(Causal/Explanatory Eliminativism), heterogeneity (Heterogeneity Eliminativism), 
and offence to metaphysical presumption (Metaphysical Eliminativism), respectively. 
Roughly, Causal/Explanatory Eliminativism is intended to jointly generalise 
from what Cowie (2009) characterises as linguistic Doesn’t Work elimiNativism plus 
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the addition of its ontological counterpart, i.e. ontological Doesn’t Work 
eliminativism. The reason for the inclusion of this latter subcategory is to provide 
room for distinguishing cases where the eliminativist conclusion of a Doesn’t Work 
argument is said to be entailed by certain causal/explanatory inadequacy. In turn, 
Heterogeneity Eliminativism is intended to jointly generalise from what Cowie 
characterises as linguistic and ontological It’s a Mess elimiNativisms, where the 
eliminativist that is commitment to one of them is not committed to the other. 
Metaphysical Eliminativism is intended to generalise from Cowie’s ontological Aren’t 
Any elimiNativism. Each of the three broad categories proposed here (i.e., 
Causal/Explanatory Eliminativism, Heterogeneity Eliminativism and Metaphysical 
Eliminativism) comprises a number of subcategories, where the several types of 
eliminativist arguments already explored can be allocated. From this point forward, 
the following summary table might be helpful. 
 
 
 
The category of arguments which are theoretically inadequate as per 
Metaphysical Eliminativism comprises two subcategories, namely eliminativist 
arguments due to strong metaphysical offence and eliminativist arguments due to 
weak metaphysical offence. Strong metaphysical offence eliminativism (e.g., artefact 
eliminativism) argues that the existence of some type of thing should be rejected due 
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to the violation of a certain metaphysical principle. These arguments are aimed at 
ontological eliminativism (e.g., rejecting artefacts because they have no proper parts 
can be deemed as violating a metaphysical principle, viz., the principle of 
‘compositionality’) but they are neutral about linguistic or conceptual eliminativism 
(e.g., artefact eliminativists do not explicitly claim that talking about chairs should be 
avoided in, say, paleoanthropological research). Regarding our previous classification 
of claim types, eliminativism by strong metaphysical offence should be associated 
with type B claims. Likewise, eliminativist arguments due to weak metaphysical 
offence are aimed at ontological eliminativism (e.g., there aren’t essential properties 
for races), but, since these arguments are not explicitly committed to eliminativism 
regarding the theoretical terms used to talk about the objects that are candidates for 
ontological eliminativism, these arguments are best associated to type C claims. 
The types of arguments which are theoretically inadequate as per 
Heterogeneity Eliminativism include both eliminativism due to explanatory vagueness 
and eliminativism due to metaphysical vagueness. Eliminativism by Explanatory 
Vagueness (e.g., innateness) argues that, because X has no determinate analysis, it 
should be rejected. Someone endorsing this type of eliminativism may or may not go 
on to argue that a given vague concept entails the ontological rejection of the type of 
thing this concept may putatively designate, depending on whether some intermediate 
premises are provided to show that this might be the case. Eliminativism due to 
metaphysical vagueness argues that we should reject the existence of a given type of 
properties, entities or events on the grounds that their existence would require that we 
previously accept the existence of some certain types of things that are too strange, 
confused or improbable, given what we know and commonly think about everything 
else. 
Arguments which are theoretically inadequate as per Causal/Explanatory 
Eliminativism include what I have called eliminativism by causal exclusion and 
eliminativism due to total explanatory failure. Eliminativism by causal exclusion (e.g., 
eliminativism regarding demons) argues that X should be rejected because X is 
ontologically redundant. More specifically, the claim is that X should be rejected 
because it does not count as part of a scientifically relevant explanatory theory (e.g., 
one that is committed to scientific realism or one that can be falsified). Eliminativism 
by Total Explanatory Failure (e.g., eliminativism regarding propositional attitudes) 
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argues that X should be rejected because X is part of a deeply mistaken theory, yet a 
scientifically relevant one. 
Recall that Doesn’t Work elimiNativism, as characterised by Cowie (2009), 
was primarily aimed at the linguistic eliminativist project (see subsection 3.3 above). I 
agree with Cowie that, in the case of the innate, her linguistic-oriented 
characterisation of Doesn’t Work arguments is plausible, but I do not think a main 
focus on this linguistic orientation reflects the scope of similar eliminativist 
arguments in other areas. A case in point is the very example she provides to illustrate 
how Doesn’t Work eliminativist arguments work, namely the eliminativism regarding 
propositional attitudes advocated by Churchland (1981). Indeed, in alignment with 
our previous characterisation of eliminativism by Total Explanatory Failure (see 
subsection 3.1 above), Churchland does not only argue for the elimination of 
‘propositional attitude’ but also for the non-existence of propositional attitudes. 
Hence, regarding our classification of claim types proposed above, 
eliminativism by total explanatory failure should be associated to type A claims, 
while eliminativism by causal exclusion is better associated to type B claims, since 
causal exclusion eliminativist arguments (not total explanatory failure arguments) are 
aimed at ontological elimination and are not explicitly committed to linguistic 
eliminativism—perhaps, in the absence of better and more precise terms, there was a 
time when talk of demons, phlogiston and the like was useful even though their 
putative referents were considered highly ontologically suspect. 
Explanatory Vagueness eliminativist arguments, by contrast, can be associated 
to any of the three types of claims, depending on whether the evident vagueness of a 
given theoretical terms is taken to support the ontological rejection of its putative 
referent. Take the case of memory, for example. As Cowie (2009) illustrates it, the 
many different mental states and processes that can be associated with the term 
‘memory’ have led memory experts in different fields to be eliminativists about 
‘memory’ yet not about memory. So, in this case, ‘memory’ eliminativism by 
Explanatory Vagueness is best associated with type B eliminativist claims. However, 
when some appropriate premises are included such that the eliminativist argument 
about ‘memory’ is also intended to support the rejection of memory, then memory 
eliminativism by Explanatory Vagueness is best associated with type A. In turn, even 
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though terms such as ‘memory’ happen to be theoretically vague, some may still 
deem them useful terms for explanatory purposes (e.g., Hampton 2010; Strohminger 
and Moore 2010), irrespective of whether their referents are thought not to really exist 
(or carve nature at its joints). In this latter case, the use of ‘memory’ can be 
regimented for convenience in certain classificatory schemes, thus meeting conditions 
for theoretical adequacy such as explanatory unification. This third type of 
eliminativism by Explanatory Vagueness is then best associated with eliminativist 
claims of type C. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a provisional general taxonomy for 
systematising what amounts to a family of related types of eliminativist arguments 
and claims. The proposed classification is grounded on the analysis of different types 
of eliminativisms. Surveying eliminativist arguments and claims in different domains 
has helped us to build a picture of the different ways people can be eliminativist about 
some type of thing. Whereas all eliminativist arguments are aimed at rejecting some 
type of thing, they differ from one another in ways that are relative to the kind of 
things they reject as well as the scope of their related eliminativist claims. In this 
respect, I have chosen to set out a taxonomical format which benefits from related 
proposals and discussions developed by Cowie (2009). The result is a general 
classification that reflects the way Cowie’s proposal could generalise as a taxonomy 
of most of the available kinds of eliminativist projects. 
Ultimately, all eliminativist arguments can be said to support a conclusion 
relative to the way eliminativists argue that certain candidates for eliminativism fail to 
be theoretically adequate. In view of that, the proposed taxonomy acknowledges three 
broad categories of eliminativist arguments. All the different arguments for 
eliminativism discussed in this chapter were sorted out according to these three main 
categories. The category of eliminativist arguments due to causal/explanatory 
inadequacy is meant to generalise from Cowie’s category of linguistic Doesn’t Work 
elimiNativism, plus the addition an ontological counterpart. The category of 
eliminativist arguments due to heterogeneity is meant to generalise from Cowie’s 
category of It’s a Mess elimiNativism, where the linguistic and the ontological 
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distinction with respect to a given candidate for eliminativism can be interpreted 
either as strict or permissive. In turn, the category of eliminativist arguments due to 
the violation of some metaphysical presumption is meant to generalise from Cowie’s 
category of ontological Aren’t Any elimiNativism. 
Finally, distinguishing between linguistic and ontological subcategories which 
focus on some kind of indeterminacy of analysis in the category of eliminativist 
arguments due to heterogeneity (viz., elimination by metaphysical vagueness and 
theoretical vagueness, respectively) has helped to draw our attention to the role of 
vague concepts in eliminativist arguments and the conditions for theoretical adequacy. 
The issue of vague and messy terms (or concepts) that may turn out to be 
scientifically productive will be an important topic in later chapters of the present 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
———————————— 
Definitional Concepts and Prominent Revisionist Contenders 
 
1. Introduction 
Concepts play a central role in our mental lives. It is the received view that 
they are the constituents of thoughts and they connect our thoughts to the world. 
Hence, one common agreement among theorists working on concepts is that a good 
theory of concepts is essential for several important philosophical issues, a claim that 
some (e.g., Peacocke 2009) have deemed as probably the only uncontroversial 
philosophical proposition about concepts that philosophers seem to agree. The current 
chapter is committed to the view that a good theory of cognition depends on a good 
theory of concepts. 
It is a common intuition among philosophers and cognitive scientists that 
individuals’ intelligent behaviour can be explicated by appealing to cognitive 
processes where concepts play a central role. This intuition has been well depicted by 
expressions such as “concepts are the timber of our mental lives” (Prinz 2002) and 
“concepts are the glue that holds our mental world together” (Murphy 2002). 
However, attempts to specify the role of concepts within a theory of mind have been 
the subject matter of interesting debates in the fields of Cognitive Science and 
philosophy of mind. These two fields of inquiry intersect with each other as many 
theoretical and experimental developments in current cognitive sciences are highly 
significant to several philosophical problems (Grush 2002). A case in point is the 
formulation of well informed theories of concepts that clearly explain the task of 
concepts in holding our mental world together. 
In the history of philosophy, one traditional understanding of concepts is based 
on the idea that concepts are definitions. On this view, for example, the concept 
woman can be identified with ADULT FEMALE HUMAN BEING.15 The theory that 
advocates this view is known as the Classical Theory of Concepts. Despite its long-
                                                          
15 In this thesis, I use capital letters refer to concepts, unless otherwise specified. 
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standing historical dominance, there are difficulties with this view and revisionist 
theories have been offered. Thus, in the last half a century, a variety of competing 
theories of concepts such as the Prototype Theory, the Exemplar Theory and the 
Theory-Theory,16 have been developed as alternatives to the Classical Theory. 
In this chapter, I will first address the central aspects of the Classical Theory 
of concepts and provide a succinct characterization of the main views of concepts 
developed as a reaction to the Classical Theory. Then, I will summarize a number of 
criticisms these theories are faced with. The conclusion will be that these theories 
have common problems which are inherent to the very formulation of the notions of 
concept they advocate. A clear characterization of these problems will be relevant for 
chapters 3 and 4, where a recent attempt to reform the current study of concepts will 
be critically assessed. 
 
2. Traditional and revisionist views of concepts 
2.1. The Classical Theory of concepts 
According to the Classical Theory of Concepts, 17  most concepts are 
definitions. What this means is that most concepts have a complex representational 
structure that encodes conditions for their application, i.e., conditions for them to 
mean what they do.18 More precisely, the definitional structure of a given concept is 
assumed to be made up of simpler representations, and these representations are said 
to provide conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for 
something to be in the extension of that concept. In this case, to say that X is in the 
extension of a concept is the same as saying that X is something that the definition of 
the concept applies to. Thus, for example, if it is definitional that thistles are plants, 
then it is not possible for anything but plants to be thistles. In turn, if it was the case 
                                                          
16 For a panoramic view and a general evaluation of main theories of concepts, see Laurence and 
Margolis 1999; Prinz 2002, chapters 3-4; Machery 2009, chapter 4. For a detailed account of findings 
in experimental cognitive psychology, see Murphy 2002. 
17 This view is also known as the Traditional Theory or the Definition View, and it does not strictly 
correspond to a single, unitary theory, but to a diverse family of theories committed to the idea that 
concepts have definitional structure (Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
18 Concepts apply to things in the world, such that, for example, if I think about Matilda, the newly 
born dog in my house, I thereby apply the concept DOG to her. Now, suppose my friend takes Matilda 
to be a cat when he sees her for the first time. In that case, he is applying the concept CAT to Matilda. 
It follows from here that concepts can be applied correctly or incorrectly. 
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that thistles were sufficiently defined in terms of IS A FLOWERING PLANT, IS 
PRICKLY, IS BIENNIAL, and IS COMPOSITE, then those four representations 
would be encoded in the definitional structure of THISTLE and they would specify all 
it jointly takes for something to be a thistle. 
Given this characterization of the structure of definitional concepts, the 
Classical Theory is said to provide powerful explanatory resources for a unified 
account of a number of important phenomena such as concept acquisition, 
categorization and reference determination, among others (Laurence and Margolis 
1999). Thus, a common model of the acquisition of a definitional concept consists of 
assembling its constituent parts. In other words, acquiring a concept is the same as 
constructing a complex representation from its constituent representations, on the 
understanding that these constituent representations provide conditions that are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of the complex 
representation. For example, if the concept RIVER has a definitional structure, then 
learning it consists of learning the definitions of the constituent concepts (e.g., IS A 
NATURAL STREAM OF WATER, FLOWS IN A DEFINITE CHANNEL, etc.) that 
provide the conditions for something (e.g., the Po) to be in its extension.   
Similarly, the Classical Theory of concepts provides a compelling model of 
categorization. In general, categorization is understood as the capacity to identify the 
category to which a given object belongs. Accordingly, a typical model associated 
with the theory in question consists of checking whether the features contained in the 
concept are satisfied by the object to be categorized. In this case, the term “features” 
corresponds to the representations that compose the concepts. Thus, for example, 
someone might categorize something (e.g., the Po) as a RIVER by noting that it 
satisfies the features that compose the concept river (e.g., IS A NATURAL STREAM 
OF WATER, FLOWS IN A DEFINITE CHANNEL, etc.). 
Analytic inferences are also explained plausibly by appealing to the definition 
construct. An inference is said to be analytic when the conclusion is guaranteed by the 
premises supporting it. Consider this example: “My wife is a female parent, so she is 
a parent.” In this case, the conclusion “she is a parent” is true in virtue of the premise 
“My wife is a female parent.” Similarly, a sentence or statement has been 
characterized as analytic in cases when its truth is necessitated by the meanings of 
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their constituent elements (Laurence and Margolis 1999). In the example given, the 
constituent elements are terms such as ‘female’ and ‘parent’, and their meanings are 
presumed to be contained in the concepts that they express. All this amounts to the 
thesis that, in those cases, the connections that take place in inferential transitions are 
intrinsic to the concepts that enter into those inferences (Fodor 1998). Hence, 
definitions qua mental representations that encode necessary features provide a 
plausible construct to infer truths from constituent concepts. 
One important phenomenon that a good theory of concept is expected to 
account for is reference determination. The concept RIVER does not mean what one 
chooses it to mean. A theory of concepts should therefore explain how it is that 
concepts can have referential properties. According to the Classical Theory, a concept 
refers to those things that satisfy its definition (Laurence and Margolis 1999). In other 
words, a concept refers to those things that satisfy the conditions encoded in its 
complex representational structure. It follows from here that only those things that 
satisfy these conditions can be in the extension of a concept. In other words, it is the 
structure of a definitional concept that norm the fact that, for example, only thistles 
and rivers can be in the extension of THISTLE and RIVER, respectively. 
The referential properties of a concept are said to be among its most essential 
properties. In the case of the Classical Theory, the account of reference determination 
mentioned above also plays a unifying role, given that the explanation of other 
phenomena such as categorization and concept acquisition are based on the very 
structure of concepts that determines its reference. However, in spite of its 
explanatory power, this theory also faces a number of important problems, and there 
is now vast evidence regarding certain cognitive effects that this traditional view is 
not able to predict (e.g., Murphy 2002).  
In view of that, a number of revisionist approaches have been developed. 
Some of them fall under the label of Prototype Theory, which makes reference to the 
emergence of theoretical and empirical developments in psychology since the 1970s 
(e.g., Posner and Keele 1968; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978; Hampton 1979).  
A second group of revisionist approaches have centred around the idea that concepts 
can be identified with sets of exemplars (Machery 2009), where an exemplar can be 
roughly understood as a kind of mental representation that is based on memories of 
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individual category members that we form when we encounter them (e.g., Medin and 
Shaffer 1978). Finally, there is a third group of approaches that reject the idea that 
concepts are merely based on superficial similarity to representations of either 
idealized or actual individual category members. Proponents (e.g., Murphy and Medin 
1985) of this alternative group of approaches claim that concepts are theories, a 
construct that is normally associated with the way scientific knowledge is 
characterized. This latter set of approaches is known by the name of Theory Theory of 
concepts. What follows is a brief characterization of each of these three revisionist 
theories. 
 
2.2. Revisionist theories of concepts 
2.2.1. The Prototype Theory of Concepts 
According to the Prototype Theory, concepts have statistical structure that 
encodes the properties (or features) deemed to be possessed by the objects in their 
extension. The most popular way of characterizing Prototypes as mental 
representations is in terms of a set of typical feature representations (Prinz 2002). In 
general, what these feature representations represent are statistically frequent features 
that members of a category are taken to have. 
Put differently, the structure of a prototype concept is said to represent the 
features that subjects in experimental settings will tend to judge as among the most 
frequent features in a given category. To illustrate, suppose some of the most frequent 
features in the category of birds comprise [+feathers], [+beak], and [+ability to fly]. In 
this case, for example, robins can be taken to be more prototypical of birds than 
ostriches, given that ROBIN, as compared to OSTRICH, share more feature 
representations with BIRD. Notably, the feature [+ability to fly] that tends to be part 
of the concept ROBIN will not tend to be represented in the statistical structure of 
OSTRICH. 
Unlike definitional concepts, prototypes do not comprise necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. Rather than that, prototypes 
encode the representation of properties of objects that can be graded statistically. This 
is why robins can be judged to be a kind of bird more readily than ostriches, precisely, 
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on the basis of the degree to which these category members tend to possess properties 
specified by the prototypical representation for birds.19 On the Prototype Theory, the 
application of a concept depends on the satisfaction of a sufficient number of features, 
some of which are considered to have more significant weight than others (Laurence 
and Margolis 1999). In this sense, it can be said that grasping a concept with 
statistical structure is knowing what features typical things falling under its extension 
normally have (Fodor 2003). An important assumption among theorists advocating 
this view is that the mind can group objects to reflect natural groupings in the world, 
on the basis of similarity relationships that hold both in the world and in the mind 
(Couchman et al. 2010). However, as it will be discussed later on in section 4, it 
should not follow from here that relevant empirical research is explicitly committed to 
this kind of metaphysical assumptions at all times. 
Prototypes can also be understood as “summary representations” (Smith and 
Medin 1981), in that they specify a set of properties or features the sum of which is 
normally exhibited by category members collectively, but not necessarily 
individually. What this means is that prototypes can sometimes specify features that 
are not necessarily co-instantiated in actual category instances (Prinz 2002)—that is, 
features that are not necessary conditions for category membership. To illustrate, 
imagine the case of a kind of tree that bears edible fruit that may either be blue in 
autumn or else pink in spring, with no significant statistical variation in the prevalence 
of these features (i.e., the features in question have “the same right” to be specified by 
the corresponding prototype, statistically speaking). Since people may abstract a 
prototype for this tree that includes both feature representations, it is reasonable to 
predict that such idealized prototype would allow experimental subjects identify a 
possible rare species with both features more readily than any other nonprototypical 
instances. As Prinz (2002) notes, what this implies is that ideal cases could 
outperform less typical cases, even if these less typical cases, as opposed to ideal 
cases, have actually been experienced. 
One important antecedent to the Prototype Theory are the experiments carried 
out by psychologists working in different research areas during the 1960s (e.g., 
                                                          
19 Some prototype theories characterize prototypes in terms of the representation of properties that 
objects either possess or do not possess, such as having wings. Others characterize prototypes in terms 
of the representation of properties that objects possess to some degree, such as being sweet (Machery 
2009, section 4.2). 
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Posner and Keele, 1968) and early 1970s (e.g., Heider 1972). Results from this work 
suggested that people store information about categories in the form of representations 
of what is taken to be their best instances. These contributions preceded the 
development of the notion of prototype in terms of a “set of typical features” (e.g., 
Rosch and Mervis 1975). The notion of prototypes can, thus, be understood in 
different ways and there is currently no clearly specified understanding that all 
theorists agree with. Notwithstanding this situation, an understanding of prototypes in 
terms of a summary representation of typical features is often preferred for the 
purposes of general exposition (e.g., Murphy 2002). This characterization will be 
helpful to describe how concepts with prototype structure are said to account for 
phenomena such as concept acquisition and categorization. 
A model of concept acquisition that is relevant for the Prototype Theory 
consists in a mechanism of assembly of feature representations. In other words, one 
acquires a concept by means of assembling its feature representations. In that sense, 
concept acquisition is similar to the model of acquisition of a definitional concept. 
However, since concepts in the Prototype Theory are made up of feature 
representations that can be graded statistically, the mechanism of assembly in the case 
of concepts with prototype structure is only aimed to monitor features that tend to co-
occur. By contrast, acquiring a definitional concept requires monitoring features that 
always co-occur, given that each of those features provides necessary conditions for 
the application of a definitional concept. The Prototype Theory rejects these necessary 
conditions and considers the representation of a list of statistically prominent feature 
representations to be sufficient for concept application. Thus, the acquisition of a 
concept with prototype structure can also be viewed as an assembly mechanism of 
statistically prominent feature representations that tend to be sufficient for its 
application. 
Categorization is probably the epistemic phenomenon for which the Prototype 
Theory offers the most natural account. In general terms, this account has been 
characterized as a similarity comparison process between two representations, where 
one is for the target category and the other for an instance (Laurence and Margolis 
1999). One central idea underlying this comparison process is that category instances 
are normally taken to be more typical than others depending on the number of 
prototypical features they have. Indeed, feature or “attribute listing tasks” are common 
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procedures used by prototype theorists to determine category membership (e.g., 
Hampton 1979; Smith and Medin 1981). Suppose experimental subjects are expected 
to judge the similarity between c1 and c2 in terms of the corresponding sets of 
features F1 and F2 associated with them in that order. A possible account of a 
similarity comparison process involving F1 and F2 is that these subjects rate 
similarity in terms of the weight they attribute to a number of overlapping 
prototypical features. Hence, a possible account of categorization involving, say, 
items c1 and c2, is that people make use of similarity comparison processes in terms 
of, say, F1 and F2, to determine the similarity between these items and the prototype 
for a given target category. In effect, Rosch & Mervis (1975) show that the 
probability of an item to be judged by subjects as a member of a given category 
correlates with the degree of similarity between the item and category prototypes. 
 
2.2.2. The Exemplar Theory of Concepts 
Not long after the emergence of the Prototype Theory, a new competing theory 
of concepts was developed. This theory is known as the Exemplar Theory. In this 
theory, the central idea is that concepts are sets of exemplars (Machery 2009). The 
question of what exactly an exemplar is has not been clearly answered by proponents 
of this view (Murphy 2002, p. 58), but it is clear that this view rejects the idea of a 
representation that can encompass an entire concept. Rather than that, what constitutes 
our concept of trees, for example, is the representation of the set of trees that we 
remember. It is an empirical fact that, sometimes, similarity to categories instances 
which have been previously experienced may be better predictors of speed than 
similarity to category prototypes.20 This has led some cognitive scientists to conclude 
that the information about particular category instances that people store is what 
people use to make their categorization judgments (Prinz 2002). Authors refer to the 
mental representation of these instances as “exemplars”. Hence, a relevant assumption 
is that it is the exemplars of the objects we remember (more or less accurately) that 
                                                          
20 Measuring experimental subjects’ “reaction time” during cognitive tasks is a typical experimental 
procedure used to test theories’ predictive power in cognitive psychology. The central idea that 
motivates the methodological interest in this measurement is that the speed of a person’s reaction to a 
given stimulus can provide insights into the nature of the processes underlying the tasks in question. 
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we consult when we make judgements about a particular category. Consider the 
following quote:  
 
Suppose you see a new animal walking around your yard. How do you decide that it 
is a dog, according to this view? […] Basically, what you do is (very quickly) consult 
your memory to see which things it is most similar to. If, roughly speaking, most of 
the things it is similar to are dogs, then you’ll conclude that it is a dog. (Murphy 2002, 
p. 49) 
 
In this quote, the central aspect of exemplar-based categorization is illustrated. 
According to the Exemplar Theory, we accomplish categorization by comparing a 
probable category instance to sets of exemplars we store in our memory. Hence, there 
are, at least, two relevant factors involved in how we categorize an instance: the 
number of exemplars that an item reminds us of, and the degree of similarity between 
a given object and each of the sets of exemplars that we remember. Obviously, what 
an item reminds us of can be a very open-ended set of exemplars (e.g., events can 
remind us of certain objects or vice versa). For this reason, just an in the case of the 
Prototype Theory, models of similarity calculation play a central role in this theory. 
In a well-known model of categorization proposed by Medin and Schaffer 
(1978), it is essential to quantify both the importance of the dimension in which a 
certain set of items can be compared with one another and the amount of similarity in 
a given dimension. In other words, the model comprises two main stages. In the first 
stage, we need to determine, on the one hand, matching and mismatching features that 
the items under comparison may have, and, on the other, how important for 
determining similarity the dimension of each of these matching and mismatching 
features is. For example, slave insurrections and revolutionary wars have things they 
generally share (say, e.g., suffering population; violent uprising against authority; 
elimination of dominating groups; etc.) and things they do not generally share (say, 
e.g., introduction of new political doctrine; complete transformation of society; 
substitution or modification of existing constitution; etc.). Thus, for determining 
similarity, certain dimensions (e.g., social and economic deprivation) maybe 
considered to be more or less important that others (e.g., property damage and 
administrative polices). 
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In this model, context is said helps in the task of determining the exemplars 
that are relevant for categorization. In short, consider two sets of exemplars, ‘ExC’ 
and ‘ExS’, where ExC corresponds to a number of contextually selected exemplars, 
say, the exemplars of the suricates a tourist has seen in the Kalahari Desert, and ExS 
corresponds to a number of stored exemplars of other categories under consideration, 
say, the exemplars of wild animals that person has experienced in the past. According 
to the model in question, the likelihood that something will fall under a given 
category is said to be a function of how similar it is taken to be to ExC relative to how 
similar it is taken to be to ExS. In the example given, the likelihood that the tourist 
categorizes a given animal as a suricate (e.g. while visiting Australia) is a function of 
how similar that animal is taken to be to the exemplars of suricates she has seen in 
South Africa relative to how similar it is taken to be to the exemplars of the wild 
animals she has experienced in the past. 
The second stage of the model, in turn, involves deciding how mismatching 
the mismatching features are. This procedure is aimed to determine the degree of 
similarity between mismatching features on a given dimension. To do this, Medin and 
Schaffer’s model proposed a multiplicative rule. The proposed rule contrasts the 
additive rule that prototype theorists used (e.g., Tversky 1977). Whereas the additive 
rule consists in summing shared features, the multiplicative rule consists in 
multiplying numerical values corresponding to the degree to which each feature is 
shared (Prinz 2002). The use of this new rule, which has been described in detail 
elsewhere (e.g., Murphy 2002; Machery 2009; Prinz 2002), provides a bias in favour 
of cases where an object is taken to be very similar to few exemplars over cases where 
it is taken to be similar to many exemplars. This is particularly interesting in that the 
model proves adequate to account for cases in which one can easily categorize highly 
atypical category members, i.e., category members which are not prototypical. 
Thus, for example, imagine there is a political leader of a given ideological 
persuasion (e.g., a communist leader that successfully advocates a peaceful and 
democratic transition to socialism) that is very similar to one you have seen before –
that is, to your stored exemplar of this leader—, but hardly similar to any other 
political leaders of the same persuasion (e.g., communist leaders successfully 
advocating proletarian revolutions). In this case, the use of a multiplicative rule would 
give the atypical item that is highly similar to your stored exemplar a higher rating 
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than it would get if one were to determine the similarity between the same item and 
the prototype of the corresponding category by means of an additive rule. The reason 
for this is that the model for similarity calculation that prototype theorists use focuses 
on the similarities that an item shares with most of the members of the corresponding 
category. Thus, with an additive rule, prototype theories fail to predict cases where 
atypical items outperform prototypical items. 
Another aspect in which the Exemplar Theory is said to outperform its 
predecessors is the account it provides for concept acquisition. Neither the acquisition 
of prototypes nor the acquisition of exemplars consists in acquiring necessary 
defining characteristics of concepts, and both prototypes and exemplars can be learnt 
by neural networks. However, the acquisition of exemplars, as opposed to prototypes, 
does not involve monitoring feature representations that tend to co-occur in order to 
compute the statistically prominent representations that determine the central 
tendency of a category. As Prinz (2002) notes, evidence also seems to support the 
prediction that exemplar theorists make about concepts that represent categories 
which are not linearly separable. For a category to be linearly separable, it should be 
possible to partition it so that members and non-members are clearly separated. 
Sometimes, this partition can be ambiguous or fuzzy. Consider, for example, 
the possible outcome of cognitive tasks where experimental subjects are confronted 
with the categorization of items such as vegetable-like fruits (e.g., tomatoes), fish-like 
mammals (e.g., whales), or atypical birds (e.g., penguins). Exemplar theorists predict 
that there should be no difficulty in learning categories that are not linearly separable. 
This prediction contrasts that of prototype theorists. Making use of their models of 
categorization based on similarity calculation between items and prototypes, 
prototype theorists have explained why people categorize certain category members 
(e.g., robins) as birds more rapidly than other category members (e.g., penguins). 
Hence, their prediction is that linearly separable categories should be easier to learn. 
However, Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981) have shown that these categories are not 
learnt more readily than those which are not linearly separable.  
 
2.2.3. The Theory Theory of Concepts 
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There is a third prominent group of revisionist approaches to the study of 
concepts that is collectively known as the Theory Theory of concepts. This theory is 
built, in part, on the basis of the difficulties that both the prototype and the exemplar 
theories have in order to account for certain categorization judgments. These 
categorization judgments seem to resort to a type of knowledge that is characteristic 
of scientific theorizing (Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
Given that scientific theories are generally assumed to explain phenomena, 
instead of providing mere descriptions of them, theory theorists have focused on the 
idea that concepts must be constituted by knowledge that can help us explain why 
something happen (Machery 2009). This knowledge has typically been characterized 
as causal, nomological, functional and the like within a given domain. When the 
relation between this knowledge and concepts is assumed to be one of identity, then 
the central idea of the Theory Theory of concepts is that concepts are mini theories of 
the categories that they represent (Prinz, 2002). Alternatively, this relation can also be 
assumed to be one where concepts are merely influenced by the kind of explanatory 
knowledge in question (e.g., Murphy and Medin, 1985). In this case, the identity of 
concepts is said to be determined by the role they play within a theory (Laurence and 
Margolis 1999). This role licences the inferential relations in virtue of which concepts 
are individuated. What this implies is that concepts cannot be understood in isolation 
from everything else (Murphy 2002), given that the content of concepts (e.g. beliefs 
about causal mechanisms and general knowledge about the world) is determined 
holistically, that is, by its role in a specific theory. From here, an important 
implication is that the content of a concept qua theory is not determined by the content 
of its constituent concepts, such as, for example, in the case of concepts qua 
definitions. 
Not all theory theorists characterize the relation between theoretical 
knowledge and concepts in the same way,21 but there are some recurrent claims that 
they tend to agree with. These claims focus on a number of theoretical facts and 
highlight the alleged superiority of the Theory Theory of concepts over its immediate 
contenders (e.g., prototype and exemplar theories). Prinz (2002) summarizes these 
                                                          
21 For example, some claim that concepts are theories (e.g., Rips 1995) and others claim that concepts 
are affected by theories (e.g., Murphy and Medin 1985).  For further discussion on this distinction, see 
Prinz (2002) and Machery (2009).  
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claims as follows: 1) that concepts encode information that allows us to account for 
the relations between the features that, according to similarity-based theories of 
concepts, concepts represent. Such information may provide, for example, an account 
of why the features HAS WINGS and FLIES encoded in the prototype for BIRD tend 
to co-occur (e.g., having wings can help to explain the ability to fly); 2) that this 
information is unobservable. For example, it has been shown that, despite the 
superficial transformation of a given animal or substance, subjects continue to identify 
it as the same animal or substance, respectively (e.g., Keil 1989; Gelman and 
Wellman 1991). What this suggests is that the concepts we use for, say, categorization 
purposes may comprise hidden features and beliefs about category members; 3) that 
concepts divide into several domains. Consider, for instance, the essence associated 
with concepts in different ontological categories. In this respect, the case of natural 
kinds contrasts with the case of artefacts. An artefact that is significantly modified in 
its appearance may be categorised differently when the modification alters the 
function it serves (e.g., an old doorknob repurposed as a coat hanger); and, finally, 4) 
that conceptual development goes through stages that resemble the stages of theory 
change (e.g., accumulation of counterevidence, theory adjustments, etc.). In this 
respect, it has even been argued that scientific theorizing and cognitive development 
are analogous and share the same cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Gopnik 1996). 
The four main claims above amount to a general contention according to 
which concepts embody background knowledge about the world that similarity-based 
theories of concepts fail to account for. Consider concept learning (e.g., Carey 1985; 
Keil 1989; Spalding and Murphy 1999; Pazzani 1991). Learning a concept involves 
the participation of prior knowledge, in the sense that learning a category is facilitated 
when people have the appropriate knowledge. Experimental evidence for this includes 
computational models describing the influence on concept acquisition of prior 
knowledge and learning strategies stored in our memory (e.g., Matsuka and Sakamoto 
2007), and neural network model simulations that show how complex concepts with 
similar features are learnt easier when they are logically consistent with concepts 
previously learnt (e.g., Hume and Pazzani 1995). 
Similarly, the theory theory may explain categorization in terms of, for 
example, how our beliefs about explanatory relations can affect the way we categorize 
(e.g., Medin 1989; Murphy and Medin 1985). For instance, consider the possible case 
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of a person who wins the National Lottery jackpot twice in a row. The reason why we 
may categorize her as a lucky person does not have very much to do with similarity 
comparison mechanisms operating between the person’s features and the features of 
the category lucky. From the alternative perspective of the theory theory, there must 
be some background knowledge about, say, the chances of winning the lottery that 
somehow explains why we take that person to be lucky. 
Another advantage of the theory theory over other theories is that it provides a 
realistic account of categorization, in that the intuition that the concepts involved in 
categorization already include hidden beliefs about category members is in line with 
people’s tendency towards essentialist thinking (Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
Consider the case of a dog with his hair dyed reddish-orange and a pattern of dark 
vertical stripes painted on it. On the basis of Keil’s (1989) findings, one could 
hypothesise that people would still take this animal to be a dog, when asked to make 
category decisions. If this was the case, then people’s tendency to identify such 
animal with a dog, instead of, say, a tiger, would be better explained in terms of 
resorting to a mentally represented theory, rather than in terms of quickly monitoring 
salient observable features. The assumption is that this theory includes the 
representation of things as having an essence, and that resorting to this kind of 
information provides a realistic account of psychological essentialism.22 
The Theory Theory has been usefully summarized as being based on two main 
ideas, namely, that concepts are some kind of knowledge (or set of beliefs) that 
underlies explanation, and that they are organised in domains (Machery 2009). These 
two claims, in turn, are compatible with two prominent developments of the theory of 
concepts in question. According to one of them, our concepts qua psychological 
theories are fundamentally analogous to scientific theories (e.g., Gopnik 1996; 
Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). Thus, concepts can be viewed as a set of beliefs about 
categories, where these beliefs can be of an essentialist or an explanatory character. 
Since these beliefs are organised in domains, concepts can also be viewed as elements 
or constituents of theories, on the assumption that concepts qua mini-theories are 
embedded within larger theories. 
                                                          
22  Psychological essentialism is the term Medin and Ortony (1989) coined to describe people’s 
tendency towards essentialist thinking. 
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Alternatively, according to a second view, our background explanatory 
knowledge about the world constrains the kind of causal, functional, and nomological 
knowledge that influences our concepts in a given domain (Murphy and Medin 1985). 
For example, suppose our psychological theory of terrestrial animal locomotion 
specifies that if something has long legs, it runs fast. Hence, when developing our 
mini-theory of, say, poisonous spiders, the mini-theory of terrestrial animal 
locomotion will cause us to include certain information about the anatomy of 
arachnids. 
To conclude this section, it is fair to say that, just as in the case of other 
revisionist proposals, theory theorists have managed to raise interesting challenges for 
the work of philosophers and cognitive scientists trying to specify the nature and the 
role of concepts in our mental life. Despite this contribution, there are problems and 
criticisms that all the theories discussed so far are faced with. This is the topic of the 
next section. 
 
3. Problems of the traditional and revisionist theories 
3.1. Why concepts are probably not definitions 
The Classical Theory of Concepts (CT, for short) suffers from serious 
problems. In view of that, the Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories (PT, ET and 
TT, respectively) have been developed to replace it. Contrary to CT, these three 
revisionist theories benefit from the experimental evidence that their advocates have 
used in order to support certain central theoretical tenets, as presented in the previous 
section. However, none of these theories have provided adequate and convincing 
alternative explanations of the main flaws normally attributed to CT. In this sense, PT, 
ET and TT have their own serious problems, some of which can be said to be 
common to all of them. Bearing this consideration in mind, I will now discuss the 
most prominent problems and criticisms of the theories presented in the previous 
section. As we will see, most of these problems are related to the assumption that 
concepts must be some kind of complex mental representations. 
One of the most evident problems connected with the notion of definitional 
concept that CT advocates is that most of the concepts we normally use are 
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tremendously hard to define. It is practically impossible to find a plausible definition 
for almost any concept, no matter how intuitive a definition may appear to be. In fact, 
any attempt to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of a definitional concept 
seems to be faced with counterexamples. Consider, for instance, the paradigmatic case 
of KNOWLEDGE as JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF. Well known counterexamples 
have shown that in many cases, even if a belief is both true and justified, one would 
hardly allow it as a case of knowledge (e.g. Gettier 1963). Other recurrent challenges 
to the notion of definitional concepts involve questioning definitions such as 
BACHELOR as UNMARRIED MAN, as well as discussing the difficulty to define 
concepts such as GAME. 
In the case of BACHELOR, it is unclear or controversial that the proposed 
definition applies, for example, to the Pope and other catholic priests (e.g. Prinz 
2002). Put differently, given that the definition of a concept fixes its extension, the 
assumption is that the concept BACHELOR (or UNMARRIED MAN, for that matter) 
and its definition UNMARRIED MAN (or BACHELOR) are coextensive (Fodor et 
al. 1980). However, whereas the Pope and other catholic priests can be part of the 
extension of UNMARRIED MAN, it is controversial that they are also part of the 
extension of BACHELOR. 
In the case of GAME, in turn, as it was championed by Wittgenstein (e.g., 
1953/1958), the features we normally use when we try to define this concept do not 
seem to be necessary or sufficient for something to fall in the category of games. 
Consider Hopscotch, Hide and Seek, Simon Says, Solitaire, Telephone, and Freeze 
Dance. What are the shared defining features of these games that also apply to all and 
only games? Admittedly, this line of criticism does not prove that there are not any 
definitions or defining features for a concept like GAME (Murphy 2002, following 
Smith and Medin 1981), but it does raise certain issues that may critically challenge 
the classical view in question. One of them has to do with the building blocks of 
definitional concepts. 
As Armstrong et al. (1983) suggests, experimental subjects tend to specify 
concepts in terms of features that are less primitive or more complex than the concept 
they describe (e.g. look up the word “simple” in the dictionary). This empirical fact 
supports the view that concepts can’t be definitions, on grounds of two conceptual 
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requirements. The first is that the myriad of concepts populating our mental life 
should result from the combination of simpler concepts (e.g., Fodor 1998; Prinz 
2002). Indeed, the number of thoughts and beliefs we can entertain and understand is 
boundless. This property is known as the productivity of our cognitive capacities. A 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that thought is compositional,23 in that 
the complex concepts that constitute our theoretically limitless variety of novel 
thoughts are formed as a function of a finite set of constituent concepts plus a finite 
set of rules of combination. The second requirement is that the extension of 
definitional concepts must be ultimately fixed by the interpretation of its basic 
constituents, i.e., those primitive and undefinable components that connect the lexical 
elements of definitions to the world. Because CT fails to account for this second 
requirement, it also fails to provide plausible grounds for the first. 
It has been argued that the appeal to the definition construct may be based on 
an overrated emphasis in the psychological reality of definitions (Fodor et al. 1980), a 
criterion that is normally used for the evaluation of psychological theories of 
concepts.24 One reason for this is that psychological theories (especially, regarding 
mechanisms for concept learning) aim to explain the performance of individuals on 
cognitive tasks by appealing to mental processes where concepts play a central role. 
And given that cognitive processes can be characterized, in general, as inferential 
processes, the inferences that take place in virtue of concepts require that these 
concepts have certain degree of complexity in order to justify the inferential 
transitions between concepts (Fodor 1998, chapter 4). However, even if the 
psychological reality of a given notion of concepts is taken to be an important 
methodological ideal, a theory of definitional concepts cannot simply bracket an 
account of what the building block of complex representations are. In other words, it 
is a serious problem for CT to be unable to explain how the proposed notion of 
concepts can allow for the participation of primitive constituents which are interpreted 
independently of the definition construct. A better theory should be able to satisfy 
                                                          
23 For Fodor (1998), this property of concepts is one of the non-negotiable conditions that a good 
theory of concepts should be able to meet. For Prinz (2002), it is one of the desiderata that a theory of 
concepts should ideally explain. In any case, this is a property of cognitive processes that theories of 
concepts must confront sooner or later. 
24 In very blunt terms, a psychological theory of concepts is said to violate this criterion when it fails to 
explain aspects of a given phenomenon that are supposed to fall within its explanatory scope. 
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both the ideal of psychological reality and an account of the basic constituents of 
thoughts that ground the way thoughts are connected to the world. 
So the problems for CT are theoretical as well as empirical. Theoretical 
problems are mainly connected with the idea that the complex structure of concepts 
must be definitional because that is the only option that can explain phenomena such 
as conceptual analyticity (see 2.1., above) and the inferential connectedness 
commented in the previous paragraph. Regarding analyticity, the problem for CT 
arises as a result of W. V. O. Quine’s criticism of the central role that analyticity had 
played in logical positivists’ project to account for people’s purported a priori 
knowledge (Laurence and Margolis 1999). Quine (1951/1980) critically examined the 
assumption that there are some truths that are free from empirical revision, and 
criticized positivists’ attempts to define the notion of analyticity for being unclear and 
circular. He concluded that the distinction between analytic definitions that are true in 
virtue of the meaning of its constituent terms and those that are true in virtue of how 
the world is was false because no belief is independent from experience. In other 
words, there is no such distinction as analytic/synthetic truths because there are no 
analytic definitions at all, a claim that threatens CT as a theory that provides a 
plausible explanation of inferential transitions as based on the concepts (or meanings) 
that participate in those inferences. 
Considering the findings on categorization carried out during the 70s by E. 
Rosch and others (see 2.2.1, above), Murphy (2002) regards typicality effect and 
category fuzziness to be among the most prominent empirical challenges for CT. 
Those findings showed that experimental subjects readily rate items as being more or 
less typical members of a given category (e.g., Rosch, 1973). From the results of 
categorization tasks where this typicality effect was studied, it was not possible to 
detect the incidence of definitions that subjects may be using to make decisions 
regarding category membership. In fact, the probability for an item to be deemed as 
member of a given category (e.g., the category of fruits, birds, etc.) was higher 
depending on its family resemblance or similarity as specified in terms of common 
features that the individuals of a given culture have previously attributed to already 
known category members. The observed fact that category membership was a matter 
of degree contrasts with the procedures CT offers for determining category 
membership unambiguously (Medin 1989; Laurence and Margolis 1999). Definitional 
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concepts are mental representations which are in a necessary and sufficient identity 
relation with it constituent mental representations. As Murphy (2002) puts it, this 
means that definitions pick out all the category members and none of the non-
members. 
Strictly speaking, Rosch’s work was not aimed to provide a theory of 
concepts, but it did support the hypothesis that concepts cannot be definitions. It was 
later on that theories of concepts motivated by this line of research were developed, 
namely the Prototype and the Exemplar theories (see 2.1). These theories are based on 
the distinction between concept and category. Accordingly, while a concept is deemed 
a mental representation, a category is understood as a class of objects in the world that 
the concept represents (Murphy 2002). Through probabilistic specifications, these 
theories have intended to make the notion of concepts fit the notion of category 
without challenging the fuzziness of categories that Rosch had discovered. 
Alternatively, Murphy and Medin (1985) think that neither of these two constructs is 
enough to account for the processes of categorization and concept acquisition. As 
described in the previous section, their proposed Theory Theory appeals to our 
background theories about the world to account for relations of coherence between 
concepts and the features that constitute a concept. We shall now turn to see the 
problems these theories are faced with in their attempt to replace the definition 
construct. 
 
3.2. Why concepts are probably not prototypes, exemplars or theories 
A common assumption underlying these three contenders is that concepts can 
be identified with complex mental representations. In general, both prototype and 
exemplar theorists agree that concepts cannot be definitions. In turn, theory theorists 
claim that concepts cannot be prototypes or exemplars all along. Nonetheless, 
prototypes, exemplars and theories are competing constructs with a common 
motivation, namely, Rosch’s work on categorization that challenged the plausibility of 
definitions as the fundamental construct of a theory of concepts. Issues concerning 
category fuzziness and the psychological reality of concepts are among the central 
challenges raised by this experimental tradition. 
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In this section, I conclude that none of these challenges is adequately met by 
any of the three constructs in question. I ground this conclusion on two main claims. 
The first is that a plausible theory of concepts cannot be merely grounded on our 
categorization performance, which is only one of the cognitive phenomena where 
concepts are involved. The second is that a focus on the problems of category 
fuzziness and the psychological reality of concepts is not enough to guarantee the 
stability or publicity25  required by (at least some) concepts. Notably, the relative 
stability of concepts proposed by the similarity-based approaches fails to account for 
concept publicity, given the epistemic account of content-constituting inferences that 
these approaches presuppose. I shall provide reasons for thinking that each of these 
claims is probably true and common to all these theories. Before that, I will succinctly 
summarize the main problems attributed each of these competing theories of concepts. 
 
3.2.1. Problems of the prototype construct 
There are recurrent problems regarding prototype-based representational 
structures. First, many concepts lack prototypes. What are, for example, the 
prototypical properties of bilingual second time mothers, or the king of Chile? In fact, 
one can possess these concepts without even knowing the corresponding prototypes. 
Second, concepts that are assumed to have prototype structure fail to cover highly 
atypical instances and incorrectly include non-instances (Laurence and Margolis 
1999). For example, a theory of prototype has serious problems to represent diseases. 
The perceptual properties of a disease are its symptoms, and symptoms of a disease 
can hardly be allowed to be constitutive of it. Indeed, a disease can be easily 
misdiagnosed if it is only judged by its superficial effects (e.g., people with normal 
blood sugar can experience symptoms of diabetes, and recently diagnosed people with 
diabetes may report to experience none of the relevant symptoms). A third problem 
involves the apparent empiricist character of prototype theories, given that they 
mainly represent perceptual properties. This could explain the explanatory impotence 
of the theory regarding cases where people can have concepts without knowing its 
                                                          
25 The publicity of concepts is grounded on the intuition that a same concept can be share by different 
people and also by a given person at different times. It may be clarifying to assume a type/token 
concept distinction and suppose that different people can share tokens of the same concept type (see, 
e.g., Fodor 1998; Prinz 2002). 
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prototype. However, some think concepts with prototype structure can represent 
statistically prominent features that are not of a perceptual kind (e.g. Machery 2009). 
For instance, we may consider certain numbers to be more typical of ODD NUMBER 
than others or, for that matter, EVEN NUMBER. 
Another problem for prototypes is that they cannot provide an account of the 
characteristic compositionality of our cognitive capacities. Consider, for a 
paradigmatic example, that the prototype for PET FISH (whatever it is)26 has little to 
do with the prototypes of its constituents PET and FISH. This clearly suggests that the 
prototype of a complex concept is not formed as a function of the prototype of its 
constituent concepts. Compositionality is an important property of concepts because it 
allows us to account for the productivity of thought. The notion of concept that the 
classical theory of concepts put forward was a good candidate to account for this 
property, in that the definitions of, say, PET and FISH can be assumed to be the 
constituent parts of the definition of PET FISH. It is, therefore, a problem for 
prototype theories that the complex structure of definitional concepts they intend to 
revise does a better job at explaining how we can learn and form concepts such as 
BILINGUAL SECOND TIME MOTHERS. 
Likewise, the model of concept acquisition the Prototype Theory has involves 
problems that are inherent to its formulation. According to this theory, acquiring a 
concept (e.g. ROAD) involves assembling a certain set of typical features. However, 
each of these typical constituent features (e.g., CAR, LANE, ROUTE, TRAVEL, etc.) 
can also be considered as instances of some category in their own right, so to say. 
What this suggests is that the statistical procedures involved in concept acquisition 
should also apply for the particular features that typical category instances normally 
have. If so, learning a new concept would entail circularity. Consider, for instance, 
that the feature lane can be taken as part of the prototypical representation for ROAD, 
and that, at the same time, the feature road can be taken as part of the prototypical 
representation for LANE. Hence, the question arises as to whether the acquisition of 
some set of primitive feature representations can be reduced to a sensory level, such 
that those primitive features can be identified with sensory properties. If this was the 
                                                          
26 In this case, PET FISH is an example akin to TROPHY HEAD, where the first lexical constituent 
item acts as an “identification attribute” (e.g., X that is Y, and, therefore, Y that is X), rather than to 
COWGIRL, where the first lexical constituent item, COW, acts as a “characterization attribute” (e.g., X 
that does/has/etc. Y).  
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case, the Prototype Theory would not have to face the problem of presupposing 
procedures of concept acquisition that involve representations without statistical 
structure (e.g., sets of exemplars).  However, it would face the empiricist problem that 
most concepts resist analysis in sensory terms (see, e.g., Laurence and Margolis 
1999), which does not render the model of concept acquisition proposed by this 
theory particularly more compelling than that of the Classical Theory of concepts. 
Finally, it is not clear whether or not the very notion of prototype—understood 
as statistical knowledge about a category—necessarily presupposes that of 
“exemplars” (see Murphy 2002, p. 64) at least in some cases. The idea here is that a 
prototype view is not entirely self-sufficient to account for cases where individuals 
form the prototype of a category member they see for the first time. Notably, in these 
cases it makes more sense to talk about an exemplar-based representation, rather than 
a statistical summary representation of the category in question. Similar 
considerations have been invoked to assess possible cases where individuals form the 
prototype of a single category member that they see on regular occasions. These cases 
raise additional serious concerns over whether prototypes can be identified with 
concepts (see Rosch and Mervis 1975, p. 575, for early background on the distinction 
between typicality manifestation and category representation). Maybe, exemplar 
approaches provide a better revisionist alternative than similarity-based approaches 
turning around the notion of prototypes. Let us, then, consider the problems of this 
alternative option. 
 
3.2.2. Problems of the exemplar construct 
As described in 2.1.2., the prototype and exemplar views do not involve 
defining characteristics of the mental representations they identify with concepts, 
which makes them immune to the problems that the definitional view of concepts 
faces. However, there is a common problem that some authors have characterized as 
the selection problem (e.g., Machery 2009; Smith and Medin 1981). According to this 
concern, individual category members have (indefinitely) many properties, so 
prototype and exemplar theorists need to explain why prototypes and exemplars 
represent the properties that they do, instead of others. Whereas neither of these 
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theorists addresses this issue, the implications of the selection problem seem to be 
more dramatic in the case of exemplars. 
Prototype theorists assume that different statistical parameters in long-term 
memory may be involved in the cognitive processes underlying different cognitive 
capacities, such as identification and categorization (Machery 2009). Alternatively, 
since exemplars theorists claim that exemplars are memories formed of the category 
members that we encounter, it is the same set of exemplars that have to be involved in 
the cognitive processes underlying different cognitive capacities. This makes the 
selection problem more pressing for an exemplar theory of concepts, as it amounts to 
answer the question of what it is that an exemplar actually represent. In this respect, 
Murphy (2002) points out the case of an animal you can see just for a fraction of a 
second, for which reason you are not able to pay very much attention to it. Or else, the 
effects it may have on someone to encounter the same animal on a daily basis because 
it happens to be her neighbour’s pet. Are these encounters relevant to decide what 
could count as an exemplar of what? Could a toy dog count as an instance for an 
exemplar of dogs under any given circumstances? Exemplar-based models of 
identification and categorization assume that similarity calculation involves the 
participation of all of the instances encoded into memory. If this is so, plausible 
models should state where one should draw the line that divides what counts as an 
exemplar from what doesn’t. 
In general, exemplar theories of concepts that make use of a similarity 
calculation model based on a multiplicative rule are more effective at identifying 
atypical instances that prototype theories fail to account for with their models based 
on an additive rule (see 2.2.2. above). However, this advantage implies high costs in 
terms of memory storage and processing, given that we are assumed to store 
memories of all the exemplars we experience and make use of all of them for 
similarity calculation at the moment of categorizing objects (Prinz 2002). Likewise, it 
is unclear how such a maximal amount of exemplars can explain the property of 
conceptual compositionality, ideally without presupposing further increase of our 
processing load. One could hypothesise, for instance, that exemplars can combine 
with one another in terms of certain association procedures. Maybe my exemplar of 
DIARY automatically retrieves my exemplar of PAPER because of my familiarity 
with paper diaries. Similarly, my daughter’s exemplar of DIARY may readily retrieve 
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her exemplar of DIGITAL because of her familiarity with digital diaries. However, 
this does not account for our capacity to entertain novel concepts of category 
instances that we have not experienced before or, simply, that we are not familiar 
with, such as VEGETABLE ICE CREAM, PET VOLCANO, or, to invoke a more 
eminent example, COLOURLESS GREEN IDEAS. Hence, an account of conceptual 
combination based on the association procedure hypothesised above would be of very 
limited explanatory scope. But, in fact, even if we grant that this limited proposal is 
plausible enough to account for conceptual combinations such as PAPER DIARY, 
exemplar theorists would be confronted—as they are—with a more serious question. 
Is the exemplar of PAPER DIARY a function of the exemplars of PAPER and 
DIARY? Clearly, the answer is negative. 
Finally, these limitations have implications for explaining other properties of 
concepts in terms of exemplars. Abstract and fictional concepts (e.g., PEGASUS, 
ROCINANTE, UNICORN, TROJAN HORSE, etc.) are especially difficult to explain 
for similarity-based theories of concepts, notably for theories that lack an adequate 
account of the compositionality of concepts. It can be thought that the content of 
fictional concepts is explicated in terms of the content of exemplar combinations 
(Prinz 2002), but, as we have just seen, exemplars can’t compose. So, exemplars 
cannot explain how it is that we can possess abstract or fictional concepts because 
exemplars are the stored mental representation of category members previously 
experienced. A fortiori, exemplars are the sort of thing that people do not share, given 
that, if people have their own stored memories of category members, then they have 
their own exemplars. Thus, identifying concepts with sets of exemplars implies 
abandoning the possibility that concepts be shared by different people or, even, by the 
same person at different time, considering that our set of exemplars can be modified 
every time we experience a category instance. In other words, the exemplar construct 
fails to meet the publicity requirement that concept theorists consider a good theory of 
concepts should be able to meet. 
 
3.2.3. Problems of the theory construct 
The Theory Theory puts forward the idea that concepts belong to larger bodies 
of knowledge. This knowledge is assumed to be arranged in specific domains with 
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explanatory principles that help us make sense of different aspects of the world (Prinz 
2002). However, knowledge varies between people and stages in their lives, which 
makes it hard to allow that people can have the same concept. Some (e.g., Fodor and 
Lepore 1992; Rey 2009) consider this variability to be characteristic of most (if not 
all) epistemic conceptions of concepts. 
In a nutshell, an epistemic conception of the notion of concept corresponds to 
one that is said to be dependent on ‘how we know what is X,’ instead of being 
dependent on ‘what is X’ irrespective of the fact that we are able to think about X 
(see, e.g., Rey 1985). According to Fodor (e.g., 1998), philosophers and cognitive 
scientists’ tendency to assume that the investigation of concepts should begin by 
enquiring about conditions of concept possession, and, then, by inquiring about the 
identity conditions of concepts is the current trend in the study of concepts. Fodor has 
extensively argued that, when this strategy is followed, conditions for having concepts 
are invariably understood in epistemic terms, given that this methodological trend is 
normally constrained by a pragmatist approach that focuses on what a person is able 
to do in order to possess a concept. On the understanding that the empirical study of 
concepts is inevitably committed to certain preliminary assumption about their nature 
(Millikan 1998), this approach is said to be in agreement with the metaphysical 
commitment that concepts are some kind of epistemic capacity (or epistemic “know 
how”), instead of, for example, abstract entities or mental particulars. A case in point 
is when possessing a concept is equated with our capacity to draw inferences. In this 
case, Fodor’s contention is that most theorists working in concepts have wrongly 
taken it for granted that a concept can be unequivocally individuated in terms of its 
inferential relations to other concepts. On his view, one of the main reasons why this 
mode of individuation is untenable is that it entails a holistic determination of the 
content of people’s thoughts. 
In a holistic theory of content, the content of a concept is determined by its 
role within a system of beliefs about the world, which, in the case of the theory of 
concepts under discussion, corresponds to a mental theory. What this means is that the 
individuation of a concept is determined by its inferential relations to all other 
concepts in a given person’s belief system about the world that a given individual may 
have at a given stage of her cognitive development. Hence, the content of a concept 
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can’t remain stable across changes in its mental theory,27 which is why the proposed 
notion of concept fails to provide a principled basis for comparison. In other words, 
the theory construct fails to offer a way to compare whether two people (or the same 
person at different times) share the same concept. This poses a serious challenge for 
cognitive scientists advocating this construct because they need to count on a stable 
notion of concept over which psychology can generalize. 
In fact, precisely because bodies of knowledge (or systems of beliefs) are 
unstable, the theory construct is unable to satisfy the publicity constraint, a 
requirement that is necessary for the generalizations about concepts that could help 
explain behaviour. Consider, for instance, the case of intentional explanations, where 
attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires) are required to be composed of the same concepts in 
order to explain people’s actions. Thus, an explanation such as ‘If S desires Q, and S 
believes that not-Q unless P, then S does P’ can generalize from particular cases 
where different people (Ss), actions (Ps) and desired outcomes (Qs) are involved, 
provided that, in all those cases, people share the same mental states (i.e., 
propositional attitudes) and, therefore, the same concepts that are its basic 
constituents. 
To put it bluntly, the Theory Theory fails to provide an adequate account of 
intentional content. It fails to determine reference, which means that they fail to refer 
to categories. Without any specification of the necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
for something to be in the extension of, say, APPLE, theories do not contain enough 
represented information to tell what belongs and what does not belong in the category 
of apples. Suppose, for instance, there is a theory of apples, according to which apples 
are the kind of things that grow on apple trees and fall off at maturity. Such 
description is inadequate to say that the theory in question is a theory of all and only 
apples. One reason is that the very concept APPLE is being presupposed in the theory 
that is supposed to explain and, therefore, individuate what APPLE is. Another reason 
is that apples are not the only kind of things that this theory can apply to. Consider 
pears, apricots, and even red-eyed tree frog tadpoles! 
                                                          
27 This is what Laurence and Margolis (1999) have dubbed as the Problem of Stability regarding the 
holistic determination of the content of a concept. 
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Similarly, theories may contain false beliefs or incorrect information. Suppose 
I believe it is the spirit of my ancestors that cause frog calls. If so, and if all the 
components of a theory are necessary for reference determination, then it follows that 
my concept FROG would be empty. At the same time, it is patent that holding such 
false belief about frog calls does not preclude me from entertaining the same concept 
FROG CALL that people normally entertain when they refer to frog calls without 
having to assume the existence of spirits of any kind. What this shows is that we can 
possess a concept even if we are mistaken or ignorant about the (essential) properties 
that the concept is deemed to possess. This is what some authors have called the 
Problem of Ignorance and Error (see, e.g., Laurence and Margolis 1999; Rey 1983). 
Compositionality is another problem for the Theory Theory. Since the theory 
construct is explanatory impotent to account for intentionality, the issue of how 
compound concepts can be formed as a function of its constituent concepts poses a 
serious challenge. Theory theorists might want to explain intentional compositionality 
in such a way that, for example, theories can be said to be formed out of its 
constituent theories. However, this is not a promising strategy for at least two reasons. 
First, it is the implausible that theories can exhaustively contain other theories, even if 
we accept the idea that the theory construct can be understood in the form of mini-
theories, as it has been characterized by Prinz (2002). Second, we lack an account of 
how (mini-)theories could combine with one another such that the content of the 
compound theory resulting from that combination can be said to be directly inherited 
from the content of the constituent (mini-)theories in question. Recall that the content 
of a theory is likely to be determined holistically. This implies that theories do not 
contain other theories exhaustively, which is why it makes no sense to talk about 
compound and constituent theories the way it is required in order to account for the 
compositionality requirement. Clearly, my theory of TREE FROG TADPOLE does 
not inherit all the possible inferential relations that my (mini-)theories of TREE and 
FROG, individually, may hold with any other set of more or less adjacent theories. 
As characterized in 2.2.3., theorists have appealed to the theory construct as a 
useful tool to gain insight into cognitive development. Laurence and Margolis (1999) 
have focused on Gopnik (1996) and Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) in order to illustrate 
a recurrent view according to which theory change between different stages of 
development mimics theory change in the history of science. Machery (2009) 
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summarizes three properties of scientific theories that are relevant to this analogy:  
introduction of theoretical entities related in a systematic set of law; explanatory and 
predictive purposes; theory changes in response to evidence. However, theory change 
in science is still a very poorly understood phenomenon, which is why its alleged 
mechanisms could hardly be said to play a central role in the explanation of other 
poorly understood phenomena such as cognitive development and concept learning. 
To illustrate this point, let us consider the current epistemological debate concerned 
with the role of models in scientific cognition. 
Given the agreeable consideration that an important part of scientific 
investigation is carried out on models (e.g. Nersessian 2008), there has been an 
increased interest in studying scientists’ modelling practices in order to understand 
how new scientific concepts are formed and what the mechanisms underlying theory 
change in science might be. Different approaches in this field focus on theorizing 
about a wide variety of practices that might support the claim that reasoning is model-
based and that the explanation of scientific cognition has to focus on some notion of 
model-like representation (Thagard et al. 1999). Nersessian (1999), for example, has 
studied a set of practices that include creating analogies, employing visual 
representation and thought experimenting. Magnani (e.g., 2001 and 2009), in turn, has 
incorporated an additional dimension that he calls ‘eco-cognitive’ according to which 
concrete manipulations of external objects influence the generation of new hypotheses 
in science. A common consensus among these researchers has to do with a rejection to 
the idea that a mere propositional formulation of inferential processes can provide an 
exhaustive account of hypothesis generation. 
This latter formulation has been advocated by an earlier trend initiated by 
Hanson (e.g., 1958, 1960) and Harman (e.g., 1965) on the basis of further 
development of Peirce’s ideas about abductive inferences.28 The main project, in this 
case, involves the view that a logic of discovery, alongside a logic of justification, is 
possible. Within this trend, research has basically aimed to determine necessary 
constrains to render abduction a reliable inference, given the substantial assumption 
that inferential processes can be understood as propositionally-based and governed by 
                                                          
28 For Peirce, abduction was special non-deductive inference that takes place in the process of forming 
an explanatory hypothesis. However, the current understanding of abduction centres over the idea of 
inference to the best explanation. See Douven (2011) for further clarification.   
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explicit rules or constrains. Alternatively, researchers advocating Model-Based 
Reasoning (MBR) claim that their proposed style of reasoning, where implicit 
constrains are said to abound, can better explain the nature of ampliative reasoning in 
science. However, MBR theorists tolerate the possibility that certain aspects of 
scientific cognition are propositionally-based, which goes to suggest that none of the 
approaches in question, by themselves, seems to be able to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of new hypothesis generation. 
Admittedly, creative aspects of scientific cognition could be conceived of as 
some kind of sophisticated version of ordinary cognition. But, given the challenge of 
developing a common theoretical framework that harmonizes the deeply opposing 
substantial assumptions in question (viz.., that, in some cases, the format of the 
representations we manipulate when we reason is model-based and that, in some other 
cases, it is propositionally-based), it is controversial that current theorizing about 
scientific ampliative reasoning, in particular, can provide reliable insights about 
ordinary cognition in general. 
Finally, as Prinz (2002) highlights, there is empirical evidence that eclipses 
many of the advantages normally associated with the Theory Theory. Some of this 
evidence includes experiments showing that this theory can get categorization 
judgments wrong (e.g., Hampton 1995; Smith and Sloman 1994), and that beliefs 
about essences do not necessarily coincide with categorization (Malt 1994). In turn, 
Malt and Johnson (1992) have shown that certain artefact objects that theory theorists 
assume to have functional essences are often categorised on the basis of superficial 
similarities. Admittedly, the Theory Theory can accommodate many of these findings, 
which somehow suggests that they cannot be taken as decisive evidence against the 
psychological essentialism that, as the theory assumes, may underlie people’s 
categorization judgments. However, people fail to specify what the essential property 
of a given category might be, even in experiments where it seems evident that concept 
users take some hidden essence for granted. Likewise, theory theorists do not provide 
a convincing characterization of such essences. Gelman et al. (1994), for example, 
describe the idea of psychological essentialism in terms of people’s tendency to 
assume that there is “a true, underlying nature that imparts category identity” (p. 344). 
This description may be useful to debunk prototype theorists’ models of 
categorization based on readily observed superficial features of objects. In fact, a 
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common criticism of this theory is that it does not provide a principled way for 
selecting those features, except for the claim that it is previous knowledge that renders 
them salient (see, e.g., Murphy 2002). The notion of hidden essential features that the 
Theory Theory advocates could solve that selection problem, yet this theory would 
still need to answer what those features are and what it is that makes them essential. 
 
4. Concluding remarks: common problems among revisionist constructs 
Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories have their own particular problems, 
but the most important problems are common to all of them. Some of these common 
problems involve, at least, three requirements that, according to the Cognitive Science 
community, a good theory of concepts should be able to meet: intentionality, publicity 
and compositionality.29 The reasons why these requirements cannot be met by the 
revisionist theories examined in this chapter are inherent to the formulation of these 
theories. In identifying concepts with prototypes, exemplars and theories, revisionist 
theories take it for granted that the way to individuate a concept is in virtue of its 
relations to other concepts. In this particular respect, none of these theories is more 
promising than the definitional view of concepts they intend to displace. 
According to the Classical Theory, the mode of individuation of a definitional 
concept is in virtue of its relations to other definitional representations that are said to 
be the constituents of the concept. In turn, the Prototype Theory assumes that a 
concept is individuated by a set of statistically frequent relations to its constituent 
features. In the exemplar theory, a concept is individuated by its similarity relations to 
the representation of its exemplars. And The Theory Theory puts forward the idea that 
a concept is individuated by its relations to other concepts in adjacent theories, which, 
in turn, can be part of a whole theory of the world relative to a person’s cognitive 
development. 
However, it is only in the case of a definitional concept that the relation 
between a compound concept and its constituent representations is assumed to be one 
of necessity. Hence, the problem of the stability regarding the content of a concept 
becomes more pressing in the case of the revisionist theories. Indeed, all these 
                                                          
29 For a broader list and a general characterization of each of these requirements, see Prinz 2002, c. 1. 
66 
 
theories are said to predict both that categories will be graded in terms of typicality 
and that there will be borderline cases showing that their boundaries are fuzzy, given 
the evidence for typicality effect (Murphy 2002). Let us consider the implications of 
the instability in question with respect to the requirements mentioned above. 
In order to account for reference determination, similarity-based approaches 
are sometimes said to refer in terms of the same features by which they categorize 
(Prinz 2002). This is the reason why prototype theorists sometimes claim that a 
prototype reference is graded. However, it is hard to allow that the FISH prototype, 
for instance, refers to salmons or trout more than it refers to seahorses. In other words, 
just because seahorses are less typical fish it doesn’t mean that they are fish to a lesser 
degree. So, maybe, prototypicality is graded, but class membership is clearly not. 
Similarly, exemplar theorists defend the idea that concepts can be identified with sets 
of exemplar representations based on the information about previously encountered 
instances that people store in long term memory. It follows from this that being a 
concept is dependent on being something that can be represented by memory 
instances. However, this excludes concepts that may refer to categories whose 
category members we have never experienced, such as, for example, PROMETHEUS, 
UNICORN, etc., even if they result from the combination of the representation of 
category instances that we may have actually experienced (e.g., ATTACK SHIPS ON 
FIRE OFF THE SHOULDER OF ORION30). In the case of the Theory Theory, in 
turn, it is part of the very formulation of the theory construct that it does not contain 
enough represented information to refer to categories, precisely, because the content 
of a concept is supposed to be determined in virtue of its relations to the role other 
concepts play in adjacent theories. Such theory of intentional content attainment does 
not provide a criterion to determine which set of those relations can be relevant for the 
individuation of a concept. 
Another implication of the instability of intentional content that the revisionist 
theories are bound to is the relaxation of the publicity requirement. The thought seems 
to be that, if strict content stability is not necessary for psychological explanation, 
then it must be that similarity of mental content is enough to guarantee that different 
                                                          
30 “I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of Orion. I 
watched c-beams glitter in the dark near the Tanhauser Gate. All these moments will be lost in time. 
Like tears in rain. Time to die.”  (The Top 10 film moments, 2000). 
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people (or the same person over time) can share the same concepts, such that they can 
be subsumed in the corresponding psychological generalizations. But this is clearly 
implausible, at least in the case of the theories in question, all of which are committed 
to the substantial preliminary assumption that the individuation of concepts is 
metaphysically dependent upon our epistemic capacities to access the objects in their 
extension. This commitment is not explicit but it is made manifest in the 
methodological tendency to assume that the way to individuate concepts is via the 
satisfaction of conditions of concept possession expressed in terms of certain 
epistemic procedures. As characterized in 2.2. and 3.2., these epistemic procedures 
can be based on the description of stereotypic features of the objects that may fall 
under the extension of a concept, and/or the description of reliable cognitive 
mechanisms that allows for the epistemic access to those objects (e.g., our ability to 
draw inferences). One clear example is a focus on the possible mechanisms 
underlying typicality effect, i.e., individuals’ tendency to judge category members to 
be more or less similar to one another. Revisionist theories, especially similarity-
based approaches, take it for granted that this cognitive effect can somehow account 
both for learning differences and reaction time differences in categorization 
judgments (Murphy 2002, p. 64). 
However, in proposing that sharing similar content is enough for people to 
share the same concept, prototype theorists presuppose content identity. Experimental 
subjects tend to produce the same features when providing the characteristics of a 
given category, and this is taken to be evidence that the content of similar concepts is 
reliably shared when these concepts share a sufficient number of the same features. 
But this is clearly question-begging, given the implied suggestion that what 
guarantees the similarity of content at the level of concepts is the identity of content at 
the level of features (Laurence and Margolis 1999).31 Moreover, empirical evidence 
shows that typicality judgments about category instances, and the features that are 
deemed to be typical of them, vary from person to person and moment to moment 
(e.g. Barsalou, 1987). 
Exemplar theorists are faced with the same dilemma. To the extent that 
exemplars are said to be represented by a list of correlated features, the problem of 
                                                          
31 See Fodor and Lepore 1992, for extended discussion. 
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presupposing content identity is the same as described in the previous paragraph. If, 
on the other hand, exemplars are represented as entire objects (e.g., abstract, summary 
representations), the problem of stability is probably intractable. Given that exemplars 
are supposed to be made out of people’s own memories, our concepts of a given 
category are different by definition, i.e. by reasons that are inherent to the formulation 
of the proposed notion of concept. 
Similarly, the Theory Theory is unable to satisfy the publicity requirement 
because, by definition, so to speak, the content of a concept is permanently revisable. 
This theory is based on the assumption that the individuation of a concept (and its 
content) depends on the explanation of our cognitive capacity to draw theoretical 
inferences among concepts in different theories. In the context of the Theory Theory, 
this epistemic commitment implies that the content of a concept is relative to an 
indefinite set of inferential relations between continuously changing bodies of beliefs. 
When it is put in that way, this mode of concept individuation entails a holistic 
determination of the content of people’s thoughts and their constituent concepts. 
Hence, the same variability constraining the failure of the theory to account for 
intentionality (or reference determination, for that matter) constrains its failure to 
satisfy the publicity requirement. This variability is inherent to the formulation of the 
theory construct. 
Finally, revisionist theories are embarrassingly poor at dealing with the 
requirement of compositionality. Theories that identify concepts with prototypes, 
exemplars and theories presuppose that most concepts require certain degree of 
complexity and that this complexity is central for psychological explanation. This is 
the reason why these constructs are individuated in terms of the pragmatic value they 
seem to have with respect to cognitive tasks where concepts are assumed to be 
involved (e.g., reasoning, categorization, induction, language understanding, etc.). 
This is a methodological assumption that may lead us to an ontological claim about 
concepts according to which concepts are complex mental representations whose 
constitutive features are the inferential relations established between concepts. 32 
                                                          
32 This applies for cases where complex concepts are assumed to be composed of other complex 
concepts as their proper parts, as well as cases where complex concepts may stand in a privileged 
inferential relation to other complex concepts that are not exhaustively contained by any other concept. 
For a general characterization of these two models of conceptual structure, see Laurence and Margolis 
1999. 
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However, from the pragmatic value in question, by itself, it does not follow that most 
concepts are, ipso facto, complex or structured mental representations. Neither does it 
follow from that methodological assumption that the only way to satisfy the identity 
conditions of a concept is by specifying the constitutive features of a complex mental 
representation. Consequently, unless a concept is individuated in a way that is not 
dependent on the multiple inferential relations that may be established among 
conceptual systems, the problem of content stability is inevitable. This problem 
underlies the particular difficulties regarding compositionality that the revisionist 
theories are faced with. 
Thus, all the revisionist theories critically examined in this chapter fail to 
satisfy the requirements under consideration. I have endorsed a characterization of 
this problem in terms of a metaphysical commitment that identifies the notion of 
concept with some kind of epistemic “know how” that is common to all these 
theories. This commitment is said to be the invariable metaphysical subtext of 
theories that attempt to individuate concepts via their possession conditions, such as 
when, for example, possessing a concept is identified with constructs that are 
dependent on our capacities to sort things or with constructs that are dependent on our 
capacities to draw inferences (e.g., Fodor 1998). If this is right, it can be concluded 
that the main problems underlying the revisionist psychological theories of concepts 
in question are inherent to the formulation of the notion of a concept they advocate. 
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Chapter 3 
———————————— 
Against Concept Eliminativism 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 examined eliminativism in different domains and concluded that most 
eliminativist arguments can be said to support a conclusion relative to the way 
eliminativists argue that what they think should be eliminated fails to be theoretically 
adequate. The taxonomy proposed in that chapter included a category of eliminativist 
arguments according to which a given theoretical term is a candidate for 
eliminativism when it has no determinate analysis and is too vague to play an 
adequate theoretical role (i.e. eliminativism by explanatory vagueness). 
In this chapter, I take issue with a recent eliminativist proposal regarding concepts put 
forward by Edouard Machery. On his view, cognitive scientists should abandon the 
notion of concept because there is something deeply mistaken about the way they 
have scientifically understood it. Because this proposal ultimately defends the claim 
that keeping this notion makes communication among cognitive scientists 
cumbersome, concept eliminativism of this type can be said to fall in the category of 
eliminativist arguments mentioned above. Here I will focus on Machery’s general 
argument against the notion of concept, arguing both that this argument fails and that 
we should reject the elimination of concepts from the theoretical jargon of cognitive 
science. Other more specific drawbacks about this type of eliminativist projects will 
be developed in the two subsequent chapters. 
 
2. Machery’s argument for concept eliminativism 
As we saw in Chapter 2, prominent competing theories of concepts have 
posited different constructs with particular structures (e.g., prototypes, exemplars and 
theories) as plausible notions of concepts to explain a variety of cognitive phenomena 
and abilities (e.g., concept learning, inferences, categorization, language 
understanding, etc.). Advocates of each of these theories have attempted to show that 
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their proposed construct is better at explaining certain phenomena than those proposed 
by other competing theories (Prinz 2002; Machery 2009, 2010). None of these 
theories is entirely independent; and cognitive scientists sometimes agree that 
different constructs may co-exist (Murphy 2002). Some of them even think it is 
plausible that concepts can have different types of structures as their components such 
that these components can be associated with different explanatory roles (e.g., 
Laurence and Margolis 1999). In any case, a shared assumption is that there must be a 
single theory of concepts that is able to account for all the relevant phenomena, an 
assumption that Machery (2009) has called “the received view.” 
An interesting reaction to this view is Machery’s version of conceptual 
heterogeneity, the view that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds 
that Machery takes to be different bodies of knowledge with very little in common. 
This view is in contrast with the assumption that the class of concepts form a single 
natural kind with many common properties, which Machery calls “the Natural Kind 
Assumption.” Denying this assumption is the main motivation behind Machery’s 
argument for conceptual heterogeneity (2009, 2010), which is committed to the 
alternative view that current psychological theories of concepts should be considered 
as distinct theories, given that what they are really about is how distinct (or 
heterogeneous) bodies of knowledge can account for similar but independent 
phenomena. A relevant presumption here is that, in any given science, theoretical 
terms that fail to pick out a natural kind should be eliminated from the corresponding 
scientific classificatory scheme.33 Machery’s hypothesis is based on the claim that the 
empirical plausibility of the different forms of conceptual representations posited by 
the most prominent competing theories of concepts (i.e., prototypes, exemplars and 
theories) violates the assumption that concepts are a natural kind. 
It is worth noting that Machery’s argument for heterogeneity draws an 
eliminativist conclusion about the class of concepts from the conclusion that ‘concept’ 
as a theoretical term is explanatory inadequate. Prima facie, this claim might resonate 
with other more traditional eliminativist views about the mental (e.g., Churchland 
1981) where it is claimed that certain theoretical posits are both enmeshed in a theory 
that is but a total explanatory failure and doomed to be displaced by future scientific 
                                                          
33 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed treatment of this claim. 
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developments. However, even though Machery thinks the notion of concept is ripe for 
scientific eliminativism, he does not go on to claim that concept theorists are utterly 
wrong about their particular theoretical proposals. Instead, his view is that talk of 
concepts should be avoided for the purposes of explaining many of our higher 
cognitive competences because there is an alternative psychological theory of these 
competences that need not make use of the notion of concept. Addressing the main 
aspects of the argument supporting this view is the aim of the current section. 
 
2.1. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
According to Machery (e.g., 2005, 2009, and 2010), prototypes, exemplars 
and theories are all distinct bodies of knowledge equally (henceforth, BoKs) relevant 
for scientific inductive generalizations about the mind. He thinks these bodies of 
knowledge are distinct because they are sustained by different causal mechanisms that 
are responsible for the manifestation of different cognitive capacities such as 
induction, categorization, analogy-making, etc. He maintains that the empirical 
plausibility of this latter claim provides grounds for the elimination of the theoretical 
notion of concept. His alternative proposal is based on five main tenets which he 
jointly dubs the Heterogeneity Hypothesis (e.g., Machery 2009, p.4). The general 
structure of the argument for his hypothesis can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
Premise 1: If a theoretical notion does not pick out a single homogeneous natural kind, 
we should eliminate it from scientific taxonomy 
Premise 2: The psychological notion of a concept is used to refer to prototypes, 
exemplars and theories 
Premise 3: Prototypes, exemplars and theories do not form a single homogeneous natural 
kind altogether 
Conclusion: We should eliminate the notion of a concept from the scientific taxonomy of 
psychology 
 
Machery’s justificatory support for his heterogeneity argument can be 
associated with three main argumentative stages. In the first stage, he argues that the 
explanatory advantages of a number of very different theories of concepts suggest that 
for each object, substance, event, etc., there can be several concepts. Thus, for 
example, for the category of horses there can be HORSE1, HORSE2, etc. The aim of 
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the second stage is to argue that these several concepts are really distinct bodies of 
knowledge used in distinct cognitive processes, which would provide grounds for 
them to count as distinct natural kinds in their own right. And, finally, the third stage 
appeals to the claim that a set of distinct (or heterogeneous) bodies of knowledge 
(notably, prototypes, exemplars and theories) should replace the allegedly 
misconceived notion of concept as a single homogeneous class relevant for scientific 
generalizations about the mind. 
Let us focus on the first stage.  On Machery’s view, Prototype, Exemplar and 
Theory theorists are, on the whole, right about the type of information they claim is 
involved in the processes underlying people’s higher cognitive capacities. In other 
words, they are right when they claim that, in categorizing, drawing induction, etc., 
people make use of the information about categories that prototypes, exemplars and 
theories are supposed to encode. If this is the case, then, contrary to the Received 
View, the explanatory advantages of a theory advocating any one of these three 
constructs should not be viewed as evidence against theories advocating any of the 
others. Machery’s relevant conclusion is that the empirical plausibility of prototypes, 
exemplars and theories implies that, for each category, an individual must have 
several concepts (tenet 1). His proposal is to characterize these several theoretical 
entities as co-referential bodies of knowledge. 
Suppose we can have different concepts for the category of birds. Let them be 
bird-prototype, BIRD-exemplar and BIRD-theory. Allegedly, people can sometimes 
produce conflicting categorization judgments about the category of birds. This is the 
case when, for example, we judge a penguin to be a bird if asked to consider the way 
they are born, but judge it not to be a bird from the set of exemplars of the instances 
of birds that we remember. In this latter case, we may fail to consider certain 
knowledge about evolutionary and developmental mechanisms that may have been 
relevant for the first categorization judgment. According to Machery, conflicting 
judgments like these could not be possible if the causal mechanisms in the 
categorization processes where BIRD-prototype, BIRD-exemplar and BIRD-theory 
are involved were the same. Then, as he contends, it must be that his proposed distinct 
bodies of knowledge are actually sustained by different causal mechanisms 
underlying higher cognitive processes (i.e., they are not coordinated, to use 
Machery’s expression). 
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In the second stage of his argumentative strategy, Machery (2009) argues that 
a variety of empirical evidence supports the claim that the use of each of these bodies 
of knowledge is actually sustained by different causal mechanisms. Notably, 
processes where prototypes, exemplars and theories are involved can yield different 
categorization (or inductive, etc.) judgments. For example, suppose an inductive 
judgment—e.g. the judgement that if something is a cat, it will probably purr—is best 
explained in terms of processes where prototypes or exemplars are involved (e.g., 
Sloman 1993; Murphy 2002, pp. 180-190). And suppose also that another inductive 
judgment—e.g., the judgement that, if your cat catches a cold, it will probably be sick 
for some days—is best explained in terms of processes where theories are involved. 
Then the thought is that, in those cases, the causal mechanisms sustaining the 
processes where prototypes or exemplars are involved are independent of the causal 
mechanisms sustaining the processes where theories are involved. In this sense, a 
given category can be said to be represented by co-referential bodies of knowledge 
that have very little in common (tenet 2). 
Given this characterization of distinct bodies of knowledge as sustained by 
different causal mechanisms, it would seem that Machery’s conceptions of prototypes, 
exemplars and theories correspond to distinct natural kinds. Consider, for example, 
Richard Boyd’s theory of natural kinds. Boyd (1991, 1999) has put forward the idea 
that, for something to count as a scientifically relevant natural kind (e.g., some 
biological species), it should possess a typical set of properties sustained or brought 
about by causal mechanisms. Likewise, Machery posits that prototypes, exemplars 
and theories are distinct natural kinds because the knowledge activated (i.e., retrieved 
from long-term memory) in processes where they are involved is sustained by 
independent causal mechanisms. 
Machery admits the importance of distinguishing knowledge that is 
constitutive of any one of these three distinct bodies of knowledge and knowledge 
that is not. In this sense, he contends that a necessary condition for these theoretical 
entities to count as natural kinds is that they be understood in terms of “bodies of 
knowledge that are used by default in cognitive processes underlying higher cognitive 
competences” (Machery 2009, p. 11). In this quote, a crucial idea is that of some 
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information that is used by default.34 I have previously equated the notion of default 
with the idea of something being used automatically, but I think a brief 
characterization of this notion would be useful to understand the centrality it plays in 
Machery’s theoretical proposal. 
The notion of default stems from the study of default inferences in fields such 
as artificial intelligence and computer science, where it is hypothesized that certain 
inferences are normally drawn unless additional information is provided (Machery 
2009). Likewise, on Machery’s view, the idea that a body of knowledge about x is 
used by default when we reason about x (or categorize, make analogies, etc.) amounts 
to conceiving of this body of knowledge as some kind of defeasible knowledge that 
we take to be relevant and preferentially available when reasoning about x (or 
categorizing, making analogies, etc.). Thus, the proposal that prototypes, exemplars 
and theories are distinct bodies of knowledge used in distinct cognitive processes 
(tenets 3 and 4) is based on the presumption that they are bodies of knowledge about x 
which, out of the whole knowledge about x that may be stored in our long-term 
memory, are preferentially retrieved from memory to be used in independent 
cognitive processes underlying our higher cognitive competences. 
The last stage of Machery’s case for the Heterogeneity Hypothesis involves 
arguing from the claim that prototypes, exemplars and theories pick out distinct 
natural kinds to the elimination of the notion of concept. A common assumption 
among philosophers and scientists with naturalistic commitments is that scientific 
taxonomies correspond to natural kinds in that they actually reflect real categories in 
nature, subject to subsequent refinement. Within Cognitive Science, theorists working 
in the development of psychological theories of concepts have generally taken it for 
granted that the notion of concept reflects a natural kind and can support causally-
grounded generalizations.35 Machery disagrees with this latter assumption and claims 
that prototypes, exemplars and theories are distinct natural kinds relevant for scientific 
generalizations about the mind in their own right. 
                                                          
34 In some more recent work (e.g., Machery 2015), it is claimed that the notion of ‘default’ should be 
applied, not the use of knowledge, but to the retrieval of knowledge from long-term memory. I will not 
consider this revised conception of default in this chapter, since it is not relevant for the current 
discussion. However, I will pay attention to this distinction in Chapter 4. 
35 See Chapter 5 for a discussion on the notion concept and its putative natural kind status.  
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As pointed out in the previous stage, Machery contends that these three 
theoretical entities do not form a single natural kind because they do not have causal 
mechanisms in common. Hence, he claims that the failure to recognize this fact 
explains contemporary theorists’ failure to develop a successful unified psychological 
theory of concepts. In other words, there can be no theory of concepts based on the 
assumption that prototypes, exemplars or theories form a single natural kind. 
According to Machery, there is enough evidence to conclude that there can be no 
theory of concepts based on the idea that the notion of concept is a single natural kind. 
He therefore recommends that, in order to discover scientifically relevant 
generalizations, cognitive scientists abandon the notion of concept and focus on 
prototypes, exemplars and theories as distinct bodies of knowledge. 
 
3. Some problems with Machery’s distinct kinds of fundamental concepts 
In Chapter 2, I went over the main aspects and criticisms of the Prototype, 
Exemplar and Theory theories of concepts. The conclusion there was that these 
theories have common problems, and that these problems stem directly from the fact 
that these theories individuate concepts by relation to other concepts. In view of that, I 
argued that prototypes, exemplars and theories fail to provide an adequate account of 
certain basic properties of concepts. 
In this section, I will show how Machery’s proposal is vulnerable to the same 
problems that Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories are faced with. These are 
problems that his proposal can directly inherit from other theories. Additionally, I will 
argue that Machery’s proposal faces its own particular problems. By making these 
problems explicit, I intend to prepare the ground to show that the argument bearing 
upon the Heterogeneity Hypothesis presented at the beginning of the previous section 
fails. 
 
3.1. Why distinct bodies of knowledge can’t displace concepts 
I will now focus on some of the problems of Machery’s view of distinct 
concepts. Most of them can be briefly stated as follows, depending on whether or not 
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they are clearly inherited from the three theories of concepts that Machery’s view is 
intended to combine.36 
Problem 1: Distinct bodies of knowledge can’t account for Intentionality. 
Concepts represent things other than themselves, notably they represent things in the 
world. What they represent is known as the intentional content of the concept and a 
good theory of concepts should explain how concepts attain their contents. For current 
purposes, this is the same as explaining how concepts refer to things in the world. The 
shortest way to show that Machery’s theoretical proposal fails to explain how the 
distinct bodies of knowledge attain their intentional content is to establish that it fails 
to do so because the Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories fail to do so as well 
(See Chapter 2, section 3.2). But Machery’s view raises its own particular difficulties 
in this respect because it is not obvious that his several kinds of concepts can be 
identified with mental representations of some kind. 
The idea of distinct bodies of knowledge about a given category presents 
Machery’s view with the following dichotomy. Either it maintains a commitment to 
the different types of structured mental representations that the Prototype, Exemplar 
and Theory theories posit, or it remains neutral about the representational nature of his 
bodies of knowledge. In both cases, his proposal will be faced with particular 
problems. On the one hand, if his bodies of knowledge are to be identified with 
complex mental representations bearing structural relations to their parts as per the 
Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories, then his proposal could be said to inherit 
the very problems of these theories to explain how those representations refer to the 
things that they do. On the other hand, if Machery’s proposal of bodies of knowledge 
remains neutral about their representational nature, then this proposal faces the 
additional challenge to provide a suitable theory of reference. This theory should help 
us understand both how the distinct bodies of knowledge about a given category can 
refer to things in the world and, at the same time, how they can be co-referential. 
According to the Heterogeneity Hypothesis, for most categories, we typically 
have a prototype, a set of exemplars, and a theory about them. Machery claims that 
                                                          
36 In this section, I will succinctly enumerate what I take to be some of the main problems of Machery’s 
view of bodies of knowledge. Chapter 4 will provide a more detailed discussion on Machery’s view 
with a focus on the problem of content, a problem I think an alternative to concepts should not 
disregard. 
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these entities are distinct but co-referential default bodies of knowledge. However, 
there are reasons to think it is hardly likely that these three entities can have the same 
referents (e.g., Margolis and Laurence 2010; Jacobson 2010). For example, a body of 
knowledge about particular instances of hammers (i.e., a set of exemplars) may apply 
to an atypical emergency hammer for breaking through the windows on public 
transport, while knowledge about prototypical hammers may not. Likewise, a body of 
knowledge about prototypical apples may apply to non-instances of the category of 
apples, such as some items on a decorative plastic fruit bundle platter, while a theory-
driven body of knowledge about causal or functional properties of apples may not. 
These possible cases are useful to show how the three bodies of knowledge can fail to 
be co-referential.37 
The previous examples are also useful to draw attention to the distinction 
between categorizing and referring. The notions of prototype, exemplar and theory 
have been useful to develop different models for categorization. In Machery’s 
proposed theoretical framework, they are meant to serve similar purposes, but how 
successful these constructs are to account for categorization is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for determining the reference of the distinct bodies of knowledge. 
In examining linguistic evidence for the Heterogeneity Hypothesis, Machery 
argues that two distinct bodies of knowledge about, say, tomatoes can be retrieved by 
default depending on what people take tomatoes to be in different respects such as, for 
example, vegetables or fruits (see, e.g., Machery 2009, p.72-73). Specifically, he 
thinks that, when people judge that the sentence “Tomatoes are vegetables” is true, 
they make use of a TOMATO-prototype (rather than, e.g., a TOMATO-theory) 
because they take the sentence to claim that tomatoes look like vegetable. This could 
help us explain why people categorize something as a member of this or that category, 
but this explanation is not a good reason to believe that there are distinct co-referential 
concepts (e.g., TOMATO1 and TOMATO2) because there are different ways in 
which we take something to be. 
                                                          
37 Here, I take it for granted that, for different bodies of knowledge to be co-referential, they have to 
share the same content. Someone might say that sharing similar content is a sufficient condition for 
different bodies of knowledge to be co-referential, provided that such similarity is accounted for in 
terms of sharing certain properties non-accidentally. I will take a closer look at the plausibility of 
content similarity and the role of non-accidental properties regarding concepts in chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively. 
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The property of being a tomato is what it is independent of what we take it to 
be;38 and the presumption that there are different bodies of knowledge about tomatoes 
that are preferentially activated when we categorize that property in terms of what we 
take it to be does not support the claim that those bodies of knowledge are distinct co-
referential concepts. In this respect, Machery’s proposal could make a stronger case if 
it included a theory of reference that could help us understand how his distinct bodies 
of knowledge with little in common refer to things in the world. However, his 
proposal is not explicitly committed to any known theory of reference, and it offers no 
alternative one. Hence, the co-referential character of his distinct bodies of knowledge 
remains unexplained as well. 
Problem 2: Distinct bodies of knowledge can’t account for Publicity. The 
notion of concept publicity is based on our strong intuition that conceptual identity is 
somehow maintained between different people and across different time slices of the 
same individual. A good theory of concepts should explain, for example, how the 
concepts HOUSE, TONIGHT, etc. that someone other than me uses when they think 
that Bernardo should be hosting the film group at his house tonight are the same that I 
use when I think that tonight might not be the best moment for a film night at my 
house. The shortest way to show that Machery’s theoretical proposal fails to explain 
how the distinct bodies of knowledge can be shared among different people and the 
same person across time is to establish that it fails because we cannot secure shared 
reference for Prototype, Exemplar, and Theory theories, as argued above (see Chapter 
2, section 3.2). But Machery’s view raises its own particular difficulties in this 
respect, given that the bodies of knowledge it posits are meant to be distinct default 
entities underwriting distinct cognitive processes (see 2.1 above). 
Surely, someone might think this objection is question-begging since a 
characterisation of the publicity requirement in terms of conceptual identity takes it 
for granted that there are such things as concepts. Alternatively, if one does not think 
there are concepts, then one could claim that the reason why people who use, say, the 
same words manage to communicate fairly well with each other is that they are 
deploying similar, not identical, bodies of knowledge. However, such a counter-
argument depends upon an acceptable notion of similarity, and it is unclear how any 
                                                          
38 Or, for that matter, independent of the fact that we can think about it in different respects. 
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such notion is to be unpacked. As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, while it is 
controversial that content similarity between different bodies of knowledge of the 
same type (e.g., two tokens of a BIRD-prototype) can guarantee publicity, it is 
probable untenable that similarity between different bodies of knowledge that are not 
of the same type (e.g., a token of a BIRD-prototype vs. a token of a BIRD-theory) can 
do so. 
Given the dichotomy stated in Problem 1, I maintain there is one of two ways 
in which we can say that Machery’s view fails to account for the publicity constraint. 
On the one hand, Machery’s view will inherit the very problems of the Prototype, 
Exemplar and Theory theories to satisfy this constraint in case his three bodies of 
knowledge are literally identified with the particular complex mental representations 
posited by those three theories, respectively. On the other, if Machery’s proposal of 
bodies of knowledge remains neutral about their representational nature, then this 
proposal faces the additional challenge of explaining how the same distinct bodies of 
knowledge can be shared and used in distinct processes both among different people 
and the same person across time. 
Machery (2009) proposes the criterion of default knowledge for establishing 
what it is for a given person to have distinct concepts about a given category. He also 
claims that an account of how different people can share the same concept (or body of 
knowledge, for that matter) is scientifically irrelevant (2010). I think we should object 
both to Machery’s claim that concept sharing is irrelevant for psychological 
explanation and to his criterion for establishing the possession of distinct kinds of 
concepts about any particular category. There are different reasons for this objection. I 
will focus on two: the compelling case of intentional generalizations and the 
implausibility of the default hypothesis. 
Machery’s Heterogeneity Hypothesis is not intended to subserve 
psychological explanation qua intentional explanation—i.e. one that appeals to mental 
states in order to explain people’s behaviour. And it is not clear how it could help 
provide an alternative explanatory framework that subsumes the explanatory power of 
intentional explanations. He also avoids discussing views of concepts that take the 
representational status of concepts to be at the centre of psychological generalizations 
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(Rey 2009; Edward 2010). Neglecting the explanatory advantages of shared concepts 
in intentional generalizations is the price Machery has to pay for this omission. 
One of the most prominent features of intentional explanations of behaviour is 
their generality, which depends on concept sharing (e.g., Prinz 2002). The assumption 
is that different people’s actions can be explained as being motivated by the same 
propositional attitudes, typically beliefs and desires, provided that those attitudes are 
composed of the same concepts. For example, suppose Jack went to the farmers’ 
market in Edinburgh because he desired fresh apples and believed that he could find 
some there. And suppose Eva went to the farmer’s market in Barcelona for the same 
reasons. In these two cases, the same intentional explanation can subsume Jack and 
Eva because the attitudes motivating their actions are assumed to be composed of 
precisely the same concepts. In this sense, concept publicity is a requirement for 
intentional explanations to generalize. Hence, the intentional generalizations about 
peoples’ behaviour that concept sharing enables is an explanatory advantage that any 
scientific understanding of the mind should be reluctant to easily dismiss. 
Machery’s view of distinct bodies of knowledge is inadequate to outperform 
the generality of intentional explanations (see Chapter 4). We all have different 
knowledge about any given category and our knowledge is empirically revisable. 
Likewise, it is also difficult to establish what particular knowledge about a category is 
collateral and what knowledge is defining of it. It is therefore difficult to establish 
how Machery’s bodies of knowledge can be distinct or clearly demarcated from one 
another. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis proposes a solution for the problem of 
demarcation in terms of default knowledge, but there are reasons to think that this 
solution can’t work. 
“Default” is the hypothesis that some bodies of knowledge are preferentially 
(or automatically) retrieved from long term memory when one is categorizing, 
reasoning, drawing analogies, making inductions, and so on (e.g., Machery 2010, p. 
196). Machery’s view admits that the processes where these bodies of knowledge are 
involved can include non-default information when default information is not 
sufficient to solve a cognitive task. He calls “background knowledge” to any 
knowledge that is not constitutive of default bodies of knowledge. Nonetheless, the 
proposal is that only default knowledge can be said to be constitutive of any given 
82 
 
prototype, exemplar or theory. I disagree that “Default” offers a plausible way to 
distinguish what is constitutive of Machery’s version of prototypes, exemplars and 
theories because the assumption that default and non-default knowledge can be clearly 
demarcated is untenable. 
Machery grounds the notion of distinct default bodies of knowledge on the 
assumption that people’s judgments under pressure are reliable indicators of their 
existence. However, cognitive tasks yield different results depending on whether or 
not time pressure is involved (e.g., Keil 1989; Rey, 2009, 2010; Blanchard 2010). 
Importantly, there are paradigmatic cases where the absence of time pressure shows 
that a theory approach to concepts does much better than similarity-based approaches 
in more or less reasoned categorization tasks, especially where the latter fail to 
consider hidden explanatory relations between features (e.g., Keil et al. 1999; Murphy 
2002, c.6). Machery (e.g., 2010, section 3) is aware of this empirical evidence but 
considers it is still compatible with the role of background knowledge that is not 
contained in a given default body of knowledge. However, if this is so, then 
Machery’s notion of theory as default knowledge would fail to account for the most 
interesting explanatory role of theories as advocated by Theory theorists (Jacobson 
2010). This is the price Machery has to pay for grounding the theoretical 
independence of prototypes, exemplars and theories on the experimental criterion of 
time pressure. 
Machery’s view of distinct bodies of knowledge is committed to the 
hypothesis that these bodies of knowledge participate in similar yet independent 
cognitive processes. However, concept theorists often agree that different constructs 
may co-exist, and this is particularly the case of Theory theorists who think none of 
the current psychological theories is independently able to account for all cognitive 
phenomena (Murphy 2002, p. 64). In order to undermine this interdependence, 
Machery needs to provide stronger grounds for defending the existence of conceptual 
heterogeneity—and the related multiple independent processes—on the basis of 
Default. Given that the proposed bodies of knowledge can’t be clearly demarcated, it 
is difficult to establish over what kind of shared bodies of knowledge psychological 
explanations can generalize. 
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Problem 3: Distinct bodies of knowledge can’t account for Compositionality. 
Typically, a concept is said to compose in case compounds concepts are formed as a 
function of their constituent concepts and some rules of combination (Prinz 2002). A 
paradigmatic formulation of the compositional combination of concepts is in terms of 
contents. Suppose, for example, ROUND and TABLE are the constituents of the 
concept ROUND TABLE. The compositionality constraint states that it is impossible 
for an individual to possess the complex concept ROUND TABLE and not possess 
ROUND (or TABLE, for that matter). Thus, the meaning of the complex concept is a 
function of the meaning of its constituents. The shortest way to show that Machery’s 
distinct bodies of knowledge fail to compose is to establish that they fail to do so 
because prototypes, exemplars and theories fail to do so as well (See Chapter 2, 
section 3.2.). But Machery’s view raises additional difficulties in this respect. 
The assertion that Machery’s view of distinct bodies of knowledge inherits the 
problems that the Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories have in accounting for 
concept compositionality only applies to the extent that Machery’s constructs are 
literally identified with structured mental representations as per those three theories, 
respectively. However, as we know, Machery’s bodies of knowledge can also be 
understood in terms of weaker identification to the traditional understanding of 
prototypes, exemplars and theories, namely, one that is neutral to their 
representational nature. 
According to this alternative understanding, Machery’s version of these three 
constructs reduces to an appeal to the kind of information that those three constructs 
are supposed to encode. Another way to characterize this information is in terms of 
default knowledge about different aspects of a given category stored in long term 
memory. The problem with this characterization is that it is non-committal (and, 
therefore, unrevealing) about the format of the inner states that serve to carry that 
information. In other words, what is missing is an account of what some (e.g., Bechtel 
2008) have called the representational vehicles of our mental contents. So, to the 
extent that Machery’s distinct bodies of knowledge are actually about categories in 
the world, i.e., to the extent that they can be said to have contents, we are owed an 
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account of the format of vehicles that play a role in the cognitive processes where the 
compositionality of mental representations is required.39 
Not all kinds of representational formats can be said to compose. From 
Chapter 2, we know that prototypes, exemplars and theories are three notions of 
complex mental representations that can’t satisfy the compositionality constraint. If 
you are neuroscientist and think that some kind of iconic (or map-like) representations 
of certain patterns of neural activity are a good model of our mental mechanisms, then 
you may also find it difficult to show how these representations are formed as a 
function of their constituent elements. The notion of distinct bodies of knowledge is 
particularly problematic to satisfy this constraint because it is silent about their 
representational format. In this case, the requirement is that (at least in some cases) a 
given distinct compound body of knowledge is formed as a function of its constituent 
bodies of knowledge plus some rules for combination. As a result of this, the content 
of the compound body of knowledge should be directly inherited from the contents of 
its constituent bodies of knowledge. However, we are not told how this could be 
accomplished. 
Another possibility is that Machery’s version of prototypes, exemplars and 
theories are capable of being combined with one another in order to account for the 
typical open ended set of concepts and thoughts we seem to be able to entertain. This 
strategy is inappropriate for, at least, two reasons. On the one hand, these allegedly 
co-referential bodies of knowledge tend to include information that can’t easily be 
said to be constitutive of only any one of them (e.g., Virtel and Piccinini 2010; 
Murphy 2002, c. 3). On the other hand, prototypes, exemplars and theories are, by 
hypothesis, supposed to take place in distinct cognitive processes, so combining them 
in some processes underlying our cognitive capacities directly violates the 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                          
39 As a case in point, our boundless capacity to entertain new and unique thoughts is typically assumed 
to required concept compositionality, and a good explanation for this compositionality is that format of 
the vehicles of thoughts (qua compound representations) inherit the format of the vehicles of its 
constituent representations. 
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3.2. The case of atomistic theories of concepts 
Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories are committed to the view that what 
makes a concept the very concept that it is is its relations to other concepts (see 
Chapter 2). Alternatively, atomistic theories are theories according to which what 
makes a concept the very concept that it is is how it is related to the world (Margolis 
1998). Whereas prototypes, exemplars and theories are inherently vulnerable to the 
problems described in section 3.1., conceptual atomism is not. 
I do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of atomistic theories of 
concepts. Instead, the purpose I have in mind is to support the claim that Machery’s 
assumption that a good theory of concepts is unviable (because the Prototype, 
Exemplar and Theory theories have failed to provide one) is unwarranted. As I want 
to argue, the reason for this is that there is at least one plausible theory of concepts 
that does not identify concepts with prototypes, exemplars or theories. To accomplish 
this purpose, it will suffice to make this case by illustrating, in a very succinct way, 
the explanatory advantages of the Informational Atomism defended by Fodor (e.g., 
1998). 
To begin with, Fodor’s Informational Atomism (IA, henceforth) holds that 
concepts have no structure and that the intentional content of an unstructured concept 
is its referent. The thesis that the content of a concept is exhausted by its referent 
should be understood in terms of the theory of reference that IA is committed to, 
namely, Fodor’s (1990) Informational Semantics. Essentially, this theory holds that 
the content of a concept is determined by the concept’s standing in an appropriate 
causal relation to the things in the world it represents (Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
Fodor conceives of this relation as a nomic relation between concepts and the things 
that fall under them. One common way to characterize this relation is to say that there 
is a counterfactual-supporting causal relation between the tokenings of a concept and 
the things in the world this concept expresses (Prinz 2002). Thus, for example, the 
reason why the concept FROG represent frogs is that there is a causal law controlling 
the informational connection between the property of being a frog and the tokenings 
of the concept FROG. This connection is informational because the concept FROG is 
said to “carry” information about the property in the world that it expresses (i.e., being 
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a frog). There is more to say about Fodor’s theory of reference 40  but this 
characterization suffices my present purpose to show how IA accommodates the 
requirements discussed in section 3.1. 
Basically, the intentionality requirement is satisfied insofar as the content of 
the unstructured (i.e., primitive) concept is determined by a reliable causal relation 
that the concept bears to and the property it represents. In this sense, IA does not only 
provide a naturalistic solution to the intentionality requirement, but it also avoids the 
problems of content stability other theories have. Theories that identify concepts with 
structured mental representations normally hold that concept identity is determined by 
the internal structural relations a concept bears to other concepts. The result is that the 
variability of the inferential relations in which the concept participates constrains the 
variability of the content of the concept. By contrast, IA holds that concept identity is 
determined by their intentional content. It is how a concept is related to the world that 
determines concept identity. Thus, this externalist mode of individuation 
accommodates the publicity requirement because it guarantees that different people 
and the same person across time share literally the same concept, independent of their 
culture and knowledge. People with different beliefs can share the same concepts 
insofar as those concepts stand in an appropriate nomic relation to the properties that 
cause them. Another way to illustrate the fact that people literally share the same 
concept is in terms of the type/token relation. According to IA, primitive concepts are 
presumed to satisfy such a relation in that people can have tokens of literally the same 
concept type. 
The following assumption underlies Fodor’s thesis that most lexical concepts 
have no internal structure: in order to account for the mental processes underlying 
human intelligent behaviour, it is not necessary to assume that inferences are 
constitutive of cognitive processes. All the theories characterized in Chapter 2 
(section 2)41 take it for granted that our inferential processes depend on the structure 
of concepts that those theories deem as essential to concepts. However, as Fodor 
suggests, there can be a more basic level at which it is possible to hypothesize that 
thought is compositional and that inferential processes are not incompatible with the 
                                                          
40 Consider, for example, the way this theory responds to cases of an erroneous application of a concept 
(see, e.g., Fodor 1990; Laurence and Margolis 1999; Prinz 2002). 
41 Definitional, Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories of concepts. 
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possibility of there being only unstructured concepts. This possibility requires 
accepting that complex thoughts (or mental representations)42 can be formed as a 
function of a limited set of primitive lexical concepts and some rules for combination. 
Given that the content of primitive concepts is causally determined by a reliable 
relation to properties in the world, the content of complex mental representations can 
be said to be directly inherited from the content of its constituents. 
 
3.3. The Heterogeneity-Eliminativism Fallacy 
I am now in a position to show why the eliminativist conclusion about 
concepts does not follow from the distinctness of prototypes, exemplars, and theories, 
considered as putative candidates for the psychological role of concepts. There are 
two general reasons why we should hesitate before drawing such an eliminativist 
conclusion.43 One is that there may be a scientifically valuable superordinate kind, 
which includes as members a number of distinct sub-kinds. The other is that we 
should not be confident that the list of prototypes, exemplars, and theories exhausts 
the possible candidates for the role of psychological concepts. 
Specifically, in relation to the second of these general points we can see that 
the following argument bearing upon the Heterogeneity Hypothesis does not follow 
from its premises: 
 
                                                          
42 IA admits that there are rules for molecule formation that can account for the psychological fact that 
there are complex mental representational structures, but only on the basis of the individuation of their 
constituents. This does not necessarily imply that complex mental representations (e.g., thoughts) are to 
be identified with concepts, pretty much like, e.g., a brick wall is not to be identified with a big 
complex brick. IA holds that concepts are primitives and it would be paradoxical to accept that bigger 
unstructured concepts are formed out of smaller unstructured concepts. Note that this claim does not 
rule out the possibility that certain structured mental representations (e.g., prototypes) can be the 
referents of unstructured concepts (e.g., an atomic concept whose referent is a BIRD-prototype). 
Complex mental representations are things in the word, so concepts can represent mental 
representations that are not concepts (e.g. prototypes as computationally-based representational 
structures that encode background, non-constitutive knowledge about the content of other—complex or 
simple—mental representations). 
43 In fact there are at least three reasons why the heterogeneity of supposed members of a kind does not 
establish the non-existence of such kinds. For there can also be highly abstract kinds, instances of 
which are known to be heterogeneous, even though there may be important nomic generalizations 
involving such kinds. Consider, for example, the kinds predator and having mass of 1 kilogram. 
However, I here mention just the first two reasons, since I am not claiming that concepts are kinds of 
such an abstract generality as the kinds of general physics. 
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Premise 1: If a theoretical notion does not pick out a single homogeneous natural kind, 
we should eliminate it from scientific taxonomy 
Premise 2: The psychological notion of concept is used to refer to prototypes, exemplars 
and theories 
Premise 3: Prototypes, exemplars and theories do not form a single homogeneous natural 
kind altogether 
Conclusion: We should eliminate the notion of concept from the scientific taxonomy of 
psychology 
 
As stated at the beginning of section 2.1 above, the first step of Machery's 
argumentative strategy for supporting the Heterogeneity Hypothesis involved 
establishing that for each object, substance, event, etc., there can be several concepts. 
For Machery (2009, 2010), this undertaking reduces to showing that, if the class of 
concepts includes prototypes, exemplars and theories, then “concepts divides into 
kinds that have little in common” (p.77). However, this preliminary requirement 
presupposes an unwarranted assumption, according to which an adequate unifying 
theory of concepts must identify concepts with some kind of complex mental 
representations, notably, Prototypes, Exemplars or Theories. This assumption is 
unwarranted because it overlooks the possibility of a plausible theory of concepts that 
is not committed to the view that concepts are structured mental representations. I 
have claimed that Fodor’s IA is that theory, but Fodor’s theory is not the only 
available atomistic option (see, e.g., Schneider 2011). 
Though IA is not without problems, it provides a plausible solution to at least 
three important requirements normally imposed upon a good theory of concept, 
namely, intentionality, publicity and compositionality. As discussed in sections 3.1 
and 3.2, Machery’s view of concepts not only fails to satisfy them all, but it also has 
further related problems. Moreover, in characterizing IA, I have also provided 
grounds to support the thesis that structured concepts might be both explanatory and 
metaphysically unnecessary. 
I agree with Machery that the Prototype, Exemplar and Theory theories have 
failed to provide a unifying theory of concepts, but I disagree that there can be no 
unifying theory of concepts at all because those three theories have failed to provide 
one. The unwarranted assumption mentioned above allows us to unveil a hidden 
premise: 
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Premise 4: Either the class of concepts includes a single type of complex mental 
representation, or else it includes prototypes, exemplars and theories qua 
distinct bodies of knowledge. 
 
This new premise makes explicit the false dilemma contained in the argument 
above. For Machery’s Heterogeneity Hypothesis to be plausible, one should have to 
accept Premise 4 or a similar one. However, since there is, at least, one plausible 
theory of concepts that does not identify concepts with complex mental 
representations, one does not have to accept Premise 4. Indeed, consider that one can 
agree that this premise contains an unwarranted disjunction even if one is not an IA 
advocate, since there is even, at least, one plausible theory of concepts qua structured 
mental representations that does not need to identify concepts with prototypes, 
exemplars and theories (e.g., Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
As we saw in Chapter 1, theoretical notions are not to be abandoned from the 
vocabulary of a given science simply because they fail to clearly pick out a putative 
natural kind. Many highly vague theoretical concepts can play a fruitful role in 
explanatory adequacy and some of these concepts have proved to be crucial for 
enquiry to proceed (e.g., Cowie 2009). So, Premise 1 is false, unless other supporting 
premises are supplied. Machery argues that the notion of concept is also explanatory 
idle and that psychologists should focus on prototypes, exemplars and theories. 
However, Machery has not made the case that those three psychological structures can 
do the job normally attributed to concepts. 
Given that Premise 1 and Premise 4 are false (unless other supporting 
premises are supplied), nothing really hangs on Premise 2 and Premise 3 being true or 
false, even if prototypes, exemplars and theories were distinct natural kinds (since 
being a natural kind and being a concept are not necessarily co-extensive) and even if 
IA was false. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I took issue with a recent eliminativist thesis regarding 
concepts put forward by Edouard Machery. In order to fulfil this purpose, I first 
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addressed Machery’s main aspects of his argument for concept eliminativism. This 
involved an account of the main tenets of his Heterogeneity Hypothesis and the 
general argumentative strategy for supporting these tenets. 
After that, I discussed some familiar problems connected with the 
psychological theories of concepts Machery considers relevant for his own view. On 
the basis of that discussion, I argued that Machery’s theoretical framework for 
conceptual heterogeneity not only inherits the same problems of the mentioned 
theories, but also introduces new problems that render his eliminativist proposal less 
viable. 
Finally, I presented and discussed a version of Machery’s general argument 
bearing upon the Heterogeneity Hypothesis. I argued that it contained an unwarranted 
assumption, according to which an adequate unifying theory of concepts must identify 
concepts with some kind of complex mental representations. To support my point, I 
went over a succinct account of Fodor’s Informational Atomism and argued that the 
eliminativist conclusion of the argument does not follow from the premises, even if 
Informational Atomism was false. Hence, the conclusion is that Machery’s argument 
fails and that we should therefore reject his thesis about the elimination of concepts 
from the theoretical jargon of cognitive science.  
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Chapter 4 
———————————— 
Content and Bodies of Knowledge 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the type of concept eliminativism that Machery (2009, 2010) 
advocates, cognitive scientists should avoid the notion of concepts for two reasons: 
first, psychologists are wrong when they assume that concepts amount to a natural 
kind; second, keeping this notion as part of the theoretical vocabulary of psychology 
prevents scientific progress. His view is that the class of concepts is not really a 
homogeneous class, but a collection of at least three distinct yet co-referential bodies 
of knowledge (henceforth, BoKs) characteristically used in independent cognitive 
processes. 
One of the ways in which this type of eliminativism can be challenged is by 
arguing that some relevant reconstruction of the general argument against concepts is 
committed to certain important unwarranted assumptions. That was the aim of 
Chapter 3. Another way of challenging concept eliminativism of this sort is by 
arguing that, in some important respect, the costs of eliminating the relevant 
theoretical term outweigh the benefits of keeping it. This is the aim of the current 
chapter. 
More specifically, the aim of this chapter is twofold. I will first argue that 
Machery’s view of BoKs can’t avoid the problem of content, i.e. providing an answer 
to the question of how it is that these putative BoKs can attain their intentional 
content. Then, I will show that Machery’s proposal that psychologists should replace 
the notion of concept with his BoKs is a bad proposal because there is no plausible 
theory of content in sight that can be made to work for these BoKs.44 
 
 
                                                          
44 I am indebted to discussions and helpful comments by Bernardo Aguilera about topic of this chapter, 
with whom I am co-authoring a related manuscript currently under peer review. 
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2. What the problem is 
Many cognitive scientists and philosophers agree that concepts are the basic 
constituents of thought and, therefore, that they must play a central role in 
psychological explanation. Scientists’ generalisations and predictions about our 
conceptual abilities are based on the assumption that it is concepts that allow us to 
coordinate our behaviour with respect to the features of the environment that concepts 
represent. In this sense, psychological theories of concepts are expected to explain 
many different yet interrelated phenomena. Among the most prominent phenomena 
are concept acquisition, categorization, inference, and the stability of meaning. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, this latter phenomenon is usually understood in terms of the 
capability of concepts for being shared by different people—or the same person at 
different time slices—when deploying thought processes about the same referent. 
Another reason for the centrality of concepts in the understanding of our 
cognitive capacities is that they can help explain the property that our thoughts have 
to represent objects (individuals, relations, etc.) in the world. Theorists call this 
phenomenon the ‘intentionality of thought’. With respect to this phenomenon, one can 
roughly characterise the relevant role of concepts in the following way. Contemporary 
research in the human mind has traditionally identified concepts with mental 
representations and, given the representational capacity of concepts, researchers have 
taken it for granted that the intentionality of thoughts reduces to the intentionality of 
their constituent concepts. In turn, the way the conceptual capacity of representing is 
explained is by appealing to the notion of content, a notoriously divisive notion that 
has been the subject matter of extensive debate and theorising (e.g., Putnam 1975; 
Searle 1983; Dretske 1988; Millikan 1989; Fodor 1990). Regardless of the variety of 
views on this notion and its role in an account of the intentionality of thoughts, it is 
relatively uncontroversial to say that concepts are typically understood as content-
bearing and that an explanation of content is deemed a desideratum for an adequate 
theory of concepts (Fodor 1998; Prinz 2002).45 
                                                          
45 Importantly, content is not only relevant for an account of how we manage to interact with external 
entities, but it is also essential for an account of the semantics of language. Influenced by Grice (1957), 
many philosophers maintain that linguistic expressions have meaning by virtue of deriving their 
contents from the content of the concepts that those expressions are used to express. 
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Despite this important role that concepts customarily play in psychological 
explanation, the very scientific relevance of the notion of concept has, as we have 
seen, been called into question by Machery (2009). Machery claims that this notion 
should be displaced altogether from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. His 
alternative suggestion is that different types of bodies of knowledge (BoKs) can do the 
job of explaining the same cognitive phenomena that those researching into the 
psychology of concepts have tried to account for by appealing to the theoretical notion 
of concept. As critically examined in Chapter 3, Machery’s argument is that these 
BoKs are so distinct from one another that they cannot be subsumed by a single 
general notion of concept, from which he concludes that this notion really fails to pick 
out a genuine psychological kind. 
In this chapter, my aim is to critically examine Machery’s notion of BoKs with 
respect to the problem of content. Theories of concepts within scientific psychology 
have traditionally provided us with possible accounts of mental content, so it is 
perfectly legitimate to ask whether Machery’s alternative to concepts can be 
supplemented with an account of content. Until the time of writing the present thesis, 
Machery has not provided us with such an account and I will attempt to show that no 
plausible notion of content can be combined with his heterogeneous BoKs. If this is 
right, then a psychology based on BoKs will be quite unable to account for the 
intentionality of the representational mind, clearly a very serious flaw. My strategy 
will be the following. In section 3, I will revisit Machery’s case for the elimination of 
concepts and a characterisation of his proposed alternative to concepts. The purpose 
of section 4 is to state Machery’s position regarding the problem of content and why 
this is a problem his view can’t avoid. Section 5 will introduce two broad approaches 
for characterising the relation between concepts and what concepts are about. The 
most prominent views of content determination will be described with respect to these 
two approaches. In section 6, I will assess the possible application of the views 
presented in the previous section to Machery’s view of BoKs. My conclusion will be 
that none of those accounts of content can be adapted to Machery’s alternative to 
concepts, which points to bleak prospects for his case for concept eliminativism. 
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3. Machery’s distinct bodies of knowledge 
One of the questions Machery (2009) asks, in connection with the current 
empirical study of concepts,46 is whether or not we have good reasons to think that the 
notion of concept psychologists make use of really designates a homogeneous class. If 
the answer to this question is positive, then concept theorists might be justified in 
inferring that such a notion is likely to pick out a natural kind and, therefore, that there 
must be a correct theory of concepts—probably, a version of one of the revisionist 
theories discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2) which attempt to displace the classical 
theory of definitional concepts. If the answer is negative, the idea of a single correct 
theory of concepts could be put into question. 
The assumption that, if one of the available psychological theories of concepts 
is true, then none of the others is true is what Machery calls “the Received View.” An 
interesting reaction to this view is Machery’s thesis that the class of concepts really 
divides into several heterogeneous kinds, a view that he dubs the Heterogeneity 
Hypothesis. He takes these kinds to be distinct BoKs. Roughly, a BoK is said to be 
information about a certain category that is preferentially retrieved from long-term 
memory to be used in cognitive processes underlying our higher cognitive 
competences. It follows from this characterisation of a default BoK that not all 
knowledge about a given category can count as a relevant BoK for solving a particular 
task. Indeed, Machery distinguishes between default knowledge (namely, knowledge 
about a given category that is preferentially retrieved) and background knowledge 
(namely, knowledge about the same category that isn’t preferentially retrieved). 
Importantly, while background knowledge is said to be context-dependent, default 
knowledge is said to be context-independent because it can be retrieved in all contexts 
(Machery 2015). These two types of knowledge do not have clear-cut boundaries, 
since, according to Machery, people’s default BoKs about a given category do not 
need to be exactly the same for them to count as BoKs of the same type and about the 
same category. He supports this claim by resorting to the view of natural kinds 
developed by Boyd (1991, 1999). According to this view, a natural kind is a class of 
things that form a Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC), i.e. a class whose members 
                                                          
46 For a general evaluation of main theories of concepts, see Laurence and Margolis 1999, Prinz 2002, 
c. 3-4 and Machery 2010, c. 4. For a detailed account of findings in experimental cognitive psychology, 
see Murphy 2002. 
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share some cluster of properties in virtue of certain causal mechanisms. These 
mechanisms sustain a cluster of properties which are jointly sufficient (but 
individually need not be necessary) for determining class membership. 
Machery (2009)47 examines the models of concepts and cognitive processes 
proposed by the main psychological theories (i.e., Prototype, Exemplar and Theory 
theories) and concludes that these models have little in common with one another, 
“given the properties that are relevant to characterize concepts” (p. 5). His suggestion 
is that prototypes, exemplars and theories, if they exist, must amount to distinct BoKs 
because they do not form a single natural kind with many common properties, as 
Boyd’s notion of HPC requires. In his view, this realisation is sufficient reason for 
displacing the term ‘concept’ from psychological taxonomies, since it is common 
methodological practice for any given science to eliminate from their classificatory 
schemes those theoretical terms that do not pick out natural kinds. Thus, given the 
assumption that the term ‘concept’ does not pick out a natural kind which is able to 
support many inductive generalisations, Machery defends the view that the existence 
of his proposed distinct BoKs provides pragmatic grounds for the elimination of the 
theoretical notion of concept. 
Machery’s proposal is essentially based on the view that the theories that 
identify concepts with prototypes, exemplars and theories are not rival theories 
competing to provide an account of the same phenomenon because they really provide 
adequate descriptions of different varieties of categorisations (Hill 2010). Thus, in line 
with the Heterogeneity Hypothesis, his contention is that what psychologists have 
taken to be three different models of concepts should be better understood as three 
different BoKs playing a central role in distinct and independent cognitive processes. 
Hence, contrary to the Received View, the explanatory advantages of any one of these 
theories would not yield evidence against any of the others. According to the 
alternative view, for each category (i.e., a certain class of things), an individual 
typically has three fundamental concepts, which Machery conceives of as distinct co-
referential BoKs. 
How can we tell when someone is using distinct BoKs which refer to the same 
category? Well, to answer this question Machery offers two individuating criteria, 
                                                          
47 See also Machery (2005 and 2010). 
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‘connection’ and ‘coordination’, and establishes the following condition: whenever 
two elements of information about x, A and B, fulfil either of these criteria, those 
elements of information can be said to belong to two distinct concepts. Machery 
(2010) characterised the connection and coordination criteria in the following way, 
respectively: 
 
1. If retrieving A (e.g., water is typically transparent) from long-term memory and 
using it in a cognitive process (e.g., a categorization process) does not facilitate the 
retrieval of B (water is made of molecules of H2O) from long-term memory and its 
use in some cognitive process, then A and B belong to two distinct concepts 
(WATER1 and WATER2). 
 
2. If A and B yield conflicting judgments (e.g., the judgment that some liquid is water 
and the judgment that this very liquid is not water) and if I do not view either 
judgment as defeasible in light of the other judgment (i.e., if I hold both judgments to 
be equally authoritative), then A and B belong to two distinct concepts (WATER1 
and WATER2). (p. 196) 
 
Thus, while the first criterion allows for WATER-prototype and WATER-
theory to count as two distinct BoKs, the second criterion is consistent with the 
possibility that two contradictory judgments (e.g., penguins are birds and penguins 
are not birds) are caused by different BoKs (e.g., PENGUIN-theory and PENGUIN-
prototype, respectively), provided that one of them is defeasible. 
According to Machery, the empirical fact that people’s categorisation 
judgments can be explained in terms of different BoKs is evidence that people do not 
make use of a single kind of concept and that, instead, we typically use different 
independent representations (notably, a prototype, a set of exemplars and a theory) for 
any given category. He rejects the less radical proposal that there might be just one 
kind of representation the components of which include different types of structures 
as the proponents of Hybrid Theories of concepts have claimed. As he goes on to 
argue, the reason for his rejection is that those theories have failed to explain what it 
means for those different BoKs to be parts of the same concept. 
Machery’s general argumentative strategy moves from the claim that 
prototypes, exemplars and theories amount to distinct BoKs to the argument that those 
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three BoKs have very few properties in common because they really pick out different 
natural kinds (i.e., different HPCs) relevant for different and independent cognitive 
processes. More precisely, his claim is that prototypes, exemplars and theories are 
three different psychological entities that individuals retrieve by default from long-
term memory to be used in cognitive processes underwriting our higher cognitive 
competences. If this was correct, as the evidence he reviews seems to suggest, then 
there would be grounds to contend that what psychologists attempt to explain by 
appealing to the notion of concepts cannot be accounted for by a single general 
scientifically relevant kind. Indeed, Machery’s radical proposal is talk of concepts 
should be replaced with talk of at least three distinct yet co-referential BoKs. As 
Machery points out, his proposal is completely empirical and able to be revised by, 
for instance, future discoveries in neuroscience regarding concept location and neural 
dissociation that challenges his argument for heterogeneity. Similarly, Machery’s 
revisionary proposal regarding the study of concepts is open to the possibility that the 
number of BoKs individuals have about a given category is not exhausted by 
prototypes, exemplars and theories. 
 
4. What Machery says on the problem of content and why he can’t avoid it 
Machery (2009) points out that his usage of the term “knowledge” 
corresponds to that of psychologists’, which he characterises as “any contentful state 
that can be used in cognitive processes” (p.8). It would appear that by adopting 
psychologists’ standpoint regarding the study of cognition Machery’s own view of 
BoKs need not be committed to providing an account of how it is that these 
admittedly contentful mental states attain their contents. The reason for this is double: 
one the one hand, psychologists are typically interested in characterising the type of 
knowledge that might be constitutive of contentful BoKs (relevant for some cognitive 
task), without specifically providing an account of how the contents of those mental 
structures are secured. On the other hand, since Machery’s view of BoKs is a 
revisionist proposal that intends to question the viability of a scientific theory of 
concepts, it might seem that by challenging this latter project defenders of a 
revisionist view of BoKs are no longer expected to supply a suitable theory of content 
as one would expect concept theorists to do. However, as I will intend to show, 
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neither psychologists’ typical explanatory interests in the study of cognition or 
Machery’s revisionist proposal is a good reason to avoid the problem of content. Let 
us consider each of these issues in turn. 
With respect to the first issue (i.e., psychologists’ explanatory interests), 
Machery relies on his methodological contention that theorising about concepts in 
psychology and philosophy pursue different agendas. According to him, whereas 
psychologists are primarily interested in the role concepts may play in processes such 
as reasoning, learning and categorising, philosophers are mainly concerned with an 
account of the semantic nature of our thoughts. One way to describe this divergence 
of interests is in terms of a division of labour according to which, while 
psychologists’ business is to explain people’s behaviour by appealing to contentful 
states, philosophers are expected to provide a foundational account of the semantic 
properties of those mental states. Indeed, even though this is a view some 
philosophers (e.g., Fodor 1994; Peacocke 1992; Rey 1998) would gladly welcome, it 
is one Machery thinks we should treat with caution due to epistemological reasons. 
What he specifically warns us about is philosophers’ development of theories of 
content on the basis of intuitions about the conditions under which one would find it 
plausible to ascribe to people certain attitudes with propositional contents. Machery 
supports this claim with evidence suggesting that people's intuitions regarding the 
ascription of propositional attitudes are neither uniform (e.g., Hewson, 1994) nor free 
from cultural variation (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001; Machery et al. 2004). I agree with 
Machery that, even though the philosophical task of accounting for how it is that we 
can have contentful states should be taken with caution, there is no reason to think 
that this project can’t be successfully developed. In that spirit, I will later on intend to 
explore what available theory of content could possibly be combined with Machery's 
theory of BoKs. 
With respect to the second issue (i.e., the possible irrelevance of a theory of 
content), Machery betrays a hasty generalisation one could make explicit in the 
following way. The inference Machery seems to take for granted is that, if the 
justification of a theory of content is that it is expected to supplement a theory of 
concepts, then, as someone might say, it follows from the fact that there are no 
concepts that there is no justification for a theory of content. Hence, we should not 
expect that someone who is committed to the existence of distinct BoKs (and, hence, 
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to the non-existence of concepts) is committed to a theory of content that works for 
those BoKs. However, this inference is invalid because it wrongly takes it for granted 
that a theory of content is only relevant for mental representations we identify with 
concepts. Indeed, one does not have to go very far to find a relevant counter-example. 
Machery (2010) reduces an account of content to an account of a “semantic theory for 
our propositional attitudes” (p. 47), but this reduction is clearly at odds with his own 
view that knowledge does not keep to explicit propositional states. According to 
Machery, the kind of knowledge that is relevant for his proposed BoKs can also be 
“implicit or explicit [as well as] propositional, imagistic, or procedural” (p.8). Thus, 
what this latter characterization of knowledge suggests is that someone who defends 
the scientific relevance of prototypes, exemplars and theories qua distinct BoKs is not 
ipso facto free from an account of how those BoKs attain their contents. 
Notwithstanding this latter consideration, Machery sometimes appears to 
incline towards a more radical motivation for ignoring issues connected with the 
problem of content in his proposed theoretical framework. If it is possible to make the 
case that the notion of concepts is theoretically idle—as someone might claim—, it 
might well be possible to make the case that the notion of content is theoretically idle 
too. Indeed, some think the idea that reference be deemed as a desideratum for an 
empirical theory of concepts is at least methodologically controversial (e.g., Machery 
et al. 2004; Piccinini and Scott. 2006). 
However, opting for this alternative would be moving too fast for at least two 
related reasons. First, Machery’s proposed BoKs are intended to replace concepts in 
the explanation of psychological phenomena formerly attributed to concepts. If this 
remark is correct, then those BoKs are expected to be involved in psychological 
processes whereby the perceptual input is classified into a collection of meaningful 
categories in virtue of which the world is made intelligible to us. Second, for the 
proposed BoKs to be able to do this job it is required that they do not only possess 
processing properties that help to account for how it is that these BoKs are used to 
discriminate and categorise, but also semantic properties that help to account for what 
it is that they discriminate and categorise. In other words, as is the case with research 
on concepts, research on distinct BoKs should be interested not only in the 
investigation of processing properties prototypes, exemplars and theories are expected 
to possess, but also in the investigation of the semantic properties that enable them to 
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refer to external objects in the world. This latter issue is particularly relevant for 
research on Machery’s BoKs because different BoKs about the same category are 
assumed to be co-referential. Thus, for example, while it is important for the proposed 
theoretical alternative to concepts to able to establish the way in which three distinct 
BoKs about the category of cats (e.g., a CAT-prototype, CAT-exemplar and a CAT-
theory) are used to categorise cats, it is also important to establish how it is that each 
of those BoKs can refer to external objects in the first place, viz., how it is that they 
can have the contents that they are supposed to have. 
Machery refrains from providing a possible account of content for his distinct 
BoKs on the grounds that such an account is not expected to be part of the explananda 
of a psychological theory of concepts, and hence, of the explananda of a theory of 
BoKs. His view is that philosophical and psychological theories of concepts are two 
different projects because philosophers and psychologists working in concepts do not 
talk about the same thing when they use the theoretical term ‘concept’. However, 
Machery (2010) has responded to his critics by acknowledging the importance of 
establishing how it is that prototypes, exemplars and theories can co-refer (see, p. 
234). I agree with Machery in this respect and I also concur with his diagnosis that, 
when theorising about concepts, philosophers, not psychologists, have typically 
focused on the problem of content. But I disagree with both his contention that 
concept theorists in philosophy and psychology are not really talking about the same 
type of thing and the view that an account of content may not be relevant for a theory 
of concepts (or, mutatis mutandis, for a theory of BoKs). 
I maintain that, just as in the case of concepts, an account of how it is that 
prototypes, exemplars and theories attain their contents should be part of the 
explanatory desiderata a complete theory of distinct BoKs should ideally explain. 
Indeed, such an account invites important interaction between concept theories in 
philosophy and psychology. In what follows, I will intend to show that a failure to 
combine Machery’s BoKs with current theories of contents constitutes a reason to 
resist both the plausibility of BoKs as an alternative to concepts and Machery’s case 
for concepts eliminativism. 
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5. Two broad approaches to conceptual content 
Theorists have proposed different ways of characterising the relation between 
concepts and their contents, viz., the things in the world they are supposed to be 
about. Here, I propose to consider an initial distinction between two broad approaches 
to this relation: Intensionalism and Referentialism.48  Intentionalism states that the 
content of a concept determines its extension. Referentialism states that the extension 
of a concept determines its content. 
As I will broadly characterise it here, Intentionalism comprises two views of 
content determination. According to the first view, content is determined by ‘Fregean 
senses’ and, according to the second, content is determined by ‘conceptual role’. In 
turn, Referentialism will be characterised in terms of its most prominent version 
according to which the conceptual content is fixed by some informational-cum-
nomological relation to its referent, such as in the case of Informational Semantics. 
With this distinction in hand, the aim of the following section will be an 
assessment of Machery’s view of BoKs with respect to each of the two approaches to 
content introduced above. In this sense, the hypothesis I want to test is that, if it was 
possible to establish that Machery’s view of distinct BoKs can be combined with 
either Intensionalism or Referentialism, his view would count as a serious alternative 
to concepts and his case for concept eliminativism would be strengthened. 
 
6. Is there a viable account of content determination for Machery’s 
proposed alternative to concepts? 
 
Intensionalism and BoKs. I will begin by assessing Machery’s distinct BoKs 
with respect to what I have called Intensionalism. Regarding this first approach, I 
broadly distinguished two main views of content determination (i.e., one based on 
Fregean senses and the other based on conceptual role) and I will now examine each 
of them in turn. 
                                                          
48 This distinction is motivated, though not strictly in accordance, with the relevant distinction proposed 
by Fodor and Pylyshyn 2015. 
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Philosopher Christopher Peacocke (e.g., 1992) has popularised a neo-Fregean 
view of concepts that exploits Frege’s distinction between sense and reference and the 
doctrine that linguistic expressions can have both of them, such that the sense of an 
expression contains the mode of presentation of its referent. Thus, for example, the 
expressions “giraffes” and “long-necked ruminants” can be said to express two modes 
of presentation (i.e., senses) of one and the same referent in the world. According to 
Frege, our access to the referent of an expression depended on whether we were able 
to grasp the sense of the expression. Peacocke proposes a theory that intends to 
legitimate Frege’s ontology of abstract objects, identifying concepts with Fregean 
senses,49 which are also said to be the constituents of propositions. Here, the central 
idea is a concept (i.e., a Fregean sense containing a mode of presentation of a given 
referent) is individuated in terms of its possession conditions. Thus, since Fregean 
senses are concepts and concepts are supposed to be the primary bearers of content, 
when a thinker satisfies the conditions to possess a Fregean sense, this sense (i.e., 
concept) ipso facto has content. 
According to Machery, prototypes, exemplars and theories form three distinct 
psychological kinds because they are retrieved by default in order to be used in 
independent yet similar cognitive processes underwriting our higher cognitive 
competences. In this sense, something like an intensionalist neo-Fregean account of 
content would appear to be compatible with Machery’s view of BoKs. Consider, for 
example, that a DOG-exemplar and DOG-prototype are distinguished from one 
another in that they are preferentially used in independent epistemic mechanisms, 
such as, say, exemplar-based categorisation and prototype-based categorisation, 
respectively. These mechanisms, as someone might say, could constitute conditions 
for the possession of three different modes of presentation of the same referent, 
which, in Machery’s terminology, would be equivalent to three distinct BoKs about 
the same category. To make this claim more appealing, one could even argue that, 
when using a BoK an individual is really grasping a Fregean sense, since entertaining 
a certain BoK involves satisfying the corresponding possession conditions for 
entertaining a certain modes of presentation of a given referent. 
                                                          
49 The proposal is to supply Frege’s notion with a strategy of legitimation based on the conditions for 
the empirical application of senses, namely, the concept's possession conditions (see, e.g. Peacocke 
1996). 
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Presumably, if this account of content could be made to work for Machery’s 
BoKs, this strategy would offer many advantages associated with the neo-Fregean 
notion of content. First, if it is true that senses are what fix reference, this strategy 
would provide a solution to account for the intentionality of BoKs. Second, it would 
also explain how DOG-prototypes, DOG-exemplars and DOG-theories could be 
distinct cognitive mechanisms that share the same referent. The idea here is that 
senses containing different modes of presentation of a given referent could be 
conceived of as distinct co-referential BoKs, in a way that is analogous to how H2O 
and WATER in the propositions “water is liquid” and “H2O is liquid” are 
distinguished by means of grasping two senses of a single referent (water). And 
finally, this strategy would account for the stability of content and shareability of 
BoKs, since senses can be grasped at different times and by different individuals. 
This move might appear difficult to accept for someone who thinks that neo-
Fregean approaches have had a hard time trying to account for the ontological status 
of senses and, hence, explaining how they can be grasped by our representational 
mechanisms. However, the notion of senses can be combined with theories of 
concepts that do not hold the Fregean commitment that senses are non-mental abstract 
objects. For example, Prinz (2002) and Margolis and Laurence (2007) have suggested 
that the notion of senses could be adapted to a representationalist approach to 
concepts by applying the type/token distinction, where concept types are conceived of 
as some sort of abstractions and concept tokens as their particular mental realisations. 
Whereas Prinz highlights that the putative abstract ontological status of senses can be 
reconciled with the abstract status of mental-representation types, Margolis and 
Laurence have put forward a ‘Mixed View’ of concepts which accommodates senses 
as the putative meanings that mental-representations tokens can have or express. In 
any case, viewing senses in terms of a type/token distinction regarding concepts 
would be no more problematic than presupposing a metaphysical type/token 
distinction regarding properties in general, as it would be, for instance, to say that 
brown objects instantiate the property of being brown. 
However, I believe that this neo-Fregean approach to content does not work 
for Machery’s purposes. Note that, if our use of BoKs satisfies the conditions for 
grasping senses, then the existence of concepts would not be challenged by the fact 
that different BoKs are preferentially retrieved to be used in independent cognitive 
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mechanisms. It may be recalled from our initial characterisation that grasping a 
Fregean sense requires that a thinker satisfies the conditions that account for 
mastering a concept. Hence, insofar as those possession conditions take the form of 
psychological mechanisms that are capable of grasping a Fregean sense (or 
instantiating a concept type, for that matter), the relevant BoKs can be said to possess 
conceptual content. If this is correct, then there is no clear motivation for eliminating 
concepts, and, hence, for discussing distinct kinds of BoKs as a replacement for the 
notion of concepts. 
Someone might want to insist on combining this neo-Fregean approach to 
BoKs and claim that equating BoKs with Fregean senses can ascribe content to BoKs 
without having to identify senses with concepts. If the notions of sense and concept 
were thus dissociated from one another, then the fact that those BoKs can capture 
Fregean senses would not threaten Machery's case for concept eliminativism. 
However, this would imply pruning the notion of sense to the point of losing its 
significance. Consider that characterising content in terms of Fregean senses brings 
along features which have traditionally been associated with the conceptual, such as 
compositionality, reference determinacy and force independence. Indeed, resorting to 
this Fregean approach is a standard strategy used for establishing criteria for concept 
possession (Gunther 2003), the satisfaction of which some think allows for concept 
individuation (e.g., Peacocke, 1992, 1996; Cussins 1990, 1993). Thus, my conclusion 
is that an intensionalist neo-Fregean view of BoKs is incompatible with Machery's 
case for concept eliminativism. 
As I pointed out at the beginning of this section, Intensionalism can also be 
associated with the view that content is determined by conceptual role. According to 
this view, the content of a concept is determined by (at least some of) its inferential 
connections to other concepts. Standard versions of the Prototype, Exemplar and 
Theory theories of concepts are good cases in point. According to these theories, a 
concept is some kind of mental representation that bears a particular type of structural 
relation to other concepts. Thus, whereas the content of a prototype concept is 
determined by a set of relations of statistical frequency to its constituent concepts, the 
content of an exemplar concept is determined by its similarity relations to the 
representation of its exemplars as stored in memory. Likewise, the content of a theory 
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concept is supposed to be determined by its inherent inferential relations with other 
concepts within a given theory (or belief system, for that matter). 
However, these theories share a common problem connected with the very 
inferential character of content determination they put forward. Given this character, it 
becomes evident that, because the corresponding inferential relations are subject to 
inevitable variation, the contents of the proposed models of concept are inherently 
unstable.50 For example, if an individual’s prototypical violin changes from wooden-
made to made-of-diverse-materials, then, according to Intensionalism based on 
conceptual roles, her old and new prototypical violins can be said to be BoKs with 
different semantic structures and, hence, different contents. Similarly, people whose 
VIOLIN-prototypes differ in some respect would not be able to think or talk about the 
same thing when using their VIOLIN-prototypes. What this example suggests is that 
BoKs with unstable inferential structures both within and across individuals are 
unsuited to support generalisations about various phenomena (e.g., how people 
reason, learn and communicate with one another) in virtue of BoKs that refer to the 
same category. Put differently, if Machery’s proposed BoKs are to attain their 
contents from their inferential relations to other prototypes, exemplars and theories, 
then this account of content determination is bound to inherit the problem of content 
stability stemming from the models of conceptual representation these BoKs are 
based on. 
Admittedly, the way I have characterised the problem of the stability of 
content determined by conceptual role is based on the assumption that conceptual 
content is constituted by every inference that a concept is involved in. This is what 
Fodor and Lepore (1992) have described as semantic holism. Someone might claim, 
however, that holism is not a challenge to content determination by means of 
conceptual role because a limited number of inferences, instead of every one of them, 
can do the job of providing our mental states with stable content. This view is usually 
committed to the idea that content similarity, not content identity, is sufficient for the 
stability of meaning required for different people (or the same person over time) to be 
said to share the same concepts (e.g., Harman, 1993). Regarding this alternative, 
Fodor and Lepore (1992) have replied that constancy of content fails to be accounted 
                                                          
50 See Fodor and Lepore 1992.  
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for in terms of a limited number of inferences without presupposing some sort of 
identity between inferences that overlap within or between individuals. A related 
problem to which Fodor and Lepore draw our attention is that, even if we granted that 
there is some invariant set of inferences that is constitutive of content, such an account 
of content would have to appeal to some kind of analytic/synthetic distinction in order 
to specify that set of inferences. The problem arises because, according to these 
authors, Quine’s critique of this distinction is widely thought to have shown the 
notion of analyticity to be untenable, at least for employment in fundamental 
philosophical theorising. 
In response to Fodor and Lepore, Greenberg and Harman (2006) argue for an 
ecumenical version of Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS) which they think is immune 
to the problems we have just mentioned. In this version of CRS, conceptual roles are 
identified with several aspects of use of mental representations in thought. These 
aspects of use do not need to be restricted to internal inferential relations, which, 
according to Greenberg and Harman, correspond to just one of the several possible 
aspects of conceptual role (i.e., one of the several ways mental representations are 
used in thought).51 In these authors’ view, whereas conceptual roles are said to be part 
of what determines that a mental representation has a given content, they should not 
be deemed constitutive parts of the content of the mental representation. Hence, as 
Greenberg and Harman claim, CRS is committed to a notion of content stability that 
is based on content similarity, without presupposing sameness of content. This is a 
theory of content determination deserves our attention since it could provide 
Machery’s view of co-referential BoKs with a plausible notion of content stability by 
means of conceptual role. However, I think there is some important incompatibility 
between Greenberg and Harman’s notion of content similarity determined by 
conceptual role and Machery’s putative co-referential BoKs. 
According to Greenberg and Harman, the content of a mental representation 
derives from use. If this view was to work for Machery’s BoKs, then what a given 
BoK represents would have to be determined by the roles of the BoK in a person’s 
cognitive economy. Thus, for example, what a prototype (e.g., BIRD-prototype) 
                                                          
51 According to these authors, other aspects of use may include perceptual representation, recognition 
of implications, modelling, inference, labelling, categorization, theorizing, planning, and control of 
action. 
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represents is determined by the way it is used to categorise certain things in the world 
(viz., birds), and the same applies for exemplars and theories, mutatis mutandis. 
Moreover, given the assumption that content similarity is a sufficient condition for 
content stability, the similar ways different people may represent a given object, say, 
prototypically could provide grounds for those people to be said to possess co-
referential prototypical representations of that object. And the same can be said about 
the ways different people may represent a given object by means of exemplars and 
theories, respectively. However, even if we granted that the similarity between two 
tokens of the same type of BoK can be enough to explain their co-referentiality (e.g., 
that two BIRD-prototypes are both about birds), things become fuzzier when it comes 
to different types of BoKs which are also supposed to be co-referential (i.e., BIRD-
prototypes, BIRD-exemplars and BIRD-theories). In these cases, we can expect 
considerable variation between their cognitive roles, and so it is not at all clear 
whether Greenberg and Harman's account of content similarity is able to guarantee the 
co-referentiality of these BoKs. 
For we should note that even though these three putative distinct BoKs are 
said to be used in similar cognitive processes (e.g., categorization, induction, 
deduction, analogy-making, planning, or linguistic comprehension, etc.), they are also 
said to be used in very different ways. For example, as Machery (2010) points out, 
while prototypes are assumed to be used in processes that compute the similarity 
between a prototype and other representations in a linear manner, exemplars are 
assumed to be used in processes that compute the similarity between a set of 
exemplars and other representations in a nonlinear manner. In turn, theories (e.g., a 
BoK involving some causal knowledge) are assumed to be used in “cognitive 
processes that are similar to the algorithms involved in causal reasoning” (p. 201). 
Thus, if the content of a BoK derives from its use, then prototypes, exemplars and 
theories associated with the same category are not expected to bear the similar 
contents that are supposed to guarantee their co-referentiality. We conclude from this 
that Greenberg and Harman’s version of CRS cannot be successfully adapted to 
Machery’s view of BoKs. 
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Referentialism and BoKs. As opposed to Intensionalism, Referentialism 
assumes that the extension of a concept determines its content. A prominent version 
of this view states that the content of concepts is determined by virtue of them being 
in a certain causal-cum-nomological relation to their referents. Here, Fodor’s 
informational semantics is the best known position (Fodor 1987, 1990). According to 
this theory, the content of a concept qua primitive (or unstructured) mental 
representation is determined by the concept’s standing in an appropriate causal-cum-
nomological relation to things in the world. Motivated by the notion of content as 
information put forward by Dretske (1981), the theory is based on the idea that a 
concept carries information about a given property if the concept is under the 
nomological control of that property. More specifically, the idea is that types of 
concepts are causally connected to the properties their tokens express by means of 
there being a natural law that prescribes this (actual or counterfactual) causal 
connection. Thus, contrary to the alternative described in the preceding paragraphs, 
the content of a concept like APPLE would not be determined by its relations to other 
concepts (e.g., FRUIT, TREE, etc) but by a causal-cum-nomological relation that 
connects (tokenings of) the concept APPLE with (tokenings of) the property of being 
an apple. 
The mention of Fodor's informational semantics is pertinent here since 
Machery himself resorts to this view when pressed by his critics to explain how his 
BoKs refer and how they can be said to be co-referential (Machery 2010, p. 235). He 
suggests that the retrieval from long-term memory of a given BoK (e.g., a prototype 
of squirrel) could be nomologically linked to the presence of a given property (e.g., 
being a squirrel) in a person’s environment. Co-referentiality would then be explained 
by the fact that different BoKs could hold nomological links to the same property, as 
it would be the case with a SQUIRREL-prototype, a SQUIRREL-exemplar and a 
SQUIRREL-theory, for example. In addition, given that those BoKs are supposed to 
share the same informational content, the problem of (in)stability of content would 
then not be a threat to Machery’s heterogeneous BoKs. However, I think there are 
good reasons why a causal view of content can’t be made to work for Machery’s 
distinct BoKs. Let us elaborate why. 
The main problem is that this causal view does not seem to guarantee the co-
referentiality of BoKs associated with the same category. There are situations where 
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prototypes, exemplars and theories about the same category could be said to be 
nomologically linked to things in the world that belong to different categories. To use 
a common example, consider the case of BoKs associated with the category of 
grandmothers. Prototypical grandmothers are gray-haired, have wrinkled skin and 
wear glasses. But there are grandmothers that do not satisfy these properties (e.g., 
Sarah Palin) and thus they fail to trigger a GRANDMOTHER-prototype to be used in 
cognitive processes that mainly depend on similarity to a prototype (e.g., prototype-
based categorization). Instead, one would expect them to be linked to a BoK 
corresponding to a GRANDMOTHER-theory, the structure of which is likely to 
include the element of information that grandmothers are mothers of a parent. 
Consequently, a subject's GRANDMOTHER-prototype and GRANDMOTHER-
theory can fail to co-refer because these BoKs can fail to be nomologically linked to 
the same referents. 
To make this point clearer, consider the reverse case: an old woman that looks 
just like a prototypical grandmother but has never been a mother (e.g., Betty White). 
People will probably identify her as a grandmother through the activation of their 
GRANDMOTHER-prototype, while their GRANDMOTHER-theory takes no part in 
cognitive processes that mainly depend on, say, causal, functional or explanatory 
knowledge about a category (e.g. theory-based categorization). So we have another 
situation where a prototype and a theory about the same category are not co-
referential (cf. Margolis and Laurence 2010).52 
Suppose Machery might address these worries by adding that BoKs about a 
given category share a common informational core that guarantees their 
coreferentiality. Thus, it is possible to claim that such core is a common constituent of 
different BoKs about a given category and that it is this core that is nomologically 
linked to a property in the environment. In this sense, someone could think that the 
nomologically-based retrieval of any given BoK about x (e.g., GRANDMOTHER-
                                                          
52 Here a Fodorian might reply that this critique does not affect the referentialist view of the content of 
BoKs since, according to Informational Semantics, content is determined by the information carried by 
a concept, not by its inferential role (whether prototypical or theoretical). But in the context of 
Machery's view of BoKs, the information that is constitutive of a BoK is that which is activated by 
default in order to be used in cognitive processes, rather than by the role of that BoK in cognitive 
inferences (see Machery 2015). So, if content is identified with information as per Informational 
Semantics, BoKs whose respective default bodies of information fail to be co-activated by a given 
referent cannot be said to be under the nomological control of that referent and, therefore, they cannot 
be co-referential. 
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prototype) does not need to imply the retrieval of a whole different BoK about x (e.g., 
GRANDMOTHER-theory), provided that the shared core about x is retrieved every 
time one of those BoK is used in cognitive processes where they play a central role. 
However, this is a solution that does not work because it is incompatible with 
Machery's requirement that each distinct BoK about x corresponds to some default 
knowledge that is retrieved independently of that of other BoK about x. Recall 
Machery’s distinction between context-independent default knowledge and context-
dependent background knowledge mentioned in section 2. Even though distinct BoKs 
about x (e.g., CAT-prototype, CAT-exemplar and CAT-theory) are required to always 
overlap in different contexts, an individual is expected to activate entirely different 
default BoKs about x, not just some overlapping background knowledge about x that 
may be activated under certain contexts (e.g., that her cat is called Lia). In sum, to 
advance the existence of common informational cores between BoKs designating the 
same category cannot help to explain their coreferentiality, since the information 
required for those cores to be literally shared is likely to correspond to some 
background knowledge that is, by definition, not constitutive part of a BoK. 
One final worry regarding the application of a referentialist approach to 
Machery's view of distinct BoKs has to do with whether these BoKs are construed at 
the right level of abstraction. As Schneider (2010) notes, if the semantic properties of 
co-referring BoKs can be individuated informationally, then the fact that prototypes, 
exemplars and theories conform to distinct processing properties does not challenge 
the idea that these BoKs could fall under the same concept type. Concepts could thus 
be understood as a superordinate—functional—kind (cf. Edwards 2010; Samuels and 
Ferreira 2010; Rey 2009; Lalumera 2013). Consider, for example, the view that the 
class of concepts is a natural kind that contains subordinate kinds including, e.g. 
prototypes, exemplars and theories in the same way that the class of minerals is a 
natural kind with subordinate kinds such as pyrite, topaz and quartz. In this sense, the 
causal view of content Machery thinks might work for his BoK really fixes the 
content of a superordinate kind, which, in turn, explains how any three different 
bodies of knowledge about a given category are actually coreferential. 
At this point Machery might contend the notion of concept as a superordinate 
kind does no useful work in psychology and that, as he has argued, keeping this 
notion would impede scientific progress (Machery 2010, 2015). But this claim is 
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highly controversial, and many have pointed out that the notion of concept does have 
many explanatory virtues. Besides providing psychology with a notion to make 
interesting generalisations about high-level cognitive processes (Scarantino 2010; 
Weiskopf 2010), concepts have shown to be a useful heuristic in guiding 
psychological research (Hayes and Kearney 2010; Margolis and Laurence 2010). To 
elucidate this view, consider Cowie's account of “messy” or imprecise concepts 
(Cowie 2009).53 In a related discussion about good and bad concepts, Cowie defends 
what she calls vulgar pragmatism, according to which imperfect and imprecise 
concepts should be preferred in the absence of better options when those concepts are 
part of a flourishing research programme.54 She specifically raises this defence in 
connection with the concept of ‘innateness’, where vulgar pragmatism is aimed at 
answering the question of when and how the use of a particular messy or imprecise 
term can be justified. Together with the objections above, Cowie’s idea of vulgar 
pragmatism can thus provide additional reasons to reject Machery’s claim that 
concept hinders scientific progress. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Machery has argued that psychological explanation should renounce the 
notion of concept and focus on how different bodies of knowledge are used in the 
cognitive processes underwriting our higher cognitive competences. But an essential 
aspect of psychological explanation—content—is absent from Machery’s alternative 
to concepts. In this paper, I examined possible options for the problem of how 
Machery’s bodies of knowledge could attain their contents. 
These options were based on the distinction between two broad approaches to 
content determination: Intensionalism, according to which the content of a concept 
determines its extension and Referentialism, according to which the extension of a 
concept determines its content. Idealised versions of known theories of content 
determination that we considered representative of the two main approaches failed to 
supply Machery’s alternative to concepts with a viable account of content. In the case 
                                                          
53 Cowie makes no distinctions of usage between ‘concepts’ and ‘terms’. 
54 The scientific relevance of a certain kind of imprecise or vague concepts will be further developed in 
Chapter 6. 
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of Intensionalism, an understanding of BoKs in terms of the conditions to possess 
certain modes of presentation of a given referent proved incompatible with Machery’s 
eliminativist claim regarding a general notion of concept. Alternatively, the problems 
to specify some minimum form of content stability for different BoKs in terms of 
conceptual roles stem directly from the models of conceptual representations they are 
based on. In the case of Referentialism, Machery’s suggestion that Informational 
Semantics could be adapted to his proposed BoKs proved to be inadequate because 
this referentialist view does not support the conceptual heterogeneity Machery puts 
forward. My conclusion is that the problems to supply Machery’s proposal with a 
viable notion of content constitute compelling reasons to resist his argument for 
concept eliminativism. 
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Chapter 5 
———————————— 
Natural Kindness Misconstrued 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 illustrated a case where a concept eliminativist argues that the term 
‘concept’ should be eliminated from scientific vocabulary on the grounds that what 
psychologists call concepts do not really form a natural kind. In this chapter I will 
defend the theoretical relevance of ‘concept’ by arguing for an appropriate 
understanding of natural kindness in the context of an immature science of the mind. 
Philosophers and natural kind theorists have proposed different characterisations of 
the notion of natural kinds which they find suitable either to support or reject their 
viability in a given field of enquiry. In my view, none of those conceptions is suitable 
to argue for or against the theoretical relevance of the notion of a concept in the 
scientific study of the mind. 
In alignment with a dominant naturalistic tradition within contemporary 
philosophy of science, I take the term ‘natural kind’ to refer to the groups of 
particulars, properties (states, relations, etc.) in the world that the classificatory 
schemes of natural sciences are supposed to be about. One important assumption here 
is that these schemes facilitate scientific generalizations and are assumed to map onto 
the structure of reality in terms of worse or better approximations to it. The view that 
a mature science should successfully reflect real and theory-independent divisions in 
nature is called Scientific Realism and, in this chapter, I take this view for granted. 
This view is compatible with the idea that, in the case of the classificatory schemes of 
immature yet fruitful sciences, the methodological role of certain imprecise theoretical 
terms is to be preferred. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The aim of the first part (section 
2) is to briefly enumerate the most prominent characterisations of the notion of a 
natural kind and present the case of the disunity of special sciences. In the second part 
(sections 3), I will characterise the sources of an apparent tension underlying two 
opposing philosophical perspectives in the discussion of natural kinds. I will call them 
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AUSTERE and INDULGENT, respectively. In discussing the explanatory adequacy 
of natural kind terms, INDULGENT advocates tend to reject the accounts of natural 
kinds offered by AUSTERE advocates, and vice versa. With a focus on the study of 
concepts, the third part of the chapter (sections 4) will argue for the need of a 
mediating methodological solution and introduce some of the requirements for 
sketching it. Later on, in Chapter 6, I will present a possible solution that could help 
to overcome the tension between these two perspectives. 
 
2. Natural kinds and the disunity of special sciences 
2.1. Natural kinds: an elusive notion 
Terms such as ‘carbon’ and ‘water’ are usually thought to refer to different 
types of stuff in the world. Likewise, terms such as ‘thistle’ and ‘tiger’ are usually 
thought to refer to different types of individuals in the world. A common assumption 
regarding the usage of those terms and the like is that their putative referents belong to 
different groups of objects with some putative interesting theoretical property (or set 
of properties) in common. Whether or not groups of objects like those are to be 
scientifically deemed as natural kinds is a topic of ongoing debate. However, what is 
clear is that not anything can count as a good candidate for a natural kind (e.g., 
compare the classes formed by different chemical elements with the class of things 
that taste bitter), and this is an important initial remark because it is objects that are 
likely to correspond to natural kinds that are scientifically interesting.  
Scientific theories are expected to provide us with reliable knowledge about 
the structure of reality and they do so by postulating, among other things, theoretical 
terms that designate the existence of probable natural kinds relevant for discovering 
new generalizations and, thus, for gaining better understanding of the way things 
really work in nature. In this respect, to the extent that scientific theories are 
successful in achieving that goal, we are then justified in adopting a realist attitude 
towards the types of objects that those natural kind terms are said to refer to. 
Different prominent reviews regarding natural kinds (e.g., Hacking 1991; 
Boyd 1991; Samuels 2009; Magnus 2012) suggest that, even though there is no 
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agreement about a clear set of conditions that a given category of objects has to satisfy 
in order for it to count as a natural kind, there are, at least, three recurrent conditions:  
 
1. They are specified in terms of a set of properties that tend to co-vary   
2. The properties specifying the natural kind are indicative of other scientifically 
interesting properties (i.e., they are properties that support inductive generalisations) 
3. The properties specifying the kind are natural (e.g., they are to be discovered, not 
defined by people) 
 
Philosophical accounts of natural kinds that appeal to conditions such as 1, 2 
and 3 are typically aimed at providing a characterisation of what it is for something to 
objectively be a natural kind and, thus, a way to distinguish natural kinds from 
arbitrary or conventional categories (Bird and Tobin 2015; Brigandt 2011). In this 
sense, for example, chemical elements are better candidates for being natural kinds 
(likely to reflect some type of natural divisions in nature) than the class of things that 
taste bitter, because chemical elements (e.g., Cu), not bitter-tasting things, satisfy 
conditions 1 (e.g., the atomic structure of Cu is common to all instances of Cu), 2 
(e.g., its atomic structure determines the chemical reactions Cu can participate) and 3 
(e.g., the atomic structure of Cu is a matter of discovery, not a matter of convention). 
The putative natural kind status of groups of things that do not satisfy conditions 1, 2 
and 3, such as the class of bitter-tasting things, can be thus put into question. 
Notwithstanding the apparent advantages of this traditional approach to 
distinguishing natural kinds, there are many cases where it seems somehow 
reasonable to take something to count as a putative natural kind even if it does not 
satisfy some or all of the conditions above. Take, for example, the case of molecules 
which are artificially generated (e.g., ascorbic acid, dubnium); the case of biological 
species and higher taxa (e.g., the vertebrate/invertebrate distinction plays a prominent 
classificatory role in biology but those higher taxa seem to be less clearly a natural 
kind than particular species); the case of planets and asteroids where category 
membership seems to be a matter of convention (e.g., Pluto isn’t any longer a member 
of what astronomers take to be the natural kind formed by planets), etc. 
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Philosophers have advanced different understandings for distinguishing 
objective natural kinds and their relevance in scientific theories. One proposal is based 
on the idea that natural kinds are the sort of categories involved in the true laws of 
nature (Magnus 2012). Consider, for example, the case where a true natural law is 
said to express a relation between universals (i.e., properties that different things can 
instantiate, as when Fido and Laika instantiate the universal property of being a dog). 
In this case, if, say, “all birds lay eggs” expressed a true natural law, then birds would 
designate a natural kind because that type of animals would correspond to a universal 
that participates in natural laws. Of course, what a true natural law really amounts to 
and whether or not available scientific generalisations might correspond to true laws 
of nature are open questions. But, for our present concern, it is interesting to note that 
this particular account of natural kinds seem to be consistent with at least two of the 
conditions stated above, namely condition 2 and 3, since this account allows for 
properties that support inductive inference (e.g., “lay egg” grounds inductions about 
all the members of the kind oviparous animals) and those properties are the result of 
discovery, respectively. 
Another proposal to characterise natural kinds is essentialism, the view that 
objective natural kinds have essences. Essentialists have provided different 
conceptions of essentialism,55 but it will suffice to illustrate this view in the light of 
one typical conception, namely one where it is assumed that for each kind K, there is 
an essential property P without which K cannot be the kind that it is. Even though the 
issue of which features on the world count as an essential property of any given kind 
is a matter of debate, essentialism allows for the essences of a kind to be qualified in 
different ways (e.g., structurally, relationally, intrinsically, etc.). Take, for instance, 
the cases of chemical kinds such as copper (Cu) and biological kinds such as Homo 
sapiens. Presumably, an essential property of Cu is its atomic structure, which is 
shared by all the members of the kind and explains in which chemical reactions 
instances of Cu can take part. Likewise, it is possible to characterise essentialism in 
relational terms (e.g., Mayr 1969), such as when, say, Homo sapiens are said to form 
a putative natural kind depending on whether they belong to the same reproductively 
isolated population. In this latter case, what is essential to the kind is its specific 
membership status. Another possibility is to argue, as Boyd (1991) has done, for a 
                                                          
55 See Bird and Tobin 2015 for a more detailed discussion. 
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notion of essence in terms of a non-accidental correlation of properties. For instance, 
in alignment with this proposal, the species Homo sapiens could form a natural kind if 
it was the case that the members of this kind tend to share a set of causally grounded 
properties, even if there is no particular property within this set that is shared by all of 
the members (see next section, below). 
A focus on relational properties may also be understood as an alternative to 
essentialism, such as in the case of functional kinds. Some philosophers (e.g., Quine 
1969; Hacking 2007; Brigandt 2009) have pointed out the role of functional kinds in 
inductive generalisations, generalisations which may describe certain relations 
between the members of the kind, rather than certain intrinsic structural essence. For 
instance, as Brigandt (2011) has illustrated it, certain ecological generalisations can 
describe the categories of predator and prey in terms of the changes in the sizes of 
certain predator and prey populations. Likewise, certain biological generalisations can 
describe the category of vertebrates in terms of their philogenetic relation of descent 
from common ancestors’ (e.g., the understanding of species defended by Cracraft 
1983). Another example is money, understood as a multiply realizable functional 
category which plays an important role in many microeconomic generalisations (e.g., 
Gresham’s Law and Thiers’ Law). Regarding the conditions for natural kindness 
stated above, functional kinds specified in this way seem to satisfy condition 1 (in the 
form of a set of functional relations that tend to co-vary irrespective of how they are 
physically realized) and 2 (in the form of induction-supporting functional categories). 
But it is controversial to say that these kinds (as described above) can satisfy 
condition 3, since they do not provide a criterion for distinguishing categories whose 
functional properties are conventional from those which are not conventional. In this 
respect, however, some functionalist could respond that, even though ‘money’ 
designates a conventional category, the functional roles attributed to the members of 
the category are not really a matter of convention. 
Another possible way of understanding natural kinds is in terms of the idea 
that natural kinds can be equated with property clusters. Particularly important for the 
present chapter is the proposal defended by Boyd (1991), according to which natural 
kinds are Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC). As we will see, one of the advantages 
of this proposal is that it provides a solution that intends to reconcile the idea that 
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natural kinds have essences and the apparently incompatible functional 
characterisation of natural kinds described above. 
 
2.2. Boyd’s solution to Natural Kindness 
One way to characterise natural kinds is in terms of some natural property that 
is shared by all the members of a given kind (e.g., Quine 1969). Another possibility, 
which is an expansion of the previous characterisation, is in terms of families of 
properties that are contingently clustered in nature (Bird and Tobin 2015). In this case, 
a relevant issue has to do with what it is that clusters such families of properties 
together. For instance, someone might have reasons to believe, as Hacking (1991) 
does, that what unites the properties of a given property-cluster kind is not a fact 
about nature, but human interest. Hacking’s claim is based on the idea that natural 
kinds should be specified by some mind-independent set of conditions and the 
realisation that property-cluster kinds do not satisfy this condition. Alternatively, one 
might think, as Boyd (1991) does, that what unites property-cluster kinds is not 
human interest, but some kind of causal mechanism. In Boyd’s words,  
 
On that conception a natural kind is associated causally with a large family of 
methodologically important properties. Even if the kind is thought of as being defined 
by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions its naturalness is a reflection of a wider 
sort of property correlation. It is natural to inquire whether in defining some kinds we 
might defer more fully to nature and take the kind in question to be defined by the 
larger family of correlated properties rather than by any special sub-set singled out as 
providing the necessary and sufficient conditions. If this possibility is acknowledged 
then it is reasonable to inquire whether there may be kinds so defined except that the 
relevant property correlations are not perfect, so that the set of correlated properties 
functions as a property- cluster. (p.141) 
 
What Boyd (e.g., 1991, 1999) specifically claims is that natural kinds are 
Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC). According to this conception, the members of 
a given natural kind are grouped together in virtue of a cluster of properties the co-
occurrence of which is determined by some underlying causal mechanism. 
Importantly, none of the correlated properties in the causally-regulated cluster that the 
members of an HPC natural kind tend to possess has to be shared by all the members. 
In other words, whereas a certain cluster of properties can be said to be sufficient for 
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kind membership, none of the properties in that cluster can be said to be necessary for 
kind membership. This provides room for variation of the properties in the cluster, 
such as, for instance, when the cluster incorporates or ceases to include properties as a 
result of adaptive changes driven by environmental pressure (Bird and Tobin 2015). 
Both the properties that may be part of a particular HPC natural kind and the 
causal mechanisms determining the homeostasis of the property cluster are an a 
posteriori theoretical question, in the sense that they are supposed to be the result of 
scientific discovery. In this respect, according to Boyd (1991), a paradigmatic case of 
HPC kinds are biological species, given their paradigmatic role in supporting 
scientific generalisations. Boyd is committed to the realist methodological assumption 
that, because natural kinds are discovered a posteriori, putative natural kinds are 
expected to play a significant epistemic role in the formulation of successful inductive 
generalisations. The realism involved in this assumption is reflected in the idea that 
the way in which we are to accommodate our categories to the objective causal 
structure of the world is a function of the success of both induction and explanation 
(Boyd 1991). Hence, his proposal that, in the case of biological species, while the 
reliable correlation of the properties associated with an HPC kind is what grounds 
instances of inductive inferences and explanations, the natural status of the natural 
kind depends on the extent to which its members are scientifically interesting 
(Brigandt 2011). 
There are at least two types of homeostatic mechanisms relevant for defining 
biological species as HPC natural kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic (Bird and Tobin 
2015).56 An example of intrinsic homeostatic mechanism may involve gene exchanges 
within a population. Thus, for instance, people who are extremely tall (e.g., 2.5m) are 
rare cases because, given the intrinsically regulated property cluster defining the 
species, individuals with those genetically determined characteristics are less likely to 
reproduce than others. In turn, an example of extrinsic homeostatic mechanism may 
involve common selective factors in the niche of a species. Sometimes, organisms 
modify their ecological niches in ways that can alter the very relationship between the 
organisms and their relative niches, a process that can be said to have effects in the 
                                                          
56  Another possibility, which I will not focus on in this chapter, could involve some continuous 
interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic homeostatic mechanisms, as it might be relevant to consider in 
light of recent proposal regarding the role of niche construction in evolutionary processes (e.g., Laland 
and Sterelny 2006). 
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evolutionary patterns of those organisms. For instance, beaver dam-building does not 
only favour the propagation of dam-building alleles (Dawkins 1982), but it is also said 
to influence subsequent beaver evolution by means of the selective pressure acting on 
many other beaver traits as a result of the inherited modified selective environment 
(e.g., Laland and Sterelny 2006). If this niche-construction evolutionary perspective is 
correct, then deviations will be expected to be selected against in environments that 
can be modified by niche construction. In both cases, the homeostatic mechanisms 
can be said to be an instance of self-regulatory process in the sense that these 
mechanisms secure the presence of many properties in the cluster, along with 
minimising deviations from the cluster. As Hacking (2007) puts it: 
 
The species is in equilibrium in the sense that descendants that diverge too far from 
the cluster of properties die out or form a new group. Species thus endure thanks to a 
network of causes that produce stability of a homeostatic sort. (p. 235) 
 
Note that HPC kinds can be said to satisfy all of the conditions for natural 
kindness stated in the previous subsection. Condition 1 is satisfied because the 
property cluster associated with the members of a putative natural kind is secured by 
its sustaining causal mechanisms. Condition 2 is satisfied because the presence of a 
given set of properties in a HPC kind is constrained by the extent to which those 
properties satisfy induction and explanation. In other words, for a property cluster to 
count as a putative natural kind it has to be involved in induction and explanation. 
Finally, condition 3 is also satisfied, since HPC kinds are ultimately specified, not by 
convention, but a posteriori so as to reflect the actual causal structure of the world. 
Note that, as I have mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, this is the notion that the 
eliminativism regarding concepts put forward by Machery (2009, 2010) employs. 
This eliminativist proposal is a case of eliminativism where a given putative natural 
class (e.g., the class of concepts) is rejected on the grounds that the theoretical term 
(e.g., ‘concept’) we used to designate it is too vague or confused to be scientifically 
interesting. Machery’s claim is that the notion of concepts does not really pick out a 
natural kind because this notion misleadingly conflates three distinct bodies of 
knowledge (viz., prototypes, exemplars and theories) which, as opposed to what he 
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thinks about concepts, are said to be independently sustained by causally active 
internal mechanisms. I will come back to Machery’s eliminativist view in later 
sections since rejecting this type of concept eliminativism by defending the theoretical 
status of concepts is central to the present work. 
 
2.3. The (dis)unity of special sciences 
At the beginning of the chapter, I briefly introduced scientific realism as the 
view that the classificatory schemes of natural science is ultimately aimed at mapping 
onto the objective structure of reality. One thing this view presupposes is that the way 
the world is really structured is independent of the way scientists might think it is 
structured, in the sense that the reality of the world (i.e., the way things actually are in 
the world) is independent of the theories that scientists develop in order to understand 
it. On the face of it, however, different special sciences (e.g., biology, psychology, 
geology, economics, etc.) seem to be about kinds (e.g., species, mental states, tectonic 
plates, services, etc.) which can’t be clearly said to be theory-independent in the same 
way. In some cases, the desideratum of theory independence is highly controversial, 
even if the theorised kinds play a role both in induction and explanation (e.g., social 
mobility, stereotype threat, monetary exchanges, etc.). The question arises about the 
extent to which the kinds that special sciences theorise about satisfy proposed 
conditions for natural kindness and, if they do not satisfy any known conditions (thus 
compromising the established commitment to scientific realism), what it is one could 
say about their theoretical credentials. 
In what follows, I will focus on two main issues. First, I will briefly survey 
different examples where some of the kinds that certain special sciences take for 
granted seem to be at odds with scientific realism (in the way I have broadly 
characterised it). The second issue to address is a version of the thesis of the unity of 
science, according to which the theorised natural kinds of all true theories of special 
sciences should ultimately reduce to those of some basic science. Let us take a look at 
each of these two issues in turn. 
Chemical kinds are a good starting point because these kinds are normally 
considered to be paradigmatic instances of natural kinds (LaPorte 2004; Magnus 
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2012). When I introduced essentialism in 2.1 above, I mentioned the case of copper 
(Cu) as a putative case where it is essential to something to be constituted by a given 
property. In the case of Cu, a good candidate for such essential property is its atomic 
structure, in the sense that whatever object which is only made up of atoms with 29 
protons in their nuclei can’t be said to be made of anything else except copper. 
However, this microstructuralist view does not seem to be useful when it comes to 
distinguishing between chemical compounds for, at least, two reasons. First, chemical 
compounds are normally identified by their constituent elements (not their 
microstructure) such that H2O can be said to be what it is because the compound is 
constituted by two hydrogen atoms and a single atom of oxygen. Second, there are 
compounds elements which are distinct compounds even if they share the same 
constituent elements in the same proportions. For example, fulminic acid and cyanic 
acid have the same constituent elements (HCNO) but they different in certain physical 
properties, namely the spatial arrangement of the atoms their constituent atoms (Bird 
and Tobin 2015).  Indeed, many scientifically interesting properties of certain 
substances (e.g., melting and boiling points of water) can’t be explained merely 
according to microstructural criteria (Weisberg et al. 2011). 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the problems of microstructuralism 
(i.e., the view that only microstructural properties can individuate chemical kinds) in 
the philosophy of chemistry have motivated extensive discussions about the natural 
kind status of many chemical kinds. For instance, Needham (2000) proposes a view of 
macroscopic objects (e.g., a body of water), and, given the empirical relevance of 
some of the dynamical aspects of certain chemical compounds, he concludes that: 
 
A macroscopically oriented account of sameness of kind doesn’t challenge the claim 
that quantities of water have some appropriate range of microfeatures under specified 
conditions. But recognising microproperties is not to favour them as more essential 
than others. (p. 21) 
 
From this quote, the suggestion is that the microstructure of a macroscopic 
objects O is not what makes O to be what it is. Alternatively, Hendry (2006) agrees 
that objects such as a body of water should be viewed as macroscopic objects which 
are both dynamic and heterogeneous at the molecular level (owing to his view that 
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water has H2O as its ingredients), but rejects the idea that being water should be 
individuated in terms other than as some arrangement of H2O molecules. 
Let us turn to the philosophy of biology. Discussions of natural kinds in the 
philosophy of chemistry should make it easier for us to understand why it has been so 
difficult for philosophers to provide an account of biological species and how it is that 
different species can be distinguished. Species evolve and this fact raises the problem 
of when to distinguish new species form their ancestors. Moreover, because species 
are normally classified in relational terms (i.e., in terms of their common ancestral 
descent), notions of natural kindness that seem useful in other more basic sciences 
(e.g., the essentialist notion of natural kinds typically used in Chemistry) do not seem 
to be relevant for characterising species as natural kinds. Different species concepts 
are on offer (e.g., the concept of species as isolated interbreeding populations offered 
by Mayr 1969 and the phylogenetic concept of species put forward by Cracraft 1983), 
but the norm among philosophers interested in the problem of species is to provide 
examples that illustrate intuitive conceptions, rather than a clear analysis of what they 
mean by their putative natural kind concept of ‘species’ (LaPorte 2004). Thus, while 
‘tiger’ and ‘mammal’ can be said to be frequent examples used to illustrate those 
intuitive conceptions of species, they are also examples used to illustrate disagreement 
about what could actually reflect real divisions in nature. Indeed, philosophers usually 
make a distinction between taxa (e.g., the class of tigers) as reflecting real divisions 
and higher taxa (e.g., the class of mammals) as reflecting conventional divisions (e.g., 
LaPorte 2004; Bird and Tobin 2015). 
Debates regarding natural kinds in biology have also focused on whether 
species are kinds or individuals. To say that certain organisms should be viewed as 
individuals is the same thing as saying that those organisms are parts of species, 
rather than members of a species as a natural kind (LaPorte 2004; Brigandt 2009). 
One common motivation for the view that species are individuals involves certain 
unwanted consequences of the evolving character of organisms. For example, if 
organisms change their characteristic properties over time then the requirement that 
members of natural kind tend to share common intrinsic properties is no longer 
relevant for characterising species as a natural kind (Bird and Tobin 2015). The view 
of species as individuals is intended to object to the inference whereby realism of 
species is rejected from the (purported) conclusion that species are not natural kinds. 
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However, this is not the only way to reject the view that species do not reflect real 
divisions in nature. For example, LaPorte (2004) has argued that both conceptions 
(i.e. species as kinds and species as individuals) are not incompatible with one another 
on the grounds that certain further refinement of both interpretations “will not affect 
the acceptability of ordinary scientific claims” (p. 17). In any case, both this 
compatibilist view and the view that species are individuals require abandoning the 
essentialist idea that species must have certain intrinsic properties in common (e.g., 
Putnam 1975), which in turn, is said to be relevant for species to take part in laws of 
nature (Bird and Tobin 2015). Two ways in which philosophers have tried to do 
without this traditional idea of essentialism are, first, by postulating some notion of 
essentialism which is not based on intrinsic properties (e.g., one that is historical or 
relational properties) and, second, by offering alternative pluralistic views natural 
kinds, where different conceptions are accepted on the basis of their theoretical merits 
(e.g., Dupré 1993).  
What about psychology, the scientific study of the mind? The question of 
whether or not certain mental states form a natural kind is central to this chapter and I 
will attempt to sketch the basis for a response later on. For the time being, suffice it to 
highlight some of the problems of providing a positive response to this question in the 
field of Cognitive Science, where a basic intuition among theorists is that the mind 
(and therefore our mental states) is a causal factor of human intelligent behaviour. 
Ever since the emergence of Cognitive Science as a reaction to the then dominant 
radical behaviourism,57 different understandings of mental kinds have been offered. 
In an attempt to develop a materialist theory of mind that allows for mental 
causes, central-state identity theorists maintained that mental events (states and 
processes) are identical with brain events and that being in a certain mental state (e.g., 
believing that the train is late) is identical to being in a certain brain state (Smart 
1959). This identity theory of the mind takes one of two forms, namely token 
physicalism (or token identity theory of the mind) and type physicalism (or type 
identity theory of the mind). Whereas the former typically maintains that tokens of 
mental state (e.g., my current desire that it snows) are identical with tokens of 
neurophysiological state, the latter typically maintains that types of mental state (e.g., 
                                                          
57 See Miller (2003) on the emergence of Cognitive Science. 
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having the desire that it snows) are identical with types of neurophysiological state. 
Another important way in which these two doctrines of physicalism differ is that type 
physicalism, but not token physicalism, rules out the possibility that anything which 
does not have neurons can have mental properties (Fodor 1981). In this sense, what 
type physicalism rules out is multiple realizability, i.e. thesis that a single mental state 
can be realised by physically diverse kinds. However, it is a logical and empirical 
possibility that distinct physical creatures (e.g. machines, silicon-based Martians, etc.) 
can be in the same kind of mental state. 
Another substantial assumption guiding much of research within mainstream 
Cognitive Science is that our brains are information processing systems, an 
assumption that, contrary to type physicalism, is compatible with the possibility of 
multiple realization. If type physicalism theorists are wrong, then it could be argued 
that, because mental states are not clearly reducible to brain states, putative mental 
kinds are good candidates for eliminativism. For instance, it could be argued that 
scientists should eliminate the notion of (irreducible) mental kinds because this notion 
is motivated by a common sense theory of the mind which is a hopelessly mistaken 
theory (cf. Churchland 1981, 1988). On the contrary, another option is a theory of 
mental states which is materialist yet one where metal states can abstract from the 
physical structure of the creatures that bear them. Functionalism is the view the 
mental states are individuated by their functional role, irrespective on which physical 
kind they are realized. In this sense, functional mental states are irreducible, yet 
compatible with token physicalism since it is possible that neurophysiological events 
are the only thing with the appropriate functional properties that individuate mental 
kinds (Fodor 1981). It is also compatible with the physicalist demand that mental 
causation is also physical causation, yet, as Bird and Tobin (2015) points out, it 
appears to violate the traditional requirement that members of a natural kind (notably, 
their physical realisations) should share some natural properties in common. 
In the case of social sciences, the issue of what actually count as theory-
independent natural kinds is even more controversial that in the other cases discussed 
so far. It is not clear whether there are any social kinds at all and, if there were any 
(say, e.g., marriage, gender, unemployment and the like), it is also unclear to what 
extent they could be compatible with the naturalist and realist doctrines that underlie 
natural science. One of the reasons why social kinds are said to be incompatible with 
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the idea of natural kinds is that social kinds are inevitably dependent on human 
interest and attitudes and, thus, they are some species of social construction (e.g., 
Hacking 1999). However, similar worries have been raised with respect to many 
traditional conceptions of natural kindness. For instance, some (e.g., Khalidi 1998) 
have argued that social kinds and natural kinds only differ from one another in the 
sense that social kinds are part of classificatory schemes that are more dependent on 
human interest than in the case of the classificatory schemes of so-called natural 
kinds. 
It is also possible to claim that social kinds are some kind of HPC because 
they tend to share a given properties cluster PC, but then the question arises as to how 
the co-variation of the properties in this cluster is sustained. It is inherent to the 
formulation of the notion of a HPC that the properties in the PC do not co-vary 
accidentally, but causally. So, perhaps, social kinds fail to be HPC because there is no 
(causal) mechanism that secures its homeostasis. 
One way in which one can argue for the legitimate theoretical status of the 
putative natural kinds relevant to the taxonomy of many special sciences is by 
challenging the reductivist thesis that true or successful theories in special sciences 
should eventually be reduced to physics or some similar basic science. Fodor (1974) 
has notoriously argued against this thesis (at least, in its strongest version) and 
defended what he calls the disunity of science as a working hypothesis. The way he 
characterises natural kinds is in terms of the kinds that figure in natural laws. Hence, 
the way he characterizes the sort of reductivism he rejects is in terms of the necessary 
and sufficient condition that all the laws of a given special science be reducible to the 
laws of physics (or some other basic science, as it might be). In doing so, Fodor 
(1974) rejects a strong version of the generality of physics: 
 
[…] reductivism entails the generality of physics in at least the sense that any event 
which falls within the universe of discourse of a special science will also fall within 
the universe of discourse of physics. (p. 101) 
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Thus, assuming that a given science corresponds to the formulation of a 
collection of laws,58 he specifically objects to the assumption underlying reductionism 
according to which special sciences are to be reduced to more basic sciences by 
means of bridge laws connecting kind predicates from the reduced sciences with kind 
predicates of the reducing sciences. Bridge laws can be of two types, i.e., they can 
either express property identities or event identities, and Fodor thinks neither of them 
has tolerable consequences—these consequences being that every natural kind is a 
physical natural kind or that every natural kind is coextensive with a physical natural 
kind. 
The point is that there are clear cases in special sciences which, if taken 
seriously, challenge the prospects of reductivism required by unity of science 
hypothesis to which the strong version of the generality of physics is committed. It is 
unlikely, for instance, that physical predicates can subsume the events that 
presumably fall under the laws of monetary exchanges in economics (e.g., ‘x is a 
monetary exchange’ iff x is physical natural kind subsumed by a physical 
description), since these types of events involve a number of highly disjunctive 
physical descriptions (e.g. wampum, cattle, cowry shells, banknotes, strings of digital 
code, etc.). Thus, the generalisations that are interesting in economics and physics 
involve events with physical descriptions that have nothing non-accidental in 
common, which, as Fodor (1974) argues, supports the thesis that economics is not 
reducible to physics: 
 
The point is that monetary exchanges have interesting things in common; Gresham's 
law, if true, says what one of these interesting things is. But what is interesting about 
monetary exchanges is surely not their commonalities under physical description. A 
natural kind like a monetary exchange could turn out to be co-extensive with a 
physical natural kind; but if it did, that would be an accident on a cosmic scale. (pp. 
103-104) 
 
Fodor claims that it is implausible that there are putative natural kinds in 
economics with co-extensive putative natural kinds in physics and this claim—he 
argues—is not special about economics but commonplace in the case of all other 
                                                          
58 More precisely, a collection of theoretical predicates the satisfaction of which allows for certain 
observed events to fall under the laws of that science. 
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special sciences. Indeed, his main concern is to show that the thesis that neurological 
natural kinds are co-extensive with psychological natural kinds (i.e., the strong 
doctrine known as type-to-type physicalism) is wrong, on the grounds that, even 
though every psychological event can be paired with some neurological event, 
psychological events of the same kind could very well be paired with distinct kinds of 
neurological or non-neurological events (i.e., the weaker doctrine known as token 
physicalism). 
This latter weaker doctrine allows for a reinterpretation of scientific reduction 
to which I feel inclined to adhere. According to this alternative understanding, the 
goal of reduction is an account of the (heterogeneous and unsystematic) physical 
mechanisms by means of which events conform to the laws (notably, counter-factual 
supporting generalisations) of the special sciences—not to find natural kind predicates 
in reduced and reducing sciences which are co-extensive with one another. In this 
sense, for example, even though natural kind predicates in chemistry (e.g., Cu, 
HNCO) are not to be seen as reducible to co-extensive natural kinds predicates in 
physics (e.g., subatomic particles), putative natural kinds in chemical events that fall 
under law-like generalisations can very well be compatible with the generality of 
physics. 
I endorse the case for the disunity of special sciences (as a working 
hypothesis) and Fodor’s suggested liberalisation of the generality of physics as a 
constraint for the acceptability of special sciences. The assumption that psychology as 
an immature scientific field is an irreducible special science will be instrumental to 
the qualified application of Boyd’s notion of HPC kinds I intend to set forth in the 
next chapter. However, more needs to be said about the need of an alternative 
characterisation of the notion of natural kinds in psychology. Thus, in the remaining 
part of this chapter, I want to characterise the sources of an apparent tension between 
two dissenting philosophical perspectives on the notion of a natural kind resulting 
from discussions about an adequate construal of this notion. After that, since my main 
concern is the domain of the mental, I will argue for the need to overcome such 
tension on the basis of a general characterisation of the notion of a natural kind in the 
study of concepts that addresses the kind of worries that motivate the disagreements 
between the two perspectives. 
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3. Two approximations to the problem of natural kinds 
If the construal of the notion of a natural kind to which one may be committed 
is too demanding (e.g., by appealing to some form of strict intrinsic essentialism), 
then it could apply (if at all) to much fewer cases than we may want and, in turn, it 
could lead one to overlook interesting generalisations in scientific fields where such 
construal is not relevant. On the contrary, if our construal of the notion in question is 
too permissive (e.g., by giving up the generality of a basic science like physics or by 
abandoning its role in law-like generalisations), then it could apply to so many cases 
that it would be difficult to tell the extent to which scientific taxonomies are 
informative regarding the general and objective character of reality. In this section, I 
will provide an idealised characterisation of two general perspectives on the problem 
of developing an adequate account of natural kinds, each of which aims towards one 
of the two mentioned situations. Call these perspectives AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT, respectively. In some respect or another, different accounts of natural 
kinds can be said to be inclined either towards AUSTERE or INDULGENT. 
One useful way to proceed is by characterising how AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT comport with respect to a motley collection of familiar background 
assumptions that constrain the theorising about natural kinds (either explicitly or not). 
Different degrees of commitment to these assumptions can help distinguish theorists’ 
tendency to adopt a perspective either towards AUSTERE or INDULGENT. It will be 
helpful to think of each of these two perspectives as adopting the extreme positions of 
a continuum between (what appears to be) a set conflicting assumptions. Depicting 
these two approximations in this way will hopefully make it manifest that there is a 
tension between them and that this tension is not resolved by simply choosing one of 
the two options. 
(1a) The objective/subjective assumption. One of the reasons why 
philosophers have been interested in working out an account of the notion of a natural 
kind is the assumption that a correct account of this notion should help distinguish 
between (relatively) objective descriptions of the structure of the world from more 
subjective or conventional descriptions (Bird and Tobin 2015). A common agreement 
in an influential tradition about the notion of natural kinds is that not anything can 
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count as natural kind (whatever they turn out to be) because, if there are any natural 
kinds at all, it is a fact about nature that they are the natural kinds that they are 
(Hacking 1991). But that agreement is not shared in other traditions where theory 
independence is not deemed a requirement for some type of things to count as a 
natural kind. Thus, for example, dissenting positions that challenge the theory 
independence requirement for natural kindness might argue that natural kinds are 
metaphysically dependent on social conventions and our psychological capacities for 
recognising them. If the objective/subjective assumption is depicted as a continuum 
between more/less objective and theory independent accounts, AUSTERE can be said 
to aim towards the more objective end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
(1b)  In connection with the mental, a similar distinction can be depicted as 
a continuum between, on the one hand, the view that what is essential to our thoughts 
is their relation to the things in the world that they represent and, on the other hand, 
the view that what makes our thoughts special is their relations to our actions (i.e., to 
what we know how to do). A radical example of the first view is the Language of 
Thought Hypothesis (e.g., Fodor 2008). A radical example of the second is the view 
that thinking is always action-oriented such that what we think is constituted by what 
we can do (e.g., Prinz and Clark 2004). Call these two types of views Semantic 
Representationalism and Semantic Pragmatism, 59  respectively. Semantic 
Representationalism is consistent with the objectivist view that what makes our 
thoughts true or false is the way the world is. In contrast, because Semantic 
Pragmatism is often used as an umbrella term for a variety of views which are 
grouped together in a rather loose way (e.g., Prinz 2011), it is hard to clearly state a 
common objectivist commitment associated with all those views. But in any case, it is 
safe to say that, to the extent that Semantic Representationalism, as the term suggests, 
focuses on thought and a representational relation between its content and the world, 
Semantic Pragmatism comprises some type of reaction against Semantic 
Representationalism. In particular, the radical reaction I want to highlight is the claim 
that the concepts that allow us to have thoughts about the world are action-oriented, a 
pragmatist view about concepts that invites us to accept that what we know about the 
things that fall under the extension of a concept (e.g., knowing that trees can produce 
                                                          
59 Semantic pragmatism is the term used by Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015) in their response to Prinz and 
Clark (2004). 
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shade) is constitutive of that concept (e.g., TREE). The reason for this, as the semantic 
pragmatist might argue, is that the content of a concept such as TREE (i.e., that which 
the concept TREE is about) is determined by the way in which we would act if we 
were confronted to things that are trees (e.g., look for sun safety on hot summer days). 
In this sense, whereas this strong Semantic Pragmatism is (explicitly or implicitly) 
committed to the subjectivist idea that the content of concept C is constituted by many 
of the things one might idiosyncratically know about C (notably, what we may happen 
to know about people’s action-oriented behaviours with respect to, say, things in the 
extension of C), a strong Semantic Representationalism can be said to be committed 
to the objectivist idea that the content of C is completely unaffected by our beliefs 
about the things falling under C.60 Thus, if the objective/subjective assumption is 
depicted as a continuum between some form of strong Semantic Representationalism 
and some form of strong Semantic Pragmatism, AUSTERE can be said to aim 
towards the representationalist end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
 
(2a) The ontological/methodological assumption. Our understanding of the 
notion of a natural kind can also be characterised in terms of where one stands with 
respect to one of two interpretations of naturalism (roughly, the doctrine that our 
investigation into the nature and structure of reality should be free from 
“supernatural” elements). Traditional accounts of natural kinds are said to aim at 
providing a metaphysical characterisation of such notion (e.g., in terms of an answer 
to the question of “what is the nature of X?”). This interpretation contrasts with a 
recent focus on accounts that favour some kind of methodologically-oriented 
characterisations (e.g., Brigandt 2011; Pöyhönen 2013). In view of that, some people 
(e.g., Papineau 2015) broadly distinguish a commitment to the doctrine of naturalism 
along the lines of two opposing interpretations, namely, ontological and 
methodological naturalism. While ontological naturalism is said to appeal to 
philosophical argument and is preferentially committed to some physicalist view 
about the content of reality (thus providing an a priori constrain for natural kindness), 
                                                          
60  To make both the objectivist character of Semantic Representationalism and the subjectivist 
character of Semantic Pragmatism more explicit, compare it to two different ways in which cognitive 
scientists tend use the term ‘representation’, namely, the existential and the purely intentional (Rey 
2005). The former use expresses the objectivist notion of concepts whose putative content is in “the 
real world” (e.g., STONE) and the latter expresses the subjectivist (and, probably, circular) notion of 
concepts whose putative content is “in the head” (e.g., MEDUSA). 
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methodological naturalism is said to be preferentially committed to the authority of 
the scientific method in philosophical practice. An effect of this latter commitment is 
an emphasis on the scientific fruitfulness of natural kind terms. Given this epistemic 
focus, methodological naturalism—as opposed to ontological naturalism—is 
permissive towards highly dissimilar construals of the notion of a natural kind, 
provided that those construals are based on empirical considerations (e.g., Dupré 
1993). If the ontological/methodological assumption is depicted as a continuum 
between ontological and methodological naturalism, AUSTERE can be said to aim 
towards the ontological end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
(2b) We can also recognise this second assumption in the study of the 
mental. Take the case of the most prominent competing theories of concepts. These 
theories can be broadly classified in at least two groups, namely those that are mainly 
occupied with ontological issues about the nature of concepts (e.g., Fodor 1998; 
Peacocke 1992) and those where theorisation about concepts is heavily grounded on 
empirical evidence obtained by reliable procedures (e.g., Murphy 2002). Given the 
diversity of mental structures postulated by current psychological theories of 
concepts, some philosophers (e.g., Weiskopf 2009; Machery 2009) in the second 
group have even suggested that there is no single mental structure that can capture the 
causal and explanatory role that most concepts theorists in both groups expect 
concepts to play. Consequently, they defend the idea that a number of different mental 
structures (e.g., exemplars, prototypes and theories) can do that job. Still more 
radically, Machery (2009) has claimed that theories of concepts in psychology and 
philosophy are not converging theories because psychologists and philosophers do not 
really talk about the same thing when they discuss what they call concepts. Even if 
one does not accept such a sharp divide, it is safe to say that concept theorists can 
have very different interests, notably, while some of them may be primarily interested 
in, say, the problem of the nature of concepts (i.e., the answer to the question of “what 
are concepts?”), others are primarily interested in the explanatory role of concepts 
with respect to certain higher cognitive capacities (e.g., categorisation). If the 
ontological/methodological assumption depicts a continuum between a focus on the 
ontology of concepts and a focus on the empirically-grounded cognitive mechanisms 
supporting certain higher cognitive capacities, AUSTERE can be said to aim towards 
the ontological end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
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(3a) The realist/anti-realist assumption.61 Within philosophy of science, a 
default position regarding the nature of our scientific knowledge is so-called scientific 
realism, i.e., a positive epistemic attitude towards the theoretical terms and 
descriptions of our best scientific theories. Realism regarding theoretical terms has 
been discussed by different authors under different characterisations (Chakravartty 
2015). For current purposes, I will characterise a strong realist position about natural-
kind terms as a commitment to the view that there is no significant difference between 
the referents of the natural-kind terms used in a current special science and the kinds 
in the taxonomy of a (future) completed version of that special science—cf. the notion 
of ‘deep realism’ in Magnus (2012). In this view, the former are just a good 
approximation to the latter. Call this position Strong NKT Realism. By contrast, anti-
realist positions regarding natural-kind terms may hold a commitment to the view that 
natural kind terms need not (or, in its most radical version, should not) reflect  
objective natural kinds because their scientific merit is only of a practical character—
as in the distinction Churchland (1985) makes between natural kinds and ‘merely 
practical kinds’. In its strongest version, anti-realism may take the form of relativism 
or social constructivism regarding the meaning of theoretical terms. Call this latter 
position Strong NKT anti-realism. If the realist/anti-realist assumption depicts as a 
continuum between Strong NKT Realism and Strong NKT anti-realism, AUSTERE 
can be said to aim towards the realist end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
(3b) Some version of this third assumption underlies important debates in 
the field of cognitive sciences. Consider the term ‘intentionality’ in the context of the 
debates about the naturalisation of the property that our minds have of being about or 
representing things, states of affair, etc. As it has been suggested, possible engineering 
solutions to this problem may involve specifying mechanisms, processes or relations 
which secure the mind-world relation (e.g., Dretske 1981; Fodor 1987). Call this type 
of proposals Aboutness Realism, as they are committed to intentional realism, the 
view that ‘intentionality’ designates some type of thing that is part of the natural order 
of things. Other options may involve solutions that do not endorse intentional realism. 
For instance, it is possible that the reason why it is so difficult to show how a physical 
                                                          
61 Note that (3a) differs from (1a) in that (3a) involves an epistemological assumption about theoretical 
terms, whereas the (1a) involves an ontological assumption about the putative referents of those terms. 
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system can have intentional states is simply because there are no such states. Someone 
who thinks so might claim that there are no intentional states, without challenging the 
existence of mental states couched in some other way (e.g., Stich 1983). Others may 
go even further and take an instrumentalist stance that makes use of the descriptive 
apparatus of intentional explanation without committing to a realist position about it 
(e.g., Dennett 1987). Call this second type of proposals Aboutness Anti-realism, as, in 
this case, the term ‘intentionality’ is deemed to be empty. If the criterion of 
Intentional State-terms attitude is depicted as a continuum between Aboutness 
Realism and Aboutness Anti-realism, AUSTERE can be said to aim towards the 
realist end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
 
(4a) The unification assumption. According to a strong reductive model of 
the unity of science, the putative natural kinds about which special sciences generalise 
should eventually reduce to those putative natural kinds that natural-kind terms in 
more basic sciences designate. One way in which this strong reductive model can be 
rejected is in terms of a weaker version of it where the reductionist requirement 
undergoes some liberalised re-interpretation. This is what Fodor (1974) does. Another 
way of rejecting that strong reductive model is by defending anti-reductivism and a 
conception of the disunity of science that is not committed to the generality of a basic 
science like physics. This is what Dupré (1993) does. Following Dupré, whereas the 
strong reductivist model of scientific unification is constrained by the metaphysical 
assumption that there is a unique and systematic order in nature, anti-reductivist 
models of the disunity of science need not accept such assumption. His proposal is a 
pluralistic epistemology, the idea that science should include a variety of projects of 
enquiry—which may or may not correspond to paradigmatic scientific disciples—
merely guided by certain set of epistemic virtues (e.g., sensitivity to empirical facts, 
plausible background knowledge, coherence of knowledge, etc.). If the unification 
assumption depicts a continuum between a strong reductive model of the unity of 
science and a strong anti-reductivist models of the disunity of science, AUSTERE can 
be said to aim towards the reductivist end and INDULGENT towards the other. 
(4b) Philosophers and cognitive scientists have extensively discussed issues 
connected with the autonomy of psychology and whether psychological theories and 
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phenomena are reducible to theories and phenomena in neuroscience. In general 
terms, there are at least three main positions with respect to reductionism of 
psychology. Some (e.g., Bickle 2003; Churchland 1981, 1989) have defended the 
view that there is no room for propositional attitude psychology in a mature science of 
cognition, where a mature science of cognition is to be understood in terms of a 
certain future developments in neuroscience. This is a view that clearly excludes the 
possibility of psychology as an autonomous science. In defence of the independence 
of psychology, others (e.g., Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974) have appealed to functionalist 
explanations of mental phenomena and the related notion of multiple realizability, i.e., 
the thesis that a given functional psychological state can be realised by indefinitely 
many structural kinds that perform the same function. It would appear that the 
autonomy of psychology is incompatible with any form of reductionism. However, 
philosophers have also looked for some kind of compatibilist solution as a third way. 
For example, Bechtel (2008) has recently defended the view that some variety of 
mechanistic explanations can be both reductionist and emergentist,62 such that, while 
the decomposition of the component parts of a whole system is compatible with 
reductionism, the higher-level organisation and operation of the whole system secures 
an independent theoretical level. Putting aside any possible objections to this latter 
mechanistic solution, Bechtel’s proposal illustrates the need to bridge two radically 
opposed positions regarding reductionism and scientific unification with respect to the 
mental. If the unification assumption depicts a continuum between some strong anti-
autonomism regarding psychology and some strong autonomism regarding 
psychology, AUSTERE can be said to aim towards the anti-autonomist end and 
INDULGENT towards the other. 
 
(5a) Quantitative assumption regarding inductive generalisations. A 
standard assumption about natural kinds is that one can make inductive inferences 
about them (Magnus 2012) and this fact raises the “how many” question, i.e., the 
question of how many generalisations might be sufficient for a given theoretical term 
to count as a legitimate natural-kind term. Note that the question does not directly 
depend on the projectibility of natural-kind predicates, which, in turn, depends on 
                                                          
62 Bechtel (2008) characterises this notion as the behaviours that whole systems exhibit, which “goes 
beyond the behaviours of their parts.” (p. 129). 
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whether the natural-kind terms of a science actually designate genuine natural kinds.63 
Instead, the question is about the justification of a putative natural-kind predicates, 
notably, the predicates expressed by the natural-kind terms of an immature science. If 
the inductive success of projectible predicates in a certain mature science is 
determined by the fact that those predicates are about genuine natural kinds, it appears 
reasonable to think that scientists are justified in inferring that natural-kind terms 
supporting many inductions are more likely to pick out genuine natural kinds than 
those supporting few inductions. However, the requirement of inductive 
generalisations might be less central (and, perhaps, even unwanted) in the case of 
immature sciences, where both informative theoretical terms and related taxonomies 
are expected to be highly imprecise. Thus, it is possible to distinguish scientific 
scenarios where the projectibility of natural-kind predicates is, say, a central 
requirement and where it is not. If the quantitative assumption regarding inductive 
generalisations depicts a continuum between the view that legitimate natural-terms are 
to support many inductions and the view that legitimate natural-kind terms do not 
have to support many inductions, AUSTERE can be said to aim towards the former 
and INDULGENT towards the other. 
(5b) Some have defended the strong requirement the legitimate natural-kind 
terms in psychology should support a rich set of causally-grounded inductive 
generalisations and, on those grounds, they have rejected the scientific relevance of 
theoretical terms that do not seem to pick out kinds that support many scientific 
inductions (e.g., Machery 2009). The question of how rich or large the mentioned set 
of generalisations required for a legitimate natural-kind term must be can vary 
depending on the conception of natural kinds one is committed to. If it is part your 
preferred account of natural kinds that natural-kind terms must feature in natural laws 
(e.g., Fodor 1974), it might be difficult to provide an account of putative natural kinds 
supporting a rich set of inductions in psychology because, in general, there aren’t any 
of those theoretical terms—At best, natural-kind terms in psychology can be said to 
feature in certain type of lawlike generalisations (e.g., ceteris paribus generalisations). 
By contrast, if your preferred account of natural kinds is so broad that, say, even 
artefacts can qualify as bona fide natural kinds (as in Machery’s case), then the 
                                                          
63 Natural-kind terms express projectible predicates if they enter into successful inductions, on the 
assumption that these successful inductions are ultimately confirmed by the fact that those terms 
designate genuine natural kinds. 
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chances are higher that a given putative natural kind can be said to support many 
scientifically interesting inductions. Thus, if the quantitative assumption regarding 
inductive generalisations depicts a continuum between the strong view that 
psychological kinds should support a rich set of inductive generalisations (perhaps, 
due to a permissive conceptions of natural kinds), on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the view that psychological kinds do not have to support many inductive 
generalisations (perhaps, due to a restrictive conceptions of natural kinds), AUSTERE 
can be said to aim towards the former and INDULGENT towards the other. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, AUSTERE and INDULGENT are meant to 
characterise two idealised perspectives to the development of an adequate account of 
natural kinds. Surely, it would be too simplistic to say that each of the available 
theories of natural kinds strictly conforms to either one approximation or the other. 
Rather than that, I prefer to say that any given construal of the notion of a natural kind 
can be roughly associated to one or the two perspectives in one or several respects 
(see summary diagram 1, below). It can very well be the case that certain construal of 
natural kindness is committed to AUSTER in one respect and INDULGENT in a 
different respect. For instance, whereas Machery’s view of natural kinds can be said 
to be INDULGENT with respect to the ontological/methodological assumption (e.g., 
consider the different types of empirically-grounded natural kinds he thinks can 
account for categorisation as a diverse family of similar processes), it can also be said 
to be AUSTERE with respect to the quantitative assumption regarding inductive 
generalisations (see, e.g., Hill 2010 and Machery 2010, respectively). The point to 
stress is that theorists choose to steer their accounts of a natural kind towards either 
AUSTERE or INDULGENT on the assumption that such choice is always done at a 
cost. Put differently, what seems to be at stake is whether the benefits of opting for 
one approximation or the other (in a given respect) outweigh the costs. However, as I 
want to maintain, that analysis is only pertinent in case the tensions I have 
characterised in terms of AUSTERE and INDULGENT (in some particular respect) 
are really incompatible with one another. Since these tensions are based on the 
assumption that they reflect irreconcilable positions, then one should expect that the 
incompatibility between AUSTERE and INDULGENT attitudes with respect to those 
tensions is justified. Well, the view about a correct approach to natural kindness in the 
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current study of the mental that I want to put forward is based on the consideration 
that such incompatibility is unjustified. A look at some of the advantages associated 
with these two perspectives can help introduce the rationale for my proposal. 
 
 
 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT positions regarding natural kindness, as I have 
characterised them here, can be associated with a number of comparative explanatory 
advantages. I will conclude this chapter by arguing for the need to take both 
perspectives equally seriously. Later on, in Chapter 6, I will provide a positive view 
regarding the scientific relevance of concepts that is intended to subsume the 
apparently independent explanatory advantages of AUSTERE and INDULGENT 
positions. The main motivation for this positive view will be an attempt to render the 
theoretically unproductive tensions between those positions theoretically productive. 
 
4. AUSTERE or INDULGENT? A tension to be reappraised 
I have characterised the sources of an apparent tension underlying two broad 
opposing philosophical perspectives in the discussion of natural kinds. Similar 
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attitudes towards natural kindness can be recognised in the study of concepts, 
attitudes which, in some particular respect or another, some philosophers have 
acknowledged by distinguishing between two theoretical projects, namely one that is 
primarily the concern of philosophical theories of concepts vis-à-vis another that is 
primarily the concern of psychological theories of concepts. For instance, in 
discussing categorisation as one of the phenomena he thinks an adequate theory of 
concepts should explain, Prinz (2002) points out that: 
 
Philosophers rarely try to accommodate such psychological findings when developing 
their theories. In fact, some philosophers think that a theory of concepts need not 
explain categorization at all. The constituents of thoughts, they contend, may have 
little to do with the mechanisms by which we classify objects under the conditions 
psychologists explore. (p. 10) 
 
In Prinz’s view, excluding categorisation as an explanatory desideratum would 
introduce an unfair bias against psychological theories of concepts. Presumably, by 
including categorisation as one of the explanatory targets of a theory of concepts, the 
bias would be against philosophical theories that do not consider concepts relevant for 
the explanation of the mechanisms psychologists think are relevant for categorisation. 
Machery (2009) has gone on to claim that psychological and philosophical 
theories of concepts are two fully independent projects. In his view, psychologists 
should simply focus on certain psychological structures that individuals use in higher 
cognitive processes and reject the use of the term ‘concept’ for scientific purposes. 
This radical conclusion illustrates the effect of choosing sides with respect to certain 
aspects of AUSTERE and INDULGENT. 
As I will make it clear in the next chapter, the unproductive tension between 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT in the study of concepts should be re-interpreted in a 
different light, on the grounds that both perspectives address important concerns 
regarding the probable role of certain putative natural kinds in our mental life. What I 
maintain is that this tension is not resolved by simply choosing one of the two options 
(in one or more of the particular aspects of this tension listed in diagram 1), but by 
developing an adequate solution in which this unproductive tension is rendered 
productive. An alternative methodological perspective regarding an adequate 
140 
 
understanding of natural kindness in the study of the mental should help to dissipate 
many disputes between AUSTERE advocates and INDULGENT advocates.  
There are certain requirements for the development of this alternative. A 
desired solution, as I will intend to show, rides on the acceptance that different 
theoretical frameworks, which are not clearly compatible with one another, can 
perfectly co-exist within the context of an immature scientific field. In this context, 
the use of vague or imprecise theoretical terms is compatible with a stricter form of 
scientific eliminativism in more mature sciences, and the problem of finding 
commonalities among psychological structures that might be involved in certain 
higher cognitive processes does not have to preclude the project of theorising about 
the nature of concepts. More importantly, the argument that a uniform notion of 
concepts should be replaced by a heterogeneous set of complex psychological 
structures on the grounds that these structures, but not concepts, pick out natural kinds 
can be seriously debunked. One reason for this is that, once the AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT distinction is reconsidered as a productive tension, it is perfectly 
acceptable for cognitive scientists to study different types of complex mental 
representations playing an important role in certain high level cognitive processes 
and, at the same time, study some type of less complex (or even, atomic) mental 
representations required as the constituents of thoughts qua complex mental 
representations, without claiming that the natural kind status of the former is a reason 
to question that of the latter. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the problem of natural kindness within philosophy of 
science, with a focus on the study of concepts. I first presented some prominent 
philosophical accounts of the notion of natural kinds and the problem special sciences 
impose on a unified construal of that notion. After that, I characterised the possible 
sources of a distinction between two apparently opposing perspectives to natural 
kinds, namely AUSTERE and INDULGENT, and claimed that this distinction 
permeates the study of concepts in an unproductive way. In view of that, I argued for 
the need of a mediating methodological solution that overcomes the unhelpful 
tensions between the two perspectives. I maintained that these tensions demand some 
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important reappraisal and that this reappraisal should allow for a more productive 
perspective towards the notion of natural kinds in the study of concepts, namely one 
in which the advantages typically associated to one perspective are not viewed as a 
challenge for the other. Finally, I set forth some general requirements I think an 
adequate alternative solution should satisfy. These requirements will be instrumental 
in the proposal about natural kinds within the scientific study of mind next chapter 
will intend to sketch. 
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Chapter 6 
———————————— 
‘Concept’ is a Legitimate Natural-Kind Term 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this conclusion chapter is to defend the thesis that the term 
‘concept’ is a legitimate natural-kind term in the context of an immature science of 
the mind. To do so, I will sketch a positive view regarding theoretical terms in 
psychology relevant for the task of identifying putative natural kinds and lawlike 
generalisations about them. Contrary to those who are skeptical about the theoretical 
credentials of the concept of a concept, I maintain that a suitable approach to natural 
kinds in psychology must allow for the co-existence of different models of concepts 
and attitudes towards the study of concepts. In this sense, the main contribution of the 
current work is that the view of scientifically relevant terms I favour does not only 
object to concept eliminativism, but it also offers common methodological space for 
issues raised by otherwise irreconcilable positions within philosophy of cognitive 
science, as those motivated by the several tensions characterised in terms of the 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT distinction in Chapter 5. In the proposed view, those 
positions can productively fall under the qualified application of a common 
conception of natural kinds, without disregarding their diverse motivations and 
explanatory interests. 
My main focus of this chapter will be on the claim that, once the tensions 
between AUSTERE and INDULGENT attitudes towards natural kinds (hereafter, 
simply AUSTERE and INDULGENT) are constructively reframed within the study of 
concepts, the heuristic advantages of applying a single common conception of natural 
kindness in two complementary ways (motivated by AUSTERE and INDULGENT, 
respectively) outweighs the prospects of a taxonomically relevant vocabulary 
constrained by AUSTERE and INDULGENT as two irreconcilable positions. In view 
of that, I will argue that a qualified application Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPCs) 
is—until further notice—a proper notion of natural kinds that can help distinguish 
concepts as putative natural kinds. 
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In short, the central argument of this chapter will be that, just as it is perfectly 
justified that an appropriate account of natural-kind terms in special sciences (notably, 
highly immature sciences) indulge in certain significant latitude vis-à-vis an 
appropriate account of natural-kind terms in more basic sciences (i.e., less immature 
sciences), it is perfectly justified that the theoretical terms within a highly immature 
special science such as psychology can be distinguished along the same lines. 
Accordingly, I will defend a combined perspective on ‘concept’ as a natural-kind term 
whereby the notion of HPC can be heuristically applied both as per AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT in order to identify putative natural kinds designated by the term 
‘concept’. 
 
2. AUSTERE and INDULGENT: Together but not scrambled 
In this section, I will argue, firstly, that different types of mental 
representations can be broadly characterised as HPC kinds in one of two different 
ways, at different degrees of complexity, depending on the type of causal mechanisms 
that sustain the property clusters that distinguish those two kinds. I maintain that the 
most prominent models of concepts within Cognitive Science can be sorted out 
according to this distinction. Secondly, I will argue that the traditional view according 
to which natural kinds share common properties must be taken with a pinch of salt 
when it comes to immature sciences. The reason for this is the unlikelihood that so-
called reliable empirical procedures within highly immature (and loosely connected) 
sciences of cognition can (as yet) supply accurate objective descriptions of reality. In 
effect, given the multiplicity of theories and the ensuing methodological diversity in 
the study of concepts, it is hard to accept that everything one can say about concepts 
(and their nature) is contained in the explanations these sciences are in a position to 
provide. This latter claim is not meant to object to scientific realism as a positive 
epistemic attitude but, instead, it is meant to object to any strict application of a single 
conception of natural kinds within current Cognitive Science, simply because we do 
not as yet know enough about the kinds psychological generalisations should 
subsume. Thirdly, I will sketch a view of natural kinds where AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT can find common ground and I will argue for the methodological and 
heuristic advantages of this view. And, finally, I will provide a possible (and yet 
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unavoidably tendentious) reinterpretation of Machery’s heterogeneous BoKs that does 
not challenge the scientific relevance of the term ‘concept’. 
 
2.1.  Lower-MRs and Upper-MRs mental representations as two types of HPC 
kinds 
I find it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that the probable existence of 
putative natural kinds which are highly complex (or molecular) mental representations 
is not incompatible with there being putative natural kinds which are minimally 
complex (or even non-molecular) mental representations. Call these two types of 
psychological kinds Upper and Lower mental representations (hereafter, Upper-MRs 
and Lower-MRs), respectively. For example, suppose prototypical representations of 
a given category (e.g., the prototype of an elephant) are highly complex mental 
representations that encode a set of statistical relations to minimally complex mental 
representations called the features of the prototype (say, e.g., lexical representations of 
tusks, trunks, etc.). In this case, as it might be, prototypes could be putative natural 
kinds at the level of Upper-MRs, and their features could be putative natural kinds at 
the level of Lower-MRs. 
Another example might help to make the point clearer. Suppose, for the sake 
of illustration, that the content of many linguistic expressions is actually determined 
by the content of language-like mental representations. And suppose also that, as an 
empirical fact, it is common for language users (e.g., English language users) to talk 
about two different types of referents (say, discrete entities and events, respectively) 
by using two different types of linguistic expressions, say, nominal phrases (NPs), 
such as, e.g., “Edison”, “the motion picture camera”, “the invention of the motion 
picture camera”, etc., and sentences (Se), such as, e.g., “Edison invented the motion 
picture camera”, respectively). Now suppose that, just as it is possible to account for 
the complexity of linguistic expressions by means of syntactic transformations (e.g., 
Ses resulting from the combination of NPs and the like), so can the complexity of 
mental representations be accounted for in terms of the transformation of different 
types of canonically structured mental representations. Thus, whereas certain types of 
complex mental representations can be the bearers of the content expressed by certain 
Ses, certain other less complex mental representations could be the bearers of the 
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content expressed by certain NPs. In this case, as it might be, while those complex 
mental representations could amount to putative natural kinds at the level of Upper-
MRs, the other less complex type of mental representations could amount to putative 
natural kinds at the level of Lower-MRs. 
Most concept theorists have typically identified concepts with some form of 
Upper-MRs (e.g., prototypes, theories, exemplars, etc.) and a few of them have 
claimed that (some or most lexical) concepts are Lower-MRs (e.g., lexical atoms in a 
language of thought).64 Thus, it is perfectly possible that, contrary to Machery (2009), 
the consideration that different prominent models of Upper-MRs fail to pick out a 
single homogeneous natural kind does not really challenge the view that there are 
concepts, since the term ‘concept’ could very well turn out to pick out either some 
other type of Upper-MRs or some type of Lower-MRs. 
Machery (2009, 2010) has offered what might be considered the most explicit 
and straightforward eliminativist proposal regarding concepts (see Chapters 3 and 4) 
so far. According to this view, the theoretical term ‘concept’ should be replaced by 
three alternative models of psychological structures (i.e., prototypes, exemplars and 
theories) because ‘concept’, as opposed to each of his proposed models, does not pick 
out a single Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC). The view of proper natural kinds 
qua HPCs is arguably the best available contribution regarding natural kinds within 
philosophy of science (see Chapter 5, section 2.2). The key feature of HPCs is the 
idea that the properties which are grouped together in the property cluster 
distinguishing a given natural kind are not accidentally grouped together, but due to, 
at least, one sustaining causal mechanism. However, since there is not just one way in 
which a given set of mental properties can be causally sustained, it is possible to 
object to the eliminativist conclusion of Machery’s argument on the grounds that it 
overlooks other possible applications of Boyd’s conception of natural kinds. 
Indeed, since the question about what homeostatic mechanisms are relevant 
for which HPC kind is an a posteriori question, the issue of whether concepts form a 
proper natural kind is otiose. The term ‘concept’ is a term of art not so much because 
it is assumed to pick out a proper natural kind (as though it was the term in the 
vocabulary of a true theory of the world), but because it allows specialists to 
                                                          
64 See Chapters 2 (section 2) and 3 (section 3.2), respectively. 
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problematize, theorise and provide a domain for certain mental phenomena and 
processes that are in need of explanation.65 Likewise, the same consideration applies 
to the notion of HPC as a characterisation of proper natural kinds, since empirical 
generalisations about some putative natural kind do not ipso facto entail genuine 
natural laws about proper natural kinds. As de Sousa (1984) puts it,  
 
Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and 
epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage in its 
progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that sense is always a real and lively 
scientific question. (p. 562) 
 
For this type of reason, Machery’s scientific eliminativism regarding concepts 
is eliminativism regarding the theoretical term ‘concept’ (i.e., a methodological or 
taxonomical issue), not eliminativism regarding a hypothesised putative natural kind 
(i.e., a metaphysical issue). Machery’s claim that the class of concepts is not a 
homogenous class is really a claim on whether the terms ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’ and 
‘theory’ are all legitimate natural kind terms in psychology (i.e., an attempt to show 
that these terms can be said to pick out certain HPCs, the best currently available 
conception of natural kinds). In his view, those three theoretical terms should replace 
the notion of concepts because the term ‘concept’ is methodologically inadequate—
the assumption being that the term ‘concept’ fails to pick out a homogenous HPC 
because none of the three terms ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’ and ‘theory’ succeeds in 
individually doing so in a way that makes the other two terms explanatorily 
redundant. Here, the notion of HPC is playing a regulatory role for the acceptance of 
the claim that each of those three notions is a legitimate natural kind term in its own 
right. However, there is no obvious connection between the acceptance of this claim 
and the acceptance of the claim that the notion of concept fails to pick out a HPC. 
Indeed, if someone thinks that prototypes, exemplars and theories are bad 
models of concepts, irrespective of whether they designate HPCs, then the realisation 
                                                          
65 In this respect, for example, the very notions of prototypes, exemplars and theories as genuine 
theoretical terms in the study of cognition can be said to be the result of the attempt to develop an 
adequate and comprehensive account of concepts. In some way, the productive empirical study of 
prototypes, exemplars and theories is a by-product of the investigation of concepts and the kind of 
phenomena where concepts are typically assumed to play an explanatory role. 
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that Machery’s proposed BoKs amount to distinct HPCs may be deemed an additional 
reason for rejecting them as a theoretical alternative to the term concept. The reason 
for this is that, being different natural-kind terms (i.e., kind terms that designate 
distinct putative natural kinds and support inductive generalisations independently 
from one another), none of them is able to subsume the others as competing models of 
concepts. Alternatively, what I suggest is a less drastic application of the regulatory 
notion of HPC. In particular, this application should acknowledge that, even though 
current psychological theories of concepts are probably wrong about the kind of 
proper natural kind the term ‘concept’ might actually designate, this latter term is a 
fruitful vehicle of inquiry in the empirical study of the mind. 
I agree that Machery’s proposed BoKs (i.e., the kind of putative natural kinds 
the psychological terms ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’ and ‘theory’ are supposed to 
designate) can be specified in terms of HPCs, but, as I have argued in Chapters 3 and 
4, I disagree that Machery’s view can satisfactorily replace the role concepts are 
normally expected to play in a theory of cognition. Alternatively, what I claim is that 
the argument according to which the terms ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’ and ‘theory’ 
designate putative natural kinds because they pick out HPCs is not incompatible with 
the view that concepts are natural kinds even if those three Upper-MRs form HPCs. 
The reason for this is that the putative referents of ‘concept’ may still be HPCs, even 
if they are not exactly the same as the HPCs which are the kinds of Machery’s BoKs. 
Thus, as I shall now go on to argue, by distinguishing two different sources of 
probable homeostatic mechanisms, the notion of HPCs could be legitimately applied 
to candidates for putative natural kinds designated by the term ‘concept’ at the level 
of both Upper-MRs and Lower-MRs. 
I propose to start by considering a distinction between computation and 
information processing. Even though the notions of computation and information can 
be interpreted in different ways (e.g., Piccinini 2015), cognitive scientists tend to 
conflate these two notions as though they were one and the same thing. As Piccinini 
and Scarantino (2010) puts it: 
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Right around the time they entered psychology and neuroscience, the notions of 
computation and information merged into what seemed an appealing synthesis. 
Roughly, the mind/brain was seen as a computer, whose function is to receive 
information from the environment, process it, and use it to control the body and 
perform intelligent actions. […] Since then, computation and information processing 
have become almost inseparable—and often indistinguishable—in much literature on 
the mind and brain. (p. 238) 
 
The main motivation for the merging of these two notions in mainstream 
Cognitive Science is the project of accounting for our characteristically inferential 
mental processes in terms of the causal transformation of complex or structured 
mental representations. In this context, mental representations are normally conceived 
of as vehicles of information and, in turn, the information those vehicles carry is 
conceived of as the semantic content of our mental representations. However, because 
there is not just one way of conceiving of the notion of information as a way to 
characterise the content the mental representations might carry (e.g., consider the 
distinction between referentialist and intensionalist accounts of mental content 
discussed in Chapter 4), one can very well distinguish between computational 
properties of our mental representations and their informational properties. Indeed, 
different authors have emphasised one or the other when characterising the causal link 
between certain psychological states (or processes) and our intelligent behaviour (or 
else, our higher cognitive competences)66. 
In particular, one could distinguish between information processes that 
determine the content of (Lower-/Upper-) MRs and the computational processes that 
are sensitive to the information-preserving structure of (Lower-/Upper-) MRs. In other 
words, one could distinguish between two independent types of causal mechanisms 
sustaining both Lower-MRs and Upper-MRs. 
Suppose, for instance, some Lower-MR (say, CAT) is individuated by their 
referent (more specifically, by a certain set of properties tokened by the members of 
the category of cats) as per, say, some form of informational semantics (see related 
discussion in Chapter 4, section 6). In this case, CAT is an HPC kind which is 
                                                          
66 For example, Stich (1983) has argued that psychological explanation could be couched in terms of a 
Syntactic Theory of the Mind, according to which mental states are identified with purely syntactic 
mental representations causally interacting with one another in virtue of their formal properties. 
Piccinini and Scarantino (2010), in turn, highlight the centrality of the notion of information in the 
sciences of the mind and the explanation of cognition (among other disciplines). 
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informationally sustained.67  Likewise, it is perfectly possible that, along with the 
occurrence of CAT (e.g., alongside the causal tokening of CAT), certain related 
Upper-MRs are inferentially activated (e.g., Upper-MRs expressing that cats have 
sandpaper tongues, retractable claws and can see in the dark; that when turned upside 
down and dropped from a height, cats tend to land on their feet; that Bernardo likes 
cats; that some cats are like Garfield, etc.). Since inferences can be explained in terms 
of causal, information-preserving computation processes, Upper-MRs which are thus 
tokened can be interpreted as computationally sustained HPCs. Whether these related 
Upper-MRs are constitutive of the type of mental representation CAT is a matter of 
empirical investigation and philosophical dispute, but it is safe to say that they may be 
involved in certain higher cognitive competences such as categorisation (see section 
2.4 for an elaboration of this latter point). 
Thus, Lower-MRs can be proper natural kinds by the same standards that 
Upper-MRs can, a consideration that does justice to the importance different cognitive 
scientists have attributed to different types of mental representations in the study of 
concepts. For instance, while informationally sustained HPCs could support 
theorising about a possible naturalised account of how a causal mind-world relation 
can be secured, computationally sustained HPCs (e.g., prototypes) could support the 
explanation of crucial mental phenomena, such as for example, how it is that certain 
putative primitive concepts are learnt (e.g., Margolis and Laurence 2011). 
 
2.2.  Rendering a destructive tension constructive 
In Chapter 5, I concluded that the study of concepts would benefit from a 
perspective towards natural kinds that renders certain unproductive tensions 
characterised as AUSTERE and INDULGENT productive. As I maintained there, an 
adequate empirical study of concepts requires abandoning the idea that adopting a 
given epistemological position motivated by AUSTERE (e.g., the view that natural-
                                                          
67  It would appear that, by characterising certain (Lower-/Upper-) MRs in terms of HPCs, strict 
essentialism about putative natural kinds is ruled out. But this is exactly the kind of thinking my 
proposal wants to object to, since it assumes an unproductive methodological tension between 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT. Alternatively, since how it is that sustaining causal mechanisms 
actually work is an a posteriori question, one can leave the related question of whether or not 
informational semantics involves strict essentialism open. For present purposes, the notion of HPC is 
compatible with strict essentialism on pragmatic grounds. If strict essentialism is true, property clusters 
are a good heuristic tool to theorise about putative natural kinds in the study of concepts. 
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kind terms in psychology should support many inductive generalisations) excludes the 
scientific relevance an apparent antagonistic position motivated by INDULGENT 
(e.g., the view that natural-kind terms in psychology do not need to support many 
inductive generalisations), and vice versa. 
‘Austere’ and ‘Indulgent’ are two labels I have used to characterise opposing 
attitudes towards a number of focal yet unresolved issues within both philosophy of 
cognitive science and, more specifically, the study of concepts. Because advocates of 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT (with respect to each of those unresolved issues) have 
made substantial cases in defence of each of their preferred positions, the possibility 
of bringing their contribution within a common theoretical framework, as I want to 
argue, is a perfectly coherent option. What follows is an attempt to sketch this option. 
In Chapter 5, I refrained from proposing a general criterion to distinguish 
between all the different tensions depicting AUSTERE and INDULGENT attitudes, 
since being committed to one of these attitudes with respect to a given issue does not 
entail being committed the same attitude with respect to a different issue. 
Notwithstanding that consideration, in this Chapter, I want to go on to claim that, if 
there is one feature that may be said to pervade most (if not all) of the several 
positions labelled as AUSTERE and INDULGENT, I believe it is accommodating the 
metaphysical and methodological understanding of natural kinds. According to the 
metaphysical conception, natural kinds are objective (or theory independent), 
homogenous, and their members share a common essence. Additionally, from the 
perspective of this metaphysical conception, natural kind terms are to be understood 
in terms of a strong natural-kind-term realism, that is, as though they designated the 
kinds which are relevant to the laws of a completed special science (given the 
charitable assumption that the current state of a science is a stage in a process that 
leads to such a completed science).68 By contrast, according to the methodological 
conception, natural kinds are theory-dependent, heterogeneous, and their members do 
not share common essences. Moreover, methodological natural kind terms are 
                                                          
68 This way of depicting natural-kind terms is equivalent to what de Sousa (1984) dubs as ‘rigid 
designators’, namely, “[natural-kind terms that] pick out members of the same class or lumps of the 
same stuff in every possible world […] even if we are ignorant or mistaken about what that class or 
stuff really is.” (p. 563-564) 
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committed to a strong natural-kind-term anti-realism, in that they are not expected to 
designate objective natural kinds. 
An important feature of the metaphysical conception is that it allows for 
objectivity to be construed in terms of the independence of Ontology from 
Epistemology, that is, in terms of the independence of the kinds of things that there 
actually are in the world (whatever they might be) from the epistemic mechanisms 
that allow us to access them. Prominent philosophers (e.g., Rey 1983, 1985; Fodor 
1998) have argued that overlooking the independence of Ontology from Epistemology 
has been the source of much confusion in the study of concepts. In particular, as these 
authors claim, one important reason for this confusion has to do with a tendency to 
conceive of the essential properties necessary for the individuation of some type of 
thing in the world as being dependent on the mental capacities that enable us to access 
them. 
In turn, one prominent characteristic of the methodological conception of 
natural kinds rides on a certain degree of scepticism towards the very independence I 
have just pointed out. Indeed, if the independence of Ontology from Epistemology is 
thought to be irrelevant for scientific purposes, then the notion of a natural kind, as 
Dupré (2002) suggests, may be just deemed as “a (more or less) [sic] useful 
methodological concept” (p. 31). In this case, objectivity is a mere presumption and 
scientists should seek only empirical adequacy for their theories (van Fraassen, 1980). 
A focus on empirical adequacy has proved to be compatible with the use of theoretical 
terms that do not seem to clearly carve nature at its joints (i.e., terms that do not 
clearly pick out putative objective natural kinds). Cowie (2009) provides a good 
example with respect to the productive use of the term ‘innate’ in different areas of 
enquiry such as language acquisition and developmental sciences. Here, a most 
agreeable remark is that, despite the multiplicity of meanings theorists have attributed 
to the term ‘innate’, this term has played a significant role in motivating serious 
discussions among biologists and psychologists. Thus, in Chapter 1 (sections 4 and 5), 
I proposed a taxonomy of eliminativist arguments and claims where certain types of 
eliminativist projects rejected the existence of a given type of thing in the world 
without abandoning the theoretical terms normally used to designate those 
ontologically suspect referents. In the light of these considerations, I concur with the 
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view that vague or imprecise terms can undeniably make some heuristic contribution 
in any developing scientific field. 
I agree that objectivity is no more than a presumption, especially in the context 
of immature special sciences where the use of vague theoretical terms is characteristic 
and probably unavoidable. In other words, these sciences need to assume certain kinds 
as natural, but it is understood that such assumptions are defeasible and corrigible in 
the course of scientific inquiry. But I disagree that a mere methodological conception 
of natural kinds can eventually uncover proper natural kinds: there has to be more to 
the existence of a genuine natural kind than pragmatic convenience, even the 
pragmatic convenience of the scientific community. The main reason one can provide 
for supporting this claim is de Sousa’s consideration that the taxonomical success of a 
given science exclusively on the basis of empirical adequacy alone is both irrelevant 
for individuating objective natural kinds (kinds which are so intrinsically) and even 
compatible with the kind of pragmatism Locke advocated. In Locke’s empiricist view, 
as de Sousa (1984) points out, what exists is unknowable and our concepts for natural 
kinds are ontologically arbitrary. Supposedly, it is the boundaries of these concepts 
that allow us to establish the natural kind a particular thing belongs to, but since the 
concepts are framed on a contingent basis and their extension is determined 
intensionally, they do not provide insight into the nature of objective natural kinds. In 
de Sousa’s words, “[those concepts] at best represent pragmatic convenience.” (p. 
563). 
My suggestion is that an appropriate methodological view of natural kinds 
should go beyond the alleged opposition between metaphysical and methodological 
matters. By going beyond that tension I mean to say that the methodological 
conception of natural kinds should also incorporate challenges posed by 
metaphysicians as part of its heuristic role in special sciences. For example, at the 
beginning of this section I mentioned my scepticism about the capability of current 
empirical theories of concepts for providing a satisfactory answer to the question of 
what concepts are. Suppose then that some sort of traditional ontological analysis 
dealing with the problem of the nature of concepts is able to offer certain 
transcendental arguments for or against some explanatory strategy in the study of 
cognition (cf. Fodor 1998). While such arguments can be deemed scientifically 
irrelevant due to their typically non-empirical character, there does not seem to be an 
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in-principle reason for opposing their contribution as additional constraints on 
argument to the best explanation in an emerging scientific field where initial progress 
may tend to resist unification.69 For this reason, not only do I favour the idea of 
embracing the tension between AUSTERE and INDULGENT as a positive tool of 
progress, but I regard it as a requirement for correct theorising about natural kinds 
within the context of immature special sciences. I incline to believe that the more 
immature a given science is, the more it is that philosophers of science should learn 
how to live with this tension (i.e., the more they need to acknowledge it as a positive 
and productive tool). 
More specifically, what I propose is a focus on a constructive reading of the 
tension in question. It is common that, in developing theories of concepts, their 
proponents take a certain destructive attitude towards some model of concept or 
another. There is nothing really wrong about these attitudes per se unless they are 
insufficiently justified. For example, if someone thinks she has good reasons to 
believe that concepts must be identified with some type of unanalysable atomic 
mental representations, then she may be justified in adopting a destructive attitude 
towards models of analysable concepts that directly challenge the thesis that concepts 
are atoms. Here, by adopting a justified destructive attitude I mean to say that 
someone has (what she thinks are) good reasons to conclude both that their opponents 
are wrong about the kind of things concepts might actually be and that their relevant 
theories have to be rejected. 
I claim there aren’t good reasons to make the case that, for theories and 
models of concepts advocating either AUSTERE or INDULGENT (in one particular 
respect or another), a destructive attitude towards theories and models advocating 
their opponent perspective should be preferred over a constructive one. On the 
contrary, given the significant variety of empirical findings within the psychology of 
concepts (see, e.g., Murphy 2002, Machery 2009, c.4) and the different philosophical 
views about the possible nature of concepts (see, e.g., Margolis and Laurence 2007; 
Prinz and Clark 2004) that have motivated the development of highly dissimilar 
theories of concepts (e.g., Fodor 1998; Peacocke 2002; Prinz 2002; Hampton 2006), a 
                                                          
69 Of course, including this type of contribution as an additional argument for the best explanation need 
not entail any strong commitment to some sort foundational role of ontology with respect of 
psychology. 
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constructive attitude on the part of theories endorsing AUSTERE vis-à-vis theories 
endorsing INDULGENT (or, mutatis mutandis, theories endorsing INDULGNET vis-
à-vis theories endorsing AUSTERE) should be preferred. Destructive attitudes, as 
characterised above, can be kept to aspects of theory construction and evaluation that 
do not appeal to a particular preference for AUSTERE or INDULGENT, as though 
the adherence to one of these perspectives was relevant for establishing a comparative 
advantage. Note that this claim is compatible with adopting destructive attitudes 
towards theories and models within the context of more established and less immature 
scientific areas of enquiry, irrespective of whether AUSTERE or INDULGENT is 
endorsed. My view is that a constructive reading of the tension between these two 
perspectives is a more sensible option when it comes to the current study of concepts. 
There are a number of issues with respect to which the study of concepts 
would benefit from acknowledging the need to reappraise tensions constrained by 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT in a different light. Since, as I have argued, there isn’t 
as yet any viable proposal to seriously challenge the scientific relevance of the term 
‘concept’, cognitive scientists should welcome methodological alternatives that allow 
for the proliferation of relevant hypotheses, especially in a domain of inquiry where 
abandoning certain elusive theoretical terms might be a hasty decision. In the 
following section, I will recommend that the notion of HPCs be applied for two 
different yet compatible heuristic purposes. Additionally, I will illustrate the sort of 
issues that this model for the application of HPCs could help to combine in one single 
domain of enquiry. 
 
2.3.  A qualified application of HPCs in the study of concepts 
Within cognitive science, enquiry into concepts and their role in our mental 
life proceeds as if we know both that there are concepts and that we can distinguish 
many of them. It then goes on to identify the properties that are typical of concepts, 
properties that should support inductive inferences about the things that fall under the 
extension of the concept. Concepts are typically identified with the tokening of mental 
representations and the properties that different competing theories deem as typical of 
concepts vary from one another, depending on both the main role concepts are 
supposed to play in our mental processes and how they are to be individuated. 
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For example, as described in Chapter 3, conceptual atomism (i.e., the view 
that concepts are unstructured) conceives of concepts as the basic constituents of 
thoughts (e.g., in a language-like representational medium) and aims at formulating 
conditions for the individuation of concepts (i.e., identity, semantic and possession 
conditions) without appealing to epistemic factors. Conceptual atomism is concerned 
with the properties of concepts that are metaphysically necessary for them to be what 
they are. By contrast, all the main psychological theories of concepts described in 
Chapter 2 are theories about the kind of structure that certain mental representations 
must have such that they can account for processes involved in many of our higher 
cognitive competences (e.g., categorisation, inference, etc.). These theories are not 
concerned with essential properties of concepts but the conditions that agents like us 
must satisfy to possess concepts. These conditions are typically specified in terms of 
epistemic factors such as certain inferential or recognitional abilities. 
When categorising theories of concepts which identify concepts with mental 
representations, it is common to distinguish between primitive (or unstructured) and 
complex (or structured) concepts (Laurence and Margolis 1999, pp. 4-5). I have made 
a similar distinction between putative Lower-MRs and Upper-MRs that are HPCs, the 
difference being that the category of Lower-MRs that are HPCs is slightly permissive 
as to whether our most basic mental representations are atomic or minimally 
structured. The reason for this is simply the acknowledgement that there is no 
agreement about the nature of the most basic component of our mental representations 
(e.g., whether or not they are sensory or perceptual in character). This degree of 
permissiveness even allows us to read this distinction as a relative one. A given 
mental representation M might be Lower-MR with respect to one mental 
representation N, but Upper-MR with respect to another mental representation, P 
(such as, e.g., when CAT is deemed to be a molecular Lower-MR by the standards of, 
say, some statistically-based account of concepts and non-molecular Lower-MR by 
the standards of an atomistic account). The point to emphasise here is that one can 
find the distinction between Lower-MRs and Upper-MRs compelling irrespective of 
whether or not one is a relativist in this respect—I hope it will become clear later on 
that, in the context of an immature cognitive science, it is a good thing that this is the 
case. 
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I have also distinguished between HPCs which are informationally and 
computationally sustained. Mainly for heuristic purposes, I propose to apply each of 
the two versions of causally sustained HPCs to any Lower-MRs and Upper-MRs for 
which the term ‘concept’ is a possible designator (see diagram 2). To regiment this 
application of HPCs, the following qualification is in order: while computationally 
sustained HPCs should be preferred where the goal of enquiry is empirical adequacy, 
informationally sustained HPCs should be preferred where the goal of enquiry is the 
metaphysical individuation of essential properties. 
 
 
 
Once the tension between AUSTERE and INDULGENT positions is accepted 
as a positive investigative tool, important controversies can be said to have a place in 
a common domain of enquiry where progress requires a sort of ‘vulgar pragmatism’ 
regarding our theoretical vocabulary. Controversies about the role of natural kinds in 
theory construction and evaluation are not an exception. 
According to Machery (2010), “The study of concepts is in an odd state of 
disarray” (p. 195). The reason for this, he goes on to say, is that current theories of 
concepts have failed to provide a general theoretical framework for all the known 
phenomena in need of explanation and there is little agreement as to what type of 
thing (i.e., what type of putative natural kind) the term ‘concept’ might actually 
designate. However, for all kinds of reasons, the cognitive science community has 
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objected to the elimination of this term.70 Thus, since this very disarray may be a good 
reason to be cautious about the premature elimination of a widely used term, the 
eliminativist’s claim that the class of concepts is too heterogeneous to form a natural 
kind is pointing at something that does not have to be deemed an obstacle to scientific 
progress. Again, for want of a more precise theoretical terminology, philosophers and 
cognitive scientists can’t avoid using the term ‘concept’, a term that has helped to 
raise and discuss issues that are relevant for both philosophers and psychologists. The 
following list of relatively familiar controversies can help to illustrate the relevance of 
keeping a constructive understanding of positions typically framed in terms of 
AUSTERE and INDULGENT: 
 
(i) Discussion of concept possession. Fodor (2004) has distinguished 
between theories which focus on concept possession from a pragmatist orientation 
(e.g. having concept C depends on agents’ capacity to distinguish concept C from 
non-C or her capacity to recognise the validity of some C-involving inferences) and 
theories which focus concept possession from a Cartesian orientation (e.g., having C 
is being able to think about concepts ‘as such’). Fodor favours a theory of concepts 
that is consistent with the Cartesian orientation (viz., his version of Conceptual 
Atomism), since he thinks pragmatism about concept possession is wrong. What is 
wrong, he argues, has to do with concept theorists’ assumptions about the correct 
order of explanation. His view is that an account of concept possession is parasitic on 
(and, therefore, not prior to) an account of concept individuation. From the point of 
view of those who think this view is probably true, a metaphysically-motivated 
application of HPCs can be said to serve the purposes of an adequate account of 
concept possession because, in the Cartesian view, concept possession is not an 
epistemic condition. 
By contrast, as I mentioned earlier, there are prominent psychological and 
philosophical theories of concepts whose main concern is the study of the conditions 
that agents like us have to satisfy in order to possess concepts (e.g., see Peacocke 
1992 for a philosophical theory; see Chapter 2, for psychological theories). For these 
theories, different epistemic capacities (e.g., inferring, recognizing, categorising, etc.) 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., the open peer commentaries in Machery 2010. 
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are constitutive of what it is to possess concepts, and, as a result of that, the answer to 
the question of what concepts are is derived from the conditions for concept 
possession (i.e., a concept is a capacity, viz. that which the possession conditions of a 
concept are indicative of). From the point of view of those who think this alternative 
view is adequate for purposes of explanation, a methodologically-motivated 
application of HPCs can serve their explanatory purposes because, among other 
things, this conception of HPCs is based on the kind of cognitive mechanisms whose 
primacy the Cartesian view of concept possession rejects. 
Concept pragmatism and concept Cartesianism are presented as two 
irreconcilable positions that can’t be part of a common theoretical framework. 
However, both positions can help (and have helped) to raise important concerns 
relevant to the discussions of concept possession: can the investigation into the nature 
of concepts be a direct concern of empirical research? To what extent is the 
satisfaction of the conditions for concept possession a sufficient requirement for an 
account of the nature of concepts? Since the use a common terminology among 
theorists has been instrumental in raising these concerns in the study of concepts, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a suitable and constructive approach to the corresponding 
controversies should allow for both positions (i.e., pragmatism and Cartesianism) to 
co-exist. 
 
(ii) Disputes about the structure of concepts. Current psychological 
theories of concepts tend to assume that concepts are a single, uniform type of mental 
representation, but there are concept theorists who think this assumption is unjustified 
(e.g., Weiskopf 2009; Machery 2009). The reason for this (or so the argument goes) is 
that none of the most prominent theories of concepts has been able to explain all the 
empirical data related to the kind of phenomena where concepts are supposed to play 
an important role. As a result of this, none of those theories can be clearly said to be 
in a better position to displace its competitors, a realisation some think is sufficient 
justification to claim that the assumption that concepts form a single, uniform kind of 
mental representation is seriously mistaken. A reaction to this impasse is the 
alternative view that some form of concept pluralism is in a better position to explain 
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the available data. According to this view, the class of concepts really comprises 
many different types of mental representations. 
Psychological theories have identified concepts with different types of mental 
structures and each of the proposed models of concepts has shown to be more suitable 
to explain certain aspects of our cognitive mind than others (see Chapter 2, section 
2.2). Hence, those theories have centred around the kind of structure that the mental 
representations involved in certain cognitive processes must have in order to account 
for certain higher cognitive competences (e.g., inference and categorisation). In this 
sense, debates about the structure of concepts (notably, whether or not concepts 
comprise a single, uniform type of mental representation) can be said to aim at 
satisfying the condition of empirical adequacy. 
Prima facie, it would appear that a pluralist theory that is able to subsume all 
the most prominent models of concepts has a clear explanatory advantage over any 
competing theories. However, the argument for concept plurality may not be very 
persuasive for someone who thinks that empirical adequacy is not the most important 
criterion relevant for both theory construction and evaluation. For instance, competing 
theories of concepts could also be assessed in terms of the extent to which they satisfy 
some non-negotiable conditions (e.g., Fodor 1998), given some preliminary 
metaphysical commitments (e.g., a commitment to a general metaphysical view of the 
mind and its working). Here, objections to a given theory regarding its empirical 
adequacy are still relevant, but they do not need to result in the conclusion that 
concept pluralism must have an inherent advantage over other less permissive theories 
when it comes to discussions on the structure of concepts. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the constraint of compositionality71 as 
an explanatory desideratum is deemed to be more important than empirical adequacy. 
Advocates of both views (i.e. uniformity and pluralism about the structure of 
concepts) have emphasised the importance of concepts in accounting for the 
productive and systematic character of thought (e.g., Fodor and Lepore 2002; 
Weiskopf 2009). They also agree that the characteristic productivity and systematicity 
                                                          
71 Roughly, ‘compositionality’ refers to the principle according to which the meaning of a thought is 
inherited from the meaning of its constituents, together with their structural arrangement. 
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of thought are two arguments for the compositionality of our mental representations.72 
However, the compositionality constraint has been particularly instrumental in the 
defence of Conceptual Atomism (e.g., Fodor 1998), and yet that is a view that many 
cognitive scientists would deem to be a non-starter. Someone might reasonably 
wonder why the compositionality constraint has not received similar attention in 
regard to other views about what concepts are. 
It should be noted that, strictly speaking, the productivity and systematicity of 
thought are a piece of evidence for the claim that thoughts are structured mental 
representations with concepts as their constituents, not for a claim about the structure 
of those constituent concepts. What this suggests is that the constraint of 
compositionality is relevant for any theory that conceives of concepts as the 
constituents of thoughts both in philosophy (e.g., Fodor 1998) and psychology (e.g., 
Carey 2009). In this sense, as it might be, the constraint of compositionality is 
relevant for practically all theories of concepts, irrespective of whether they identify 
concepts with structured or unstructured mental representations. Hence, someone 
could legitimately object that difficulties in accounting for the productivity and 
systematicity of thought are not exclusively grounds for treating models of structured 
concepts as implausible. 
However, a characterisation of concepts as the constituents of thoughts is not 
shared by all concept theorists and this lack of agreement about this characterisation 
reflects radically different views about what a theory of concepts should achieve. 
Some philosophers (e.g., Prinz 2005; Edwards 2009) have pointed out an alleged 
incompatibility between views of concepts as arbitrary symbols primarily used for 
representing categories and views of concepts as the mechanisms that allow us to 
draw inferences, recognise categories, etc. Similarly, Machery (2010) has 
controversially distinguished between two fundamentally different theoretical projects 
associated with the term ‘concept’: the first project involves an “attempt to determine 
                                                          
72 The term ‘productivity’ is used to refer to our cognitive capacity to entertain an unbounded number 
of thoughts. In turn, ‘systematicity’ is normally used to refer to two empirical facts: the first is that our 
capacity to entertain certain thoughts is intrinsically connected to our capacity to entertain certain 
others. The second is that our capacity to make certain inferences is intrinsically connected with our 
capacity to make certain others. Thus, the systematicity of our cognitive capacities would explain why 
it is unlikely that someone who is able to entertain the thought that, say, politicians sometimes behave 
like celebrities but unable to entertain the thought that celebrities sometimes behave like politicians (cf. 
our capacity to infer the thought that X from X&Y and our capacity to infer the thought Z from 
X&Y&Z). 
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the conditions under which people are able to have propositional attitudes about the 
objects of their attitudes” (p. 199) and the second involves an attempt to explain the 
mechanisms underwriting our abilities to categorise, draw inferences, etc. Given the 
way this distinction is characterised, it is unclear whether the notion of concepts as the 
constituent of thoughts is equally relevant for both theoretical projects. 
Note that the first project can be said to be consistent with the view that 
concepts are the constituents of thoughts, since the generality of intentional 
explanations of people’s behaviour 73  presupposes that the same intentional 
explanation can apply to different people because their mental states are composed of 
the same concepts (Prinz 2002, c. 1). By contrast, theories falling under the second 
theoretical project do not aim at the establishment of intentional generalisations and, 
hence, at an account of our cognitive mind where the view of concepts as thought 
constituents plays an important role. Instead, given their alternative explanatory 
targets, these theories tend to construe relations of constituency with respect to the 
posited structure of concepts (Prinz 2005). As Weiskopf (2010) has remarked, 
 
“Prototypes, exemplars, and theories are all complex representations that bear 
structural relations to their parts, over which inferences, similarity computations, and 
the like, might operate.” (p. 228). 
 
Interestingly, it is by considering the apparent incompatibility between 
theories with different explanatory targets that one can raise issues and worries about 
each of the two projects: how is it that theories that characterise concepts as the 
constituents of thoughts can accommodate available empirical findings (e.g., the role 
of prototypical representations in an account of typicality effects) supporting theories 
that characterise concepts as the mechanisms underwriting particular cognitive 
competences (e.g., categorisation)? How is it that theories of concepts aimed at 
empirical adequacy can respond to the characterisation of concepts as the constituents 
of thoughts, given their limited resources for satisfying the compositionality 
constraint? Does the explanatory relevance of constituency relations regarding the 
structure of concepts support the explanatory irrelevance of constituency relations 
                                                          
73 That is, explanations of behaviour by appealing to the causal role of mental states. 
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regarding the structure of thoughts? It is fair to say that, while the jury is still out with 
respect to issues like these, it is because theorists count on a common way of talking 
about concepts that these concerns can be raised. 
Radically different views about the goals of a theory of concepts can help 
explain the motivations underlying radically different views about the structure of 
concepts. Consider, again, concept pluralism and concept atomism as reactions to the 
limited explanatory scope of current psychological theories of concepts. Where the 
goals of a theory are motivated by the explanatory role of concepts in particular 
cognitive abilities (e.g., categorisation, inference, etc.), concept theorists can be 
justified in inferring that the class of concepts comprises many types of mental 
representations and that, perhaps, some form of concept pluralism is probably the best 
option capable of satisfying the condition of empirical adequacy. Alternatively, where 
the goals of a theory are motivated by a commitment to a certain broad metaphysical 
picture of the mind (e.g., that our mental processes take place in a system of 
representations with syntactic constituent structure), cognitive theorists can be 
justified in inferring that the class of concepts comprises a uniform type of mental 
representations and that, perhaps, some form of conceptual atomism is probably the 
best option capable of satisfying the compositionality constrain. 
In this respect, I maintain that trying to find common ground between theories 
with fundamentally different motivations is to be preferred to the destructive option of 
favouring a myopic development of just one type of theory. More importantly, there 
are no good reasons to conclude that, because different views about the structure of 
concepts (notably, uniform and non-uniform types of representations) are motivated 
by radically different assumptions about explanatory goals of a theory of concept, the 
term ‘concept’ is a bad natural kind term. 
Instead, what I suggest is that, when ‘concept’ is used as a theoretical term 
aimed at designating empirically-adequate psychological kinds (i.e., prototypes, 
exemplars and theories), a methodological application of HPCs should be favoured. 
The reason for this is that this application of HPCs is compatible with the operational 
relations of constituency that a complex mental representation is supposed to bear to 
its structural components (e.g., the statistical relation between a prototypical 
representation and the features that it might encode). Alternatively, a metaphysically-
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motivated conception of HPCs is more useful when ‘concept’ is combined with less 
empirically-adequate hypotheses about concepts. The notion of informationally-
sustained HPCs is a useful heuristic tool for exploring hypotheses about the 
compositional character of our thought processes. 
 
(iii) Psychological generalisations. Admittedly, there is a kind of general 
agreement that philosophers and psychologists do not talk about exactly the same kind 
of thing when they use the term ‘concept’ (see Chapter 5, section 4). If we take a 
closer look at the particular theories of concepts psychologists and philosophers have 
developed, one might reasonably wonder if there any two theories about concepts that 
are really about the same kind of thing. For comparative purposes, it is common 
practice to provide idealised versions of theories that attempt to do justice to the 
variety of theoretical proposals available in the literature on concepts. As you would 
expect, without a common idea of what concepts are, the question of what a good 
theory of them can explain remains just as controversial as practically anything else 
theorists might want to say about concepts. In order to explore possible answers to 
this question, it can be useful to adopt a wider perspective and try to identify where 
there can be common ground regarding the scientific study of concepts. 
Since almost every philosophical claim about concepts seems to be 
controversial (Peacocke 2009), it should come as no surprise that one of the widest 
agreements in the scientific study of concepts has nothing to do with concepts in 
particular: just as in practically any other special science (e.g., chemistry, biology, 
economics, etc.), cognitive scientists propose theories about certain particulars and 
assess those theories in the light of certain evidence typically collected by relatively 
standard procedures that the scientific community recognise as reliable. Similarly, as 
in many other sciences, cognitive scientists develop a theoretical vocabulary to 
theorise about the particulars they study and attempt to discover causally grounded 
generalisations on the assumption that the existence of those particulars is what 
justifies our scientific inferences. In this sense, the more a given particular under 
study successfully supports the discovery of scientific inductive generalisations, the 
more scientists would be justified in inferring that those particulars are candidates for 
natural kinds. What is special about the current state of cognitive science is the lack of 
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agreement about the putative nature of the mental particulars that may be involved in 
an explanation of cognition and, hence, what a good theory of these particulars should 
explain. 
As you may recall from the relevant discussion on special sciences in Chapter 
5 (section 2), the autonomy of psychology has been defended on the grounds that 
natural kind predicates in the laws of an ideally completed science of the mind are not 
reducible to the natural kind predicates in the laws of any other science. If this view is 
correct, and if psychology is to become that correct science of the mind, then it is 
reasonable to wonder about the aims of the generalisations that are interesting for 
psychology as an autonomous special science. One possible answer to this question 
stems from the programmatic consensus shared by the community of cognitive 
scientists committed to the classical symbolic/computational paradigm of cognition. 
According to this consensus, a science of mind should aim at the formulation of law-
like generalisations that count as the basis for the explanation of intelligent 
behaviours, where intelligent behaviour is roughly understood as one which is guided 
by goals and purposes (Simon and Kaplan 1989). 
At the heart of the classical paradigm of cognition is the assumption that the 
cognitive mind is an information-processing device that contains mental 
representations in virtue of whose structure information-processing is realised. 
Accordingly, if concepts are to play a role in cognition, then they must also be mental 
representations. Indeed, a general agreement within philosophy of cognitive science is 
that concepts are the basic constituents of the mental representations that are 
scientifically interesting for a science of cognition. In particular, concepts are assumed 
to be the primary bearers of the intentional contents that complex mental 
representations are the vehicles of. Hence the view that a theory of concepts is at the 
centre of a general theory of cognition. 
The importance of identifying putative natural kinds is that they could tell us 
what the laws of a given special science should govern (Dupré 2002). Thus, if a 
scientific intentional psychology is to aim at the formulation of lawlike 
generalisations that help to account for our intelligent behaviour, then a psychology of 
concepts should aim at identifying the kind of things over which those generalisations 
might quantify. Usually, the generality of intentional explanations is said to be 
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grounded in the attribution of mental states in the form of propositional attitudes (e.g., 
O believes that P; O desires P). One reason for this is that propositional attitudes are 
thought to involve the tokening of mental representations that have concepts as their 
constituents. Another reason is the assumption that concepts are capable of being 
shared. Thus, the reason why the attribution of propositional attitudes as an 
explanation of behaviour (e.g., Claudia went to the box office because she desired to 
get a ticket for tonight’s film and believed that she could buy one there) can generalise 
and subsume different people or the same person at different times (e.g., Constanza, 
Trinidad and Nico can all go to other box offices for the same reason that Claudia did) 
comes down to the fact that the concepts underwriting intentional generalizations 
must be shareable among different people and the same person at different times. For 
this reason, the shareability requirement is sometimes deemed as a core motivation for 
a theory of concepts (Edwards 2010). 
To put it in more general terms, intentional generalisations in psychology 
generalize over content-bearing intentional states. If such generalizations are to be 
possible at all, then we must be able to represent intentional states which have the 
same content in a potentially endless number of different agents and situations. Our 
way of attributing these contents is by shared human concepts. Note that the same 
can’t be done in the case of other species, precisely because we cannot justify the 
assumption of shared concepts. The intentional explanations we sometimes attribute 
to the behaviour of our pets (e.g., explanations of why a dog is pawing at the earth in 
attempt to get a bone) are typically anthropocentric, in that they really reflect the kind 
of explanations we would give of the behaviour of agents like us if they were acting 
like our pets normally do. 
However, such motivation for a theory of concepts might not be relevant for a 
concept theorist who is not committed to the view that psychological generalisations 
involve intentional explanations. Similarly, as it might be, the shareability 
requirement may very well be acknowledged as a concern for a theory of concepts 
that is not aimed at supporting intentional generalisations (e.g., Carey 1985). Indeed, 
current theorising about concepts in psychology does not seem to be motivated by the 
programmatic consensus of classical Cognitive Science mentioned above. Or else, the 
motivation is something like a re-interpretation of that consensus. In this re-
interpretation, psychological generalisations are about intelligent behaviour as long as 
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intelligent behaviour can be analysed in terms of some set of higher cognitive 
competences, notably categorisation. Indeed, to an important extent, the current 
psychology of concepts based on this re-interpretation of the consensus seems to 
straightforwardly reduce to the psychology of categorisation. As Prinz (2002) puts it, 
“psychologists typically postulate concepts to explain categorization” (p. 272). 
Machery (2010) goes on to characterise the current motivation for a theory of 
concepts in the following way:  
 
Why do cognitive scientists want a theory of concepts? Theories of concepts are 
meant to explain the properties of our cognitive competences. People categorize the 
way they do, they draw the inductions they do, and so on, because of the properties of 
the concepts they have. (p. 199) 
 
The contrast between the different motivations for a theory of concepts I have 
described is probably best described in terms of a transition from a focus on 
intentional generalisations to a focus on models of categorisation. Intentional 
generalisations can be said to be aimed at a kind of ‘hard’ causally grounded 
generalisation, in that they are committed to the formulation of lawlike 
generalisations. By contrast, the causally-grounded psychological generalisations 
relevant for the development of models of categorisation are ‘soft’, in that their 
relevant casual factors are modified strictly in terms of what the available evidence 
dictates. 
As might be expected, my suggestion is that the term ‘concept’ can apply to 
both metaphysically-motivated HPCs that are postulated to formulate ‘hard’ causally 
grounded generalisations and methodologically-motivated HPCs that are postulated to 
support ‘soft’ causally grounded generalisations. 
 
2.4. Machery’s heterogeneous BoKs re-interpreted 
Finally, we are now in a position to suggest a relevant reinterpretation of the 
type of HPCs that the notions of prototype, exemplar and theory are supposed to pick 
out. In Machery’s view, the claim that the taxonomical term ‘concept’ is empty 
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derives from the realisation that prototypes, exemplars and theories can be 
characterised as three distinct HPCs. In my view, the same realisation does not entail 
the claim that the term ‘concept’ is empty since those three HPCs are compatible with 
the probable existence of computationally sustained HPCs that are not concepts. I 
ground this view on the acceptance of two empirical claims. The first claim is that 
computationally sustained HPCs satisfy the traditional formality condition of the 
classical paradigm of Cognitive Science according to which our mental processes are 
defined over the structure of our mental representations. If this is correct, then it is 
plausible to think that they support some sort of “null hypothesis” according to which 
the view that there are prototypes, exemplars and theories does not challenge the 
existence of traditional syntactic representations.74 The reason for this is that it is 
plausible that the information typically associated with those three constructs is 
related to the content, not the form, of already interpreted Upper-MRs (notably, 
thoughts about prototypical or particular dogs). The second claim involves a particular 
characterisation of the distinction between constitutive and background knowledge. 
It is reasonable to think that, together with the tokening of some particular 
mental representation, certain concomitant activation of Upper-MR-based inferential 
processes takes place. Suppose concept C corresponds to some type of mental 
representation that we are using in certain cognitive processes in a given situation, 
such as, for example, when we communicate some C-involving thoughts to someone 
else in a given context. The suggestion is that we should interpret whatever context-
independent information that concept C bears when we use it to communicate with 
others as knowledge that is constitutive of C. Alternatively, the context-dependent 
information about C contained in those Upper-MRs involved in concomitant 
inferential processes should be interpreted as background knowledge.75 Given this 
characterisation of constitutive and background knowledge, I suggest that we identify 
prototypes, exemplars and theories with the type of computationally sustained HPCs 
that concomitant inferential processes bring to bear in the form of certain 
systematically organised background knowledge. For example, if CAT is a concept, 
then CAT-prototypes, CAT-exemplars and CAT-theories might correspond to 
                                                          
74 This claim is motivated by the characterisation Pylyshyn (2002) provides of a “null hypothesis” with 
respect to imaged-based reasoning. 
75  Cf. Machery’s alternative characterisation of the distinction between ‘invariantism’ and 
‘contextualism’ (Machery 2015). 
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interpreted Upper-MRs encoding information about what we know (or believe) about 
cats.76 The systematic role of these Upper-MRs in categorisation tasks as informed by 
empirical data suggests that they are legitimate psychological HPCs.  
I have objected to the claim that these types of HPCs can replace the role 
concepts are expected to play in the explanation of cognition (see Chapters 3 and 4), 
but there is significant empirical evidence to support the claim that they play an 
important role in certain higher cognitive processes, notably categorisation. In this 
sense, I agree with Machery that the most prominent theories of concepts fail to 
provide a good model of concepts but I disagree that this is good reason to say that the 
notion of concept is scientifically idle. 
It is better to say that, whereas an EYE-prototype, an EYE-exemplar and an 
EYE-theory are (empirically adequate) natural-kind terms relevant for supporting 
scientifically-interesting inductions about our capacity for categorising (what we take 
to be) members of the category of eyes, the concept EYE is a (metaphysically-
motivated) natural-kind term that accounts for the truth maker of those inductions 
(i.e., inductions about categorisations are true, depending on whether or not an object 
categorised as eye is a token of the concept EYE). In a recent publication, Barrett 
(2015) introduces his discussion of concepts by pointing out that: 
 
There are concepts that all of us probably share at least in some way, such as the 
concepts PERSON, FOOD, MOTHER, WATER, and EYE. These concepts are not 
necessarily carbon-copy identical in everyone who possesses them; an 
ophthalmologist’s concept EYE, for example, may differ substantially from that of a 
nonexpert. (p. 151) 
 
In this passage, Barrett seems to overlook (or, perhaps, disregard) the 
distinction I have just made between the concept of X and what we know about the 
things that tokens of X represent. Bearing this distinction in mind, here is a possible 
reinterpretation of the quote above. First, what all of us probably share at least in 
some way is the very concept EYE (or PERSON, FOOD, MOTHER, WATER, etc.). 
EYE is an informationally-sustained HPC that supports inductive generalisations 
                                                          
76  Some (e.g., Laurence and Margolis 1999) have gone on to suggest that a concept might have 
different kinds of structure (e.g., an atomic and various other kinds of structures) involved in the 
explanation of different psychological processes. 
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regarding the intentional explanations where that concept is involved. Second, what 
we do not share in terms of carbon-copy identical representations is what we know (or 
believe) about the things that tokens of EYE represent. Different interpreted 
computationally-sustained HPCs (e.g., Upper-MRs encoding information about 
prototypical eyes, particular eyes or causal-explanatory knowledge about eyes) can 
account for the concomitant systematic role of our background knowledge about the 
things in the extension of EYE. This background knowledge, as opposed to the 
concept EYE, is not the same in different contexts because, while we can all share the 
same concept, we never share exactly the same knowledge about the things that the 
tokens of that concept represent. Presumably, experts are in a better position to 
categorise things as eyes (e.g., the strange multiple eyes of some insects, perhaps even 
eyes of some creatures from outer space) because of the projectibility of their 
informed inductive generalisations about the members of the category of eyes. 
Finally, this does not mean that the ophthalmologist’s concept EYE “differs 
substantially” from that of a nonexpert, because generalisations with respect to our 
capacities to categorise things as eyes and generalisations about the concept EYE are 
about different types of HPCs. In this sense, the fact the prototypes, exemplars and 
theories pick out HPCs that are relevant for categorisation does not challenge the 
scientific relevance of the term ‘concept’ because this term designates a different HPC 
in its own right. 
 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
The present thesis has aimed to challenge what is currently the most prominent 
eliminativist proposal regarding concepts and, as a result of that, defend the 
theoretical relevance of the term ‘concept’. In order to accomplish this project, I have 
organised this work in three main stages. 
In the first stage (Chapter 1), I explored different prominent eliminativist 
projects and showed that there are different ways of being an eliminativist regarding 
some type thing. In particular, eliminativists tend to advance arguments where a 
certain candidate for eliminativism (say, e.g., X, Y or Z) is said to fail to meet some 
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kind of conditions for theoretical or explanatory adequacy (say, e.g., X is theoretically 
inadequate due to the violation of certain metaphysical principle; Y is theoretically 
inadequate because it has no definite analysis; Z is theoretically inadequate because it 
is ontologically redundant). Accordingly, a general taxonomy was proposed, 
consisting of different categories and subcategories of eliminativist arguments and 
different categories of eliminativist claims (see Chapter 1, table 1). Relevant for the 
subsequent stages of the thesis, the proposed taxonomy allowed for the 
characterisation of a type of eliminativist projects that centres on the role of concepts 
that do not clearly designate a single class of things. 
In the second stage (Chapters 2-4), I challenged the viability of what is 
currently the most prominent eliminativist proposal regarding concepts. In Chapter 2, 
I begin by providing an overview of the classical (or definitional) theory of concepts 
and the most prominent accounts of concepts that psychologists have developed as a 
reaction to that classical view. These alternative accounts identify concepts with one 
of three types of mental representations, namely, prototypes, exemplars and theories. 
Examining the main features and problems of each of these three types of theories 
allowed us to illustrate that their most serious challenges have a common origin, viz. 
the assumption that the way to individuate a concept is in virtue of its relations to 
other concepts. With this consideration in mind, Chapters 3 and 4 mount a direct 
attack on the type of concept eliminativism advocated by Machery. Thus, in Chapter 
3, I take issue with Machery’s general argument against the term ‘concept’, according 
to which cognitive scientists should abandon this term because it fails to pick out a 
natural kind (according to some conception of natural kinds) and keeping it would 
prevent scientific progress. Contrary to Machery, I argue both that this argument fails 
and that we should reject the elimination of concepts from the theoretical jargon of 
cognitive science. I offer two main reasons for this. On the one hand, Machery’s 
theoretical framework for conceptual heterogeneity not only inherits many of the 
same problems facing the theories of concepts that Machery criticizes, but also 
introduces new problems that render his eliminativist proposal less viable. On the 
other, a reconstruction of a version of his argument bearing upon his so-called 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis allows to reveal an unwarranted assumption, namely, that 
an adequate theory of concepts must be committed to the view that concepts are some 
kind of complex mental representation. Chapter 4 goes on to contend that Machery’s 
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alternative to concepts is significantly ill-equipped to solve the problem of intentional 
content. I argue that this is good reason to support the claim that eliminating the 
theoretical term ‘concept’, as opposed to keeping it, encumbers scientific progress. 
In the final stage (Chapters 5-6), I advance a defence of the theoretical notion 
of concept by sketching an approach to natural kinds suitable for the current state of 
scientific immaturity of the study of cognition. Chapter 5 addresses the problem of 
natural kindness in philosophy of science with a focus on the study of concepts and 
attempts to characterise the sources of two apparent incompatible perspectives (or 
attitudes) towards natural kinds which I dub AUSTERE and INDULGENT, 
respectively. These perspectives are made manifest in the form of opposing attitudes 
with respect to a motley collection of background assumptions constraining the 
theorising about natural kinds (either explicitly or not). I argue that these attitudes 
amount to a set of unproductive tensions which demand some important reappraisal. 
This reappraisal should allow for a more productive approach to natural kinds 
regarding the study of concepts, namely one in which the advantages typically 
associated to one of the mentioned attitudes (i.e., AUSTERE or INDULGENT 
attitudes) are not viewed as a challenge for the other. 
Consistent with these considerations, the present conclusion chapter has 
sketched a proposal regarding theoretical terms in cognitive science relevant for the 
task of identifying putative natural kinds and lawlike generalisations about them. 
According to this proposal, a suitable approach to natural kinds in a highly immature 
science of the mind must allow for the co-existence of different models of concepts 
and attitudes towards the study of concepts. I maintain that those otherwise opposing 
positions can productively fall under the qualified application of a single general 
conception of natural kinds, without disregarding their diverse motivations and 
explanatory interests. What I have specifically defended is a combined perspective on 
the notion of a concept as a natural-kind term, whereby the notion of Homeostatic 
Property Clusters can be heuristically applied both as per AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT in order to identify putative natural kinds designated by the term 
‘concept’. 
In this sense, the main contribution of the current work is that the view of 
scientifically relevant terms I favour not only undermines the premature elimination 
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of the notion of a concept, but it also offers common methodological space for issues 
raised by otherwise irreconcilable positions within philosophy of cognitive science, as 
those motivated by the several tensions characterised in terms of the AUSTERE and 
INDULGENT distinction.  
Admittedly, the defence of the term ‘concept’ I have explored in this thesis is 
based on an approach to natural kindness (relevant for cognitive science) that is in 
need of further refinement. Future research may explore standards for the elimination 
of vague or imprecise theoretical terms in the context of the current state of 
development of cognitive science and, I believe, the proposed conception of natural 
kinds may subserve that purpose. For example, as I have pointed out, a vast amount of 
empirical evidence suggests that the notions of ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’ and ‘theory’ 
designate putative psychological kinds that play some interesting role in certain 
cognitive processes. However, theorists have proposed different theories of each of 
those notions. Since there isn’t a clear consensus about which of the several theories 
of prototypes (or exemplars or theories) is to prevail over the others, Heterogeneity 
Eliminativism regarding the term ‘prototype’ (or ‘exemplar’ or ‘theory’) might apply. 
On pain of indiscriminate and unproductive eliminativism within a highly immature 
science of the mind, it is of paramount importance that we can figure out some 
minimum standards for the theoretical adequacy and elimination of core terms in 
cognitive science. Until those standards are worked out, it is safest to count on a 
theoretical vocabulary that not only supports further scientific progress in the study of 
concepts, but is also suited to resist the risks of hasty scientific elimination motivated 
by standards that may be irrelevant for a developing science of the mind. The goal of 
this thesis has been to show both that doing psychology without the term ‘concept’ is 
not an option and to propose a conception of theoretical terms that allows for further 
investigation into the role of concepts in our mental life. 
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